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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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Introduction

International relations, or international politics, is not merely a field of study at university but is an integral facet of our (increasingly international) day to day lives. We all live in a world where it is not possible to isolate our experiences from an international dimension. If a Indian student and American student watches Majid Majid's *Children of Heaven* (Iranian film) they are both learning about and participating in a culture different from their own. If a student flies from India to London they are subject to international air space agreements and contributing to global warming. Whether we work for an Indian Organization or International Multinational Company, or even if you work for a locally based company, all these companies will have to adhere to the international trading norms. Hence, the contemporary international relations continue to impact our lives. Studying international relations or politics enables us to better comprehend the information we receive daily from newspapers, television, radio, internet or social media.

People not only live in villages and towns, but form part of the wider networks that constitute regions, nations and states. As members of the global community, we have to be equally aware of both our rights and our responsibilities – and should be capable of engaging in important debates concerning the major issues facing the international community. Our requirement to understand the world has phenomenally increased in present times because of the growing interconnectedness not only across the regions, but socially and intellectually as well.

The syllabus of this paper is intended to cover most of the important aspects related to academic study of international relations. It is so comprehensive that it covers the disciplinary growth, methodological issues, impotent theoretical aspects, concepts and issues related to contemporary international relations.

Directorate of Distance Education, University of Jammu, M.A. Political Science, Semester-I, International Politics : Theory and Issues.

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**1.1 CHANGING DYNAMICS OF STATE SYSTEM IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: FROM EMPIRES TO
NATION-STATE TO GLOBALIZATION**

-V. Nagendra Rao

STRUCTURE

1.1.0 Objectives

1.1.1 Introduction

1.1.2 Evolution of State System

1.1.2.1 The Pre-Westphalian World

1.1.2.2 Treaty of Westphalia: Emergence of Modern State
System

1.1.3 Expansion of State System

1.1.4 The Changing Dynamics of State

1.1.5 State and Globalization

1.1.5.1 Critics of Globalization View

1.1.6 Summing Up

1.1.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to:

- Understand how the state system evolved in Europe
- Know how it has expanded to other parts of the world
- Comprehend the changes to the state system over the period
- Familiar with the globalization and its influence on state system

1.1.1 INTRODUCTION

We all know that the entire population of the world is divided into separate territorial political communities, or what we call independent 'states'. All these states together form an international system that is becoming global in extent. At present there are almost 200 independent states. Every person on earth with very few exceptions not only lives in one of those countries but is also a citizen of one of them and very rarely of more than one.

Since we all inhabit one state or the other, it is easy to assume that the states are permanent features and that they have always been and will always exist. This assumption is false. We need to keep in mind that the state system is a historical institution, evolved over the period and still evolving. It has been formed by certain people at a certain time. It is a social organization. Like all social structures, the state system has advantages and disadvantages which change over time.

The state is the formal amalgamation of a community into an entity which can formulate policies and make decisions through its government, and carry out its decisions by means of compulsory measures, the law. The state differs from all other associations, as its membership is mandatory. It follows that the rules formulated by the government are binding on all persons, whether they consent to these rules or not.

The state, the basic unit of our modern global state system, remains to be a complex political and legal concept of crucial importance in the study of

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international relations. According to the classic definition of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) a state should possess (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) government capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and (4) of conducting international relations with other states.

However, in close observation we come to know that there is an enormous variation in contemporary international relations in the degree to which states meet these criteria. For example, many states struggle to maintain effective sovereign control over even part of their defined territory. Some states do not have a monopoly of control of the armed force within their frontiers and find themselves confronted by civil wars and insurgencies, which leave whole areas of their countries under the International Relations control of rebel leaders and war lords (for example, Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Colombia, Somalia, and Sudan). Despite experiencing such fundamental challenges to their sovereignty, this kind of states still receive international recognition, sign agreements with other states, send their representatives to the United Nations and other international bodies, and enjoy the full membership of the global community of states.

Thus, the state is central to the study of international relations and will remain so in the predictable future. State policy is the most common element of analysis. States decide in going for a war, imposing trade barriers, and have an option to choose at what level to establish environmental standards. States decide on their entry into an international agreements, or not, and choose whether to abide by their provisions, or not. Thus, International Relations as a discipline is primarily concerned with what states do on the world stage and, in turn, how their actions affect other states. Hence, the State remains to be the primary unit for many theories of International Relations. Hence, both as the object and as a unit of analysis, international relations are largely about states.

1.1.2 EVOLUTION OF STATE SYSTEM

There were no visibly identifiable sovereign states before the sixteenth century, when they first began to be instituted in Western Europe. But for the past three

or four centuries, the state system got institutionalized across the world. The epoch of the sovereign state corresponds with the modern age of expanding power, prosperity, knowledge, science, technology, literacy, urbanization, citizenship, freedom, equality, rights, etc.

Modern state system in its true sense in Europe began with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) which marked the end of the Thirty Years War. In this section, we will first look at the pre 1648 world and then proceed towards the post-Westphalian world as well as Europe of the nineteenth century, and finally the major transitions in the twentieth century. The rationale of this historical overview is to trace significant trends related to the evolution of state and its sovereignty over a period of time.

1.1.2.1 The Pre-Westphalian World: Greece and the City-State System

The first and clear historical manifestation of a state system is that of ancient Greece. (500 BC – 100 BC). It comprised a large number of small city-states. But they were not modern sovereign states with extensive territories. The Greeks engaged in classic power politics. As the militaries of the great city-states struggled, states carried on economic relations and trade with each other to an unprecedented degree. This environment fostered the flowering of the strong philosophical tradition of Plato and Aristotle.

Rome: Governing of an Empire

Many of the Greek city-states were eventually destroyed and got incorporated into the Roman Empire (100 B.C. – 400AD) making the Roman Empire as the precursor for larger political systems. Its leaders imposed order and unity by force on a large geographic stretch—covering much of Europe, the Mediterranean portions of Asia, the Middle East, and northern Africa. After conquering different regions and diverse peoples, the Roman emperors were preoccupied with controlling various units—tribes, kingdoms, and states—within their sphere of influence and ensuring that the fluid borders of the empire remained secure from the north and east. Indeed, the word ‘empire’ itself emerged from the Roman

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experience, having the root word *imperium* in Latin. The emperors imposed different forms of government, from Roman proconsuls to local bureaucrats and administrators.

The Medieval Europe


When the Roman Empire got disintegrated in the fifth century A.D., power and authority became decentralized in Europe, but other forms of interaction flourished—travel, commerce, and communication, not just among the elites but also among traders and ordinary citizens. By 1000 A.D. three civilizations had emerged from the ruins of Rome. One among them, the Arabic civilization, had the largest geographic area, stretching from the Middle East and Persia through North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula. United under the religious and political domination of the Islamic Caliphate, the Arabic language, and advanced mathematical and technical accomplishments, the Arabic civilization was potent force. Second the Byzantine Empire located near the core of the old Roman Empire in Constantinople and united by Christianity. Third was the rest of the Europe, where with the demise of the Roman Empire, central authority went missing, languages and culture proliferated, and the networks of communication and transportation that were developed by the Romans were disintegrating.

A major part of Western Europe reverted to feudal principalities, controlled by lords and tied to fiefdoms that had the authority to increase taxes and exercise legal authority. Lords exercised control over vassals, who worked for the lords in return for the right to work on the land and acquire protection. Feudalism, which placed authority in private hands, could be seen as a response to the prevailing disorder. Power and authority were situated at different overlapping levels.

The prominent institution in the medieval period was the church; virtually all other institutions were local in origin and practice. Thus, authority was located either in Rome (or in its agents, the bishops) or in the local fiefdom. This incongruity – the desire on the part of the church for universalism versus the medieval reality of small, fragmented, diverse authorities – continued throughout

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the medieval period.



The medieval era was one of considerable confusion, disorder, conflict and violence which emanated from this lack of clear lines of territorial political organization and control. Often wars were fought between feudal and local lords and rival groups.

The Late Medieval Period: Developing Transnational Networks

After 1000 A.D., secular trends began to weaken both the churches' and local feudal lords' authority. Trade and commerce expanded into larger areas, as merchants traded along safer transportation routes. All forms of communication improved. New technology, such as water mills and wind mills, not only made daily life easier but also provided the basic infrastructure to support agrarian economies.

These economic and technological changes resulted in fundamental changes in social relations too. A new group of individuals emerged—an inter-nation business community—whose interests extended beyond its immediate region. The group acquired more cosmopolitan experiences outside the purview of the church

and its teachings. The individual members developed new interests in literature, art, philosophy and history, acquiring economic wealth along the way. They believed in themselves, becoming the individualists and humanists of the Renaissance.

During the 1500s and 1600s the old Europe still remained unsettled. In some key locales such as France, Spain and England, feudalism was replaced by an increasingly centralized monarchy. These new monarchies used the armies to consolidate their power internally and conquer more territory. Other parts, of Europe were caught-up by the secular-versus-religious controversy, and Christianity itself was torn by the Catholic and Protestant split. In 1648, that controversy moved slowly its way towards resolution.

1.1.2.2 Treaty of Westphalia: Emergence of Modern State System

The Thirty Years War (1618-48) devastated Europe; the armies plundered the Central European landscape, fought battles, and survived by ravaging the civilian population. The war finally ended with the treaty of Westphalia, which not only ended the conflict but also had a profound impact on the practice of international relations. First, the Treaty of Westphalia embraced the notion of sovereignty. The Holy Roman emperor was dead. Monarchs in the West realized that religious conflicts had to be stopped, so they agreed not to fight on behalf of either Catholicism or Protestantism. Instead, the monarchs gained the authority to choose the version of Christianity for his or her people. This meant that monarchs, and not the church, had religious authority over their population. This new development emphasised the acceptance of sovereignty—that the sovereign has exclusive rights within a given territory. With the power of the pope and the emperor stripped, the notion of the territorial state was accepted.

Secondly, the newly emerged leaders had also understood the negative and violent effects of mercenaries fighting wars. Thus, after the Treaty of Westphalia, the leaders sought to establish their own permanent national militaries. The growth of such forces led to centralized control, as the state had to collect taxes to pay for these militaries and the leaders assumed absolute control over the troops, the state with a national army emerged, its sovereignty was acknowledged, and its secular

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internal disorder and external threat. Peasants too gradually, reduced their dependence on local feudal rulers to become the direct subjects of the King: they eventually became 'the people'.

The political change from medieval to modern thus basically involved the construction of the independent territorial state. The state captured its territory and turned it into state property, and it captured the population of that territory and turned them into subjects and later citizens. In short, territory is not only consolidated but also unified and centralized under a sovereign government. All institutions are now subordinated to state authority and public law.

The budding state system had several prominent characteristics which can be summarized as follows. First, it consisted of neighbouring states whose legitimacy and independence was mutually recognized. Second, the recognition of states did not extend outside of the European state system. For example, the political systems in Asia and Africa were not members of the state system. These political systems were regarded as politically inferior by Europeans and in due course most of them were subordinated to European imperial rule. Third, the relations between European states were subjected to international law and diplomatic practices. In other words, they were expected to observe the rules of the international game. Lastly, there was a balance of power between states which was intended to prevent any state from getting out of control and making a successful bid for hegemony which would in effect re-establish an empire over the continent.

1.1.3 EXPANSION OF THE STATE SYSTEM

One of the interesting features of the World in the Nineteenth century was while Europeans resisted empire in Europe, at the very same time they also constructed vast overseas empires by which they controlled political communities in the rest of the world. The Western states that could not dominate each other succeeded in dominating much part of the rest of the world both politically and economically. This way the external control of the non-European world by European powers started in the beginning of the early modern era in the Sixteenth century, alongside the emerging of European state system. It lasted till the middle of the twentieth

century, when the last non-Western peoples finally broke free of Western colonialism and acquired their political independence. The fact that Western states were never able to dominate each other but were capable of dominating almost everybody else has been vitally important in shaping the modern international system. This global dominance and supremacy of the West is important for understanding IR even today.

The first stage of the internationalization of the state system took place through the incorporation of non-Western states that could not be colonized by the West. Not every non-European country came under the political control of a Western imperial state. At the same time, the countries that escaped colonization were still obliged to accept the rules of the Western state system. The Ottoman Empire (Turkey) is one example; it was forced to accept those rules by the Treaty of Paris in 1854. Japan is another example. Similarly, China was forced to accept the rules of the European state system during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. China was not fully recognized as an independent power until 1945.

The second stage of the internationalization of the state system was brought about via anti-colonialism by the colonial subjects of Western empires. By the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century national sentiment was stirring within many colonial possessions, even if these claims would not come to realization until after 1945. In the nineteenth century both Italy and Germany became unified national states, and nationalist sentiment was on the rise within the Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Empires. Greece gained independence from the latter in the 1820s, and Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria followed suit later in the century. World War I gave the final blow to these Empires. As the conflict drew to a close, a number of groups claimed independent statehood, including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland. Others such as Hungary and Turkey, which had been at the core of Empires, were also recognized as sovereign states within newly demarcated boundaries.

Just as World War I brought the European and Ottoman Empires to an end, so too World War II contributed to the collapse of colonial Empires in Asia and Africa. Claims by non-Western peoples to the right to self-determination were rejected after

World War I, but after 1945 they pressed their claims more vigorously. Though some colonial powers (e.g. the Dutch in what was to become Indonesia) resisted these claims, the legitimacy of this form of rule no longer held.

While it is hard to generalize about such a large number of states, these state builders faced a number of different tasks under very different conditions from the ones that were faced by the early state builders. They inherited the domestic institutions that were often inappropriate and faced with the challenge of governing the states that existed territorially and legally. Once the euphoria of independence had passed, these states encountered the problem of maintaining a legitimate central authority and, often, a lack of state capacity. As Tilly and Spruyt point out, these institutional structures came to characterize Western European states developed over a number of centuries as rulers gradually conceded authority to their subjects and refrained from overt coercion, recognizing that this would undermine their legitimacy. States that came into existence in the twentieth century entered into a very different environment, where external military support could mitigate against claims for democratic government and the need to maintain legitimacy. As the ongoing processes of democratization in many states, was fragile and contested as they are, demonstrate, institutional development on the scale of states takes time, and there is no guarantee that democratic, representative institutions will be the outcome everywhere.

In the post-Cold War era the world witnessed yet another phase of state formation as the Soviet Union collapsed, followed by the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the peaceful ‘velvet divorce’ of the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

From this brief overview it is clear that in the recent past, the state formation has taken place under very different conditions to those of the first phase. The early state makers not only ‘made’ their states, as they jostled for position against one another they contributed to the creation of the international realm into which later states entered at independence. Thus, as we have seen, in the early, mid, and late twentieth century new states arrived into an increasingly more institutionalized international environment and were constituted according to

dominant norms within this system. Such norms can of course be challenged or revised, as the story of the changing content of self-determination in the wake of the two World Wars and the delegitimation of colonialism demonstrates.

What this should alert us to is that while we may identify many similarities between states at the international level, we should also be sensitive to the different conditions under which they were constituted and what this means for their current functioning, both domestic and international. This is not an evolutionary argument that there is a single path that all states must pass through. On the contrary, it is a call to recognize that legal recognition as a state (or juridical sovereignty) is an important part of the story. However, states have different histories and varying capacities for empirical sovereignty, for the capacity to function effectively at the domestic as well as the international level. Understanding the relationship between states and their societies becomes important in this context as well. The issue that highlights many of these problems is breakdown of contemporary state and various forms of humanitarian intervention.

To sum up, today the state system is a global institution that affects the lives of virtually everybody whether they realize it or not. It means more than ever, today IR is a universal academic subject. It also means that international politics of the twenty-first century must accommodate a variety of states which are far more complex and different—in terms of their cultures, religions, languages, ideologies, forms of government, governance mechanisms, military capacity, technological sophistication, levels of economic development, etc.—than ever before. This marks a fundamental change in the state system and a fundamental challenge for international relations scholars to theorize.

1.1.4 THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF STATE

The concepts of state, sovereignty and territory are vital to the study and practice of international relations. For generations of scholars, the concept of state has been the principal subject and unit of analysis in international politics. The

principle of sovereignty has provided one of the central bases for order in international relations, mainly in its codified form since the end of the Thirty Years War. Disputes over territory or struggles over territorial control have figured virtually in every major inter-state war of the past hundred years.

However, forms of state, meanings of sovereignty and conceptions of territoriality are neither fixed nor constant across time and place. The absolutist states of the seventeenth century are profoundly different from the liberal states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The meaning of the sovereignty of states that prevailed prior to the French Revolution bears only a limited resemblance to the application and assertions of sovereignty today. The formidably armed territorial boundaries that separated and defined the major states of Europe throughout most of the twentieth century were fundamentally redefined within the European Union by the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Hence, one of the important challenges for scholars of international relations is to identify multiple meanings of territory, state, sovereignty and political system, and to understand their origins, comprehend the changes in meaning, analyze their interrelationships, and characterize their transformations. The purpose of this section is to illustrate important changes in the meaning of these central concepts over the course of twentieth century and to suggest some ways of thinking about them.

State and sovereignty are mutually constitutive concepts. As F.H. Hinsley reminds us, 'In a word, the origin and history of the concept of sovereignty are closely linked with the nature, the origin and the history of the state'. Through their engagement in practices of mutual recognition, states define the meaning of sovereignty for themselves and others. At the same time, the mutual recognition of claims of sovereignty is an important element in the definition of the state itself (although there is a school of thought within international law which maintains that states can exist without formal recognition by other states). Both the concepts of state and sovereignty also have territorial conceptions associated with them. The idealized, Westphalian state has discrete boundaries, and the Westphalian ideal

of sovereignty stresses the principle of the sacredness of those borders.

The modern state and sovereignty have been co-determinative since their common origins as concepts and associated practices in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But while they have always been closely associated, they have not remained constant or been mutually constitutive in the same ways over time. That is, different forms of state have constituted different meanings of sovereignty and been associated with different conceptions of territoriality over time and across place.

The literature on the nature of the state typically differentiates between its origins and absolutist forms in the sixteenth century and the variation in its modern forms. This includes variations from the era of popular sovereignty to the nineteenth-century liberal state, the twentieth-century totalitarian state, and what some have described as the late twentieth-century 'post modern' state. Perry Anderson has recorded the origins and functions of the absolutist state, while Charles Tilly, Anthony Giddens and Michael Mann have each described the role of war in the making of the modern state. Douglass North has emphasized the critical role of early state in the establishment and enforcement of property rights, central to the development of capitalism. The relationship between the absolutist state and the origins and functioning of the classical European balance of power system has also been examined extensively in the scholarly literature. The absolutist nature of the state in the sixteenth and seventeenth century was highly correlated with the diplomatic practices of the period, especially the ease with which diplomats and heads of state were able to settle disputes with the division, re-division and allocation of territory. This absolutist residue is a characteristic of the balance of power system that has troubled democratic leaders of the liberal state all through the twentieth century. Woodrow Wilson detested the political immorality of the balance of power system prevalent at the beginning of the twentieth century and favoured open diplomacy to secrecy, and self-determination over the 'unconscionable bartering of helpless and innocent peoples'. The tension between the frequently illiberal practices of balance of power diplomacy and the tendencies of democratic liberal states has persisted throughout the twentieth century.

It is one thing to establish changes in the form, meaning and conceptualization of the state over time, but yet another to establish its implications for our analysis and understanding of international relations. The basic affinities between the absolutist state and the operation of the classical European balance of power system have already been suggested. Martin Wight identified relationships between the emergence of other forms of state – revolutionary, democratic state forms – and the international systems that developed in later periods. More recently, Mlada Bukovansky has illustrated how the French and American revolutions produced new forms of state which challenged the dynastic principles that governed the international system during the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. These were the principles that have been derived from, and in many ways continuation of, the principles associated historically with the absolutist state. However, the enlightenment ideas played a vital role in the transformation of the state and of the international political culture that was shaped and formed by state interactions.

We can also illustrate the importance of changes in the meaning of states with more contemporary examples drawn exclusively from the twentieth century. The great powers (and their imitators) were more than mere states or nation-states at the beginning of the century: they were empires. It was not until the middle of the twentieth century that the nation-state form was actually globalized, following the break-up of formal empires and the transformative process of decolonization. By the century's end, we had evidence of both 'failed' states in Africa and the emergence of a distinctly different polity (or a potential 'superstate') in Europe. Thus, while states remained central to international politics throughout the course of the twentieth century, the meaning of 'state' has not remained fixed in time or place.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, empires were the 'natural' form of state for the great powers. The British, French, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires governed most of the world, while Germany, Japan and the United States aspired for the empires of their own. According to J.A. Hobson, it

was an era ‘of competitive forms of imperialism’. World maps reflected empires as the principal units in territorial terms, and the language of geopolitics and imperialism tended to take the imperial state for granted. Advocates of imperial expansion, from Jules Ferry in France to Cecil Rhodes in England, asserted the economic, political and strategic benefits of imperialism, along with the moral imperative of assuming ‘the selfless burden of empire’. Imperial expansion was natural and smooth, with a primacy given to the physical occupation and possession of territory. The ‘hierarchy of civilizations’ ensured that the world was very much a European world (with Europe on top), and there was widespread belief in the benefits to be derived from the historically progressive aggregation of political units, from nations to states to empires. Adam Watson has described this in terms of ‘the worldwide expansion of European international society’.

The beginning of the twentieth century also saw the surfacing of mass politics, and increasingly, at least in some parts of the world, the emergence of mass, democratic politics. As urbanization and industrialization both advanced, labour became increasingly mobilized and eventually became a political force that generated reform movements within liberal democratic states, and revolutionary upheavals in more autocratic places like Russia and China. Similar forms of mass mobilization and proto-nationalist movements began to emerge throughout the colonial possessions of the empires by 1920s, from Africa and South Asia, to the Middle East and East Asia. It was the presence of these movements for reform and self-determination, in combination with the great world wars of the twentieth century that lead eventually to the demise of the imperial form of the twentieth-century state.

The primacy of the nation-state form is most strikingly apparent during the middle years of the twentieth century, from the 1930s through the 1970s. The ‘welfare state’, the ‘territorial state’, the ‘national security state’, and the ‘developmental state’ are all prominent constructs of the middle part of the twentieth century. The decolonization process following the Second World War distributed the nation-state form throughout the territories of the former colonial empires. By the middle of the twentieth century, virtually all the empires demised, and the world was increasingly

divided into nation-states. These new states contained more than one nation and new 'nation-building' efforts predominated.

One way to illustrate the change in the meaning of the state in the twentieth century is to examine changing norms about the legitimate role of the state, both in the economy and in the provision of security. Between the First and the Second World Wars, there was a genuine contestation between radically different alternative political forms of the state, from the welfare-nationalist state to the alternatives of the fascist state and the socialist state. Each of these three different state forms entailed substantial increases in the degree of the state's intervention in the economy. It was not until the end of the twentieth century that there were significant initiatives to reverse the degree of state economic intervention in the economy.

Another indication of the preponderance of the nation-state form at the middle of the twentieth century is contained in the Charter of the United Nations. The UN Charter is founded on the defence of the inviolable norm of non-intervention into the affairs of member nation-states, inscribed in Article II, Chapter 7 of the Charter. The United Nations as an institution has, since its creation in 1945, been robustly associated with asserting the rights and defending the concerns of its member states. It is a greatly statist institution. Although the nation-state form was universalized during the middle part of the twentieth century, not every observer viewed this development as benign. The intense nationalism associated with the origins of the Second World War also contributed to a global search for institutions that would rise above the nation-state construct, from an interest in regional integration to the expansion of global institutions more generally.

By the end of the twentieth century, the intense state-centrism associated with its middle decades began to show the evidence of fading. Beginning with the late 1970s there were sizeable reductions in the degree and nature of state involvement in the economy. By the early 1990s this transformation was nearly universalized, as the global expansion of capitalism was achieved under the banner of 'economic reform' and the neoliberal state. The national security state was ever more challenged by the transparency of Internet, but it was doing its best to defend itself by enhancing its

surveillance capacity. Governance had become increasingly complex.

At the same time, the failure of the great state-building project of the post-colonial era was becoming increasingly visible in many parts of Africa. The promise of postcolonial development and nation-building was replaced by frequent crises of development and the spectre of state failure and incapacity. Also at the same time, Europe, the birthplace of the nation-state, was moving away from the separate nation-state form, in the direction of a polity whose definition remains vaguely situated between a collection of nation-states and a single, super state. While there is no agreement on a label for the modal state form at the beginning of the twenty-first century, candidates range from the self-restrained, neoliberal or postmodern state to the defective, retreating or failed state.

Up to this point, most of the discussion about different forms of state has focused on its change of meaning over time. The form of the state has changed across the centuries, and it has also shown significant changes. However, not only did the form of the state change over time, but it also changed across location, place and space. Which means, the importance and meaning of state economic intervention and the nature of the relationship between state and society are profoundly different in different places on the globe at the same point in time. The differences are most apparent when we compare the importance of the nation-state in contemporary Western Europe with its contemporary salience throughout most of the developing world. The contrasts between Europe and North America on one hand, and Asia on the other, are equally striking, regardless of level of development. These contextual differences have implications both for the ways we need to understand the nature of state economic intervention, as well as for the nature of relationship between state and society.

In the final analysis, why should the differences between twentieth-century forms of state – i.e. the imperial state and the nation-state, for example – concern us? Why should this be of interest to the students of international relations in particular? State forms matter, because they provide essential forms of political identity, around which people mobilize, kill others and commit their lives. The

defence of empire is far more abstract and qualitatively different from the defence of the nation-state. State forms also play a critical role in the construction of the culture of international relations. The culture of international relations during the era of empires, balance of power geopolitics and competitive imperialisms was significantly different from the culture of international relations when the nation-state was at a high point, with its imperfect norms of non-intervention and multilateralism. Different state forms can also define the likelihood of international conflict. This is especially the case, if advocates of the democratic peace hypothesis are correct about their assessment of the probability of conflict among democratic states.

1.1.5 STATE AND GLOBALIZATION

As you understand by now, the study of international relations has largely concerned with the study of states, their practices of sovereignty, the effects of anarchy on their foreign policies, the patterns of their interactions, and the organization of international politics. However, the developments from late twentieth century onward somewhat reduced and redefined the notion of anarchy, especially due to the emergence of many regulatory international organisations in which most of the states have become members. Hence, the scholars of international relations, while recognizing the existence of anarchy in inter-state relations, however, shifted their focus to study the functioning of international structures where states share the space with many other non-state actors, and where developments in international politics are shaped not only by states but also by this non-state actors and forces. In short, the discipline is moving away from the study of “international relations” to the study of “global society.” We use this shift in the name to symbolize a series of transformations in the last thirty years in the discipline regarding what and whom we study, and how and why we study them.

Hence, it is imperative for the students of international relations to understand what actually constitutes “globalization” in the twenty-first century and how it is different from earlier phases. Anthony Giddens, a political-sociologist, defines

globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”. Martin Albrow provides the most succinct and general definition of globalization as “all those processes by which the people of the world are incorporated into a single world society”.

Globalization is an elusive concept in many ways but broadly relates to a series of interacting processes involving economics, technology, politics, communications, culture and other exchanges. Globalization is an expansion and intensification of cross-border activities, trans-national actions and global interactions that are changing many aspects of international relations. For some scholars like Susan Strange, Peter Van Ham and Graeme Gill globalization is transforming the state in many ways. The argument is that the structural changes of globalization are fundamentally changing the nature of the sovereign state. The de-territorialisation of many activities, including economic exchanges like the transfer of money, may be undermining the authority of the state. For example, multinational corporations can avoid paying taxes, move their factories from one state to the other and demand the governments even before they invest. Susan Strange suggested that instead of states controlling market forces, market forces are now controlling states. In addition, as processes like privatization occurred in many Western states, private firms were – and are – taking over important state functions suggesting that states are giving up many of their powers. In a globalized division of labour, the state no longer primarily initiates the action in, but rather reacts to, worldwide economic forces.

Such developments mean it is not just states; many other new actors are involved in international relations. Arguably, technological innovations such as the development of the Internet too undermined the aspects of the state because it allows people to spread information and news, offer dissenting voices to a global audience, sell and buy goods, and transfer money instantly with little control by the state. A few states like North Korea, China and Iran are resisting such developments by imposing controls over internet usage and imposing censorship over websites. However, the development of new technologies is indisputably allowing individuals and groups to have greater autonomy that may be contrary

to the interests of the state. State transformation may mean that the state increases its surveillance function through the introduction of biometric passports and identity cards, use of lists to identify or target specific groups in society, and to increase its monitoring of people moving from one state into another. If a state transformation is occurring then this suggests that the state is able to adapt, change and respond to the changing global environment.

Globalization is also challenging the one-dimensionality of conservative accounts of world politics that conceive it principally in state-centric terms of struggle for power between states. The concept of global politics, which is now talked by many social scientists, focuses our attention upon the global structures and processes of normative principles and values, the maintenance of security and order in the world system. It acknowledges the continuing centrality of states and power politics, but does not give a privilege either in understanding and explaining contemporary international affairs. In contemporary international relations, state are increasingly became parts and sub-units of multilateral institutions and plural politics from NATO and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to the G20, transnational associations and networks, where diplomats, government and non-governmental actors, and corporates dealing with shared global problems. Global politics directs our attention to the **emergence of a fragile global polity within which interests are articulated and aggregated, decisions are made, values are allocated and policies conducted through international or transnational political processes.**

The main arguments in favour of globalization comprising a new era of world politics are stated by John Baylis in his *Globalization of World Politics*. These are:

1. The pace of economic transformation is so great that it has created a new world politics. States are no longer closed unites and they cannot control their economies. The international economy is more interdependent now comparing with the past, with ever expanding trade and finances.
2. Communications have fundamentally revolutionized the way we deal with

the rest of the world. We now live in a world where developments in one location can be immediately observed on the other part of the world. Electronic communications alter our notions of the social groups we work with and live in.

3. There is now, more than ever before, a global culture, so that most urban areas resemble one another. The metropolitan locations in America, Europe, Asia and Africa share a common culture, much of it emanating from Hollywood and global literature.
4. The world is becoming more homogeneous. Differences between peoples are diminishing.
5. Time and space seem to be collapsing. Our old ideas of geographically space and of chronological time are undermined by the speed of modern communications and media.
6. There is emerging global polity, with transnational social and political movements and the beginning of transfer of allegiance from the state to sub-state, transnational, and international bodies.
7. A cosmopolitan culture is developing. People are started to 'think globally and act locally'.
8. A risk culture is emerging with people realizing both that the main risks that face them are global (pollution and HIV for example) and that states are unable to deal with the problems.

If global politics involves a diversity of actors and institutions, it is also, on the other hand, marked by a diversity of political concerns. The agenda of global politics is anchored not just in traditional geopolitical concerns but also in proliferation of economic, social, cultural, and ecological questions. Due to the globalization, climate change, narcotics, human rights, and terrorism have become an important international policy issues that go beyond territorial borders and existing political jurisdictions.

Moreover, while globalization limits the state power, there is a reassertion of historical forces. Just as globalization gives impetus to cultural homogenization (e.g., the diffusion of standard consumer goods throughout the world), so too does a global thrust weaken state power and unleash subterranean cultural pluralism. This opposing process merges with the dialectic of sub-nationalism and supra-nationalism. Many polities are disrupted by sub-state actors and simultaneously seek advantage in global competition through regionalization. Despite the past failings of regional groupings, regional cooperation is widely regarded as a way to achieve mobility in the changing global division of labour. Thus, the state is being reformed from underneath by the tugs of sub-nationalism and from the top by the pull of economic globalization.

That is the reason why many of the scholars of international relations consider that under globalization many forces are at work to undermine the defining feature of international relations for several centuries—national sovereignty. As Ian Clark explains, “According to conventional wisdom it is sovereignty which is most at risk from globalization....[Thus] if we wish to trace the impact of globalization, then it is within the realm of sovereignty that the search must properly begin”. The fear is that states are steadily losing the ability to decide their own fates as the forces of globalization shift the locus of meaningful decision making to other entities. The fundamental question is whether state can still shape the policies and tame the forces that affect the lives of their citizens.

In his books, *The Borderless World* and *The End of Nation State*, Kenichi Ohmae argues that economic and technological trends are rendering the nation-state increasingly irrelevant and impotent. This effect can be seen most vividly in the global economy: “On the political map the boundaries between countries are as clear as ever. But on the competitive map, a map showing the real flows of financial and industrial activity, those boundaries have largely disappeared”. If we remove the political boundaries from a map and look only at the pattern of economic activity, we would no longer be able to redraw the world’s political boundaries.

This disconnect between economic and political realities, however, cannot last forever. Ohmae thinks a readjustment is already well under way: “the modern nation-state itself—the artefact of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—has begun to crumble”. And Anthony Giddens has joined the Nation-State’s funeral chorus: “Nations have lost the sovereignty they once had, and politicians have lost their capacity to influence events.... The era of the nation-state is over”.

1.1.5.1 Critics of Globalization View

However, many scholars disagree with the view that globalization is forcing the state to take a backseat. They disagree with the notion that the sovereign state is in decline. The sovereign power and authority of national government is being transformed but by no means eroded. Locked into systems of global and regional governance, states now assert their sovereignty less in the form of a legal claim to supreme power than as a bargaining tool. As a result, sovereignty, once considered as a monopoly of state, is now shared among the agencies at different levels, from the local to the global.

More severe critics of globalization question the disappearance of state thesis. Though no one questions the impact of globalization on states and communities, the issues is whether patterns of international interactions are changing in ways and to a degree so that it makes sense to even begin talking about a borderless world or the end of nation-state. For globalization sceptics, such a talk is too early at best and rests on a persistent pattern of exaggeration and selective use of evidence.

No one can deny that advances in transportation and communication have helped overcome the obstacles of distance. Sceptics caution, however, that this should not be confused with an “end” of geography. They argue that most accounts of globalization focus on companies and plants that relocate production from one country to another while ignoring those that stay in their respective countries. Still most of the industries and finances are located in Western Europe, the United States and Japan. For instance, Robert Wade notes that “today the stock of U.S.

capital invested abroad represents less than 7 per cent of the U.S. GNP. Similarly, Robert Gilpin states that “Trade, investment and financial flows were actually greater in the late 1800s, at least relative to the size of national economies and the international economy, than they are today”.

The Realist school of international relations rejects the view of globalization as an irreversible process that threatens states. On the contrary, they see globalization as a process promoted and enabled by the policies of states. Globalization will come to a grounding halt if the major states reverse the policies that sustain it.

Many Marxists and Critical thinkers object the globalization thesis. For them, the globalization is merely a buzz-word to denote the latest phase of capitalism.

1.1.6 SUMMING UP

The term International Relations is perhaps synonymous with Inter-state Relations because the study of international relations, while inter-disciplinary in many ways, pays particular attention to states and to state-based actors in the international system. Throughout history states have existed in many forms, from the city-states of ancient Greece to the feudal states of the medieval period to the modern system of states in place today.

The surfacing of the modern state system was in reality a slow, steady process driven by several significant economic, religious, and military developments that finally undermined the feudal order and replaced it with a new way of organizing European politics. It is claimed by many scholars that the modern system of state originates from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. A number of important principles emerged from the Westphalian settlement such as territoriality, secularism and reciprocal recognition. The Peace of Westphalia also codified an important feature of statehood, namely sovereignty. As European influence spread throughout the world in subsequent centuries, this new way of organizing things would come, for better or worse, to characterize international politics on a global scale. Many new states emerged in the twentieth century due to national self

determination, anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa. Finally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the formation of independent nation-states in Eastern and Southern Europe has followed the path of violent secessions.

The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States sets out the four main criteria of statehood. These are: population; territory; government; and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The scholar Alan James (1986) argues that a fifth unwritten criterion exists, that of 'constitutional independence'.

Many scholars view that the nation-state at one time represented a response to the historical challenge of finding a functional equivalent for the early modern form of social integration that was in the process of disintegrating. Today we are confronting an comparable challenge. The globalisation of commerce and communication, of economic production and finance, of the spread of technology and weapons, and above all of ecological and military risks, poses problems that cannot be resolved within the traditional method of agreements between sovereign states. If current trends continue, the progressive undermining of national sovereignty may call for the founding and development of political institutions on the supranational level.

Those who are critical to the present-day globalization argue that globalization is robbing nations of their ability to shape their own policies and destinies. Some believe that economic and technological trends are taking away the power of making critical decisions out of the hands of national governments, placing them at the mercy of supranational forces, actors, and institutions. Economic actors such as multinational corporations are becoming more and more powerful to escape the power of national governments. Observers from a variety of perspectives agree that globalization is occurring, though they disagree on whether this process is eroding the importance of state. Some argue that national boundaries, communities, and governments are still dominant and the world remains fundamentally a assortment of national communities rather than a truly global society or economy.

**1.2. MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN 20TH CENTURY
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: FIRST WORLD WAR, INTER-
WAR POLITICS, SECOND WORLD WAR, BIPOLARITY AND
COLD WAR, END OF COLD WAR AND CHANGES IN
GLOBAL POWER STRUCTURE**

- V. Nagendra Rao

STRUCTURE

1.2.0 Objectives

1.2.1 Introduction

1.2.2 First World War

1.2.3 International Politics between two World Wars

1.2.4 Second World War

1.2.5 Origins of Cold War

1.2.6 The Post Cold War Era

1.2.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to:

- Understand the history of twentieth century international politics
- Know the causes and impact of two World Wars
- Comprehend the reasons for emergence of Cold War between two superpowers
- Understand the nature of post-Cold War international relations

1.2.1 INTRODUCTION

This lesson intends to explain the key developments of the international relations in the twentieth century without which it is very difficult to understand contemporary scenario. The twentieth century is known for massive upheavals. The two World Wars in the first half of the century caused millions of human casualties and utmost destruction that the world ever witnessed in the past. The century also witnessed the rise of anti-colonial movements, birth of various international organizations, advent of nuclear weapons, spread of state system among the countries of Asia and Africa. The conflict between European countries, which was most common feature of world since 16th century, replaced by the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. This confrontation, termed as Cold War, to a large extent remained as a major feature of the second half of the twentieth century. It brought newly emerged Asian and African countries also into the bloc system. However, the military and political strength of both the superpowers prevented another large scale war to occur in the world, though both powers fought proxy wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The collapse of Soviet Union ultimately brought the Cold War to an end and the world shifted towards newer aspects of cooperation and confrontation. This is the background in which this lesson critically analyses the major developments of the twentieth century, i.e. First World War, the Inter-War Politics, Second World War, Cold War and developments in the Post-Cold War international relations.

1.2.2 FIRST WORLD WAR

At the dawn of the twentieth century the world got transformed. The age of absolutist monarchies was fading over or on its last legs. The spread of

nationalism was reconfiguring the map of Europe, creating new powers while weakening the old ones. Nationalism and industrial revolution allowed governments to create war machines capable of unparalleled destruction. European political and military power had spread even to the most remote reaches of the world. Hence, the root cause for the World War I was the imperial disputes, particularly between the dominant powers Britain and France and the rising powers Germany and Italy. The opening years of twentieth century were marked with these alliances and rivalries.

1.2.2.1 The Road to War

The division of Europe into rival alliances almost assured that a war involving anyone would eventually involve everyone. The only question was which conflict would bring the precarious peace to an end. The changes were good that a general would emerge from the conflicts in the Balkans. It was here that the power of the Austrian-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires intersected in political waters muddied by the conflicts of nationalism. One of the most volatile conflicts was between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. There were substantial population of Serbians living within the borders of Austria-Hungary. Consistent with the sentiments of nationalism, powerful forces within Serbia called for the creation of a Greater Serbia incorporating all the Serbian people, something that did not sit well with Austria-Hungary. When a Serbian nationalist extremist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary (next in line to the throne) in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, the first step on the road to war was taken. What followed was a dizzying round of threats and ultimatums that failed to resolve the crisis. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914. Russia, which generally supported Serbia, mobilized its army on July 30, setting off a chain reaction in Germany and France. By August 4, all of Europe was at war, with Britain joining France and Russia.

The war spread all over the world as colonial powers brought subject people into the war. The war dragged for four years, turning into a horrific war of attrition that destroyed and scarred the entire generation. World War I became the first **total war**, in which every element of society and every aspect of national life

were consumed by the conduct of war.

The carnage continued for three years, and by 1917 the nations and armies of Europe were close to exhaustion. Three pivotal events finally brought the war to an end Russian revolution in November 1917 and the entry of United States of America into the war on the side of Britain and France. The tide turned against Germany by August 1918 and Germany defeated by November.

1.2.3 INTERNATIONAL POLITICS BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS

That there were two major power wars within a single generation is unusual in international history. That Europe would again be plunged into war merely two decades after World War I indicates a connection between the two conflicts. World War II cannot be understood without an appreciation of the impact on World War I on both the victors and the vanquished. As the 1920s and 1930s began, World War I cast a long, dark shadow. It is impossible to exaggerate the impact of the war on European societies. The legacy of the war was not uniform, however. For some, the horrors of World War I forged a determination to avoid a repeat at any cost. Modern war had become so dreadful that nothing could rationalize another war. For others, the perception that the First World War's settlement was unfair and unjust fuelled bitterness. These two ways of looking at the war were to prove a dangerous mix.

1.2.3.1 Treaty of Versailles

Major wars always pose the problem of creating a post-war order, a task that usually favors to the victors. The first step in this direction was the **Treaty of Versailles** (1919), which spelled out the final peace terms. The Treaty failed to tackle what was for some the central problem of European security after 1870—a united and frustrated Germany—and precipitated German resentment by creating new states and devising contested borders. For some scholars like E.H.Carr, the interwar period represented a twenty-year crisis.

The treaty was in many ways a “victor’s peace”—harsh on the losers, soft on the

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winners. Germany was required to accept conditions that applied to no one else—relinquishment of territory, restrictions on the size of its armed forces, and payment of huge reparations. Most important, Germany was forced to accept sole and total blame for the war. This provision was particularly annoying and humiliating for the Germans, who came to feel that they had been unfairly singled out for harsh treatment simply because they were the losers. Due to this, all parties and statesman in Germany demanded for the drastic revision of the Treaty of Versailles. A decade later, Hitler and the Nazis were able to take advantage of and exploit these sentiments during their rise to power.

In Great Britain and France, the legacy of the war was somewhat different. Having gone to war in 1914 expecting a tiny conflict, they rather found themselves trapped in a war of unprecedented horror. Though victorious, victory came at an astounding cost. From the perspective of those who had just been through this experience, the first priority was avoiding another war.

1.2.3.2 Establishment of League of Nations

Many states desired the creation of a post-war international order that might prevent another war, and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson attempted to provide one. The corner stone of this new world order was the **League of Nations**, an organization that could form the basis for a combined, international response to future threats to peace. The League eventually proved unsuccessful. Several obstacles doomed the League. First, despite the organization's connection to Woodrow Wilson, the United States failed to join when the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty. Second, the then dominant countries did not recognize post-revolution Soviet Union, due to which it retreated into isolation. Third, and most important, the League's members were unwilling and unable to do what was necessary to respond to the threats to peace. The League of Nations was a voluntary organization of states, not a world government. It did not have its own military forces. If it were to mount a credible response, it would need to convince member states to do so. In the end, member nations proved unwilling to respond when needed.

1.2.3.3 Rise of Hitler and Nazism in Germany

As the 1920s drew to a close, a dangerous brew was already simmering—Germany was dissatisfied with the terms laid out at Versailles; Western European nations were weary of war and resolved to avoid a repeat at almost any cost; and the principal post-war institutions designed to preserve the peace was not living up to expectations. The Great Depression, partly due to the crash of Wall Street stock market, made things worse, leading to economic adversity and political disorder everywhere. In Germany, Hitler and Nazis took advantage of German resentment and the hardships of the depression to expand their political appeal. Many forget that although the Nazis quickly destroyed German democracy, they came to power initially through democratic means. Fascist, military-oriented dictatorships emerged in Italy, Japan, and Spain as well. These regimes provided the final tipping point that plunged the world into war for the second time in a generation.

Conventional accounts date the start of World War II to Germany's invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, however Japan's takeover of Manchuria (part of China) in 1931 or its attack of China in 1937 were also equally initiated the Second World War. As Japan was expanding its empire in Asia during the 1930s, Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933. Ravaged by the Great Depression and limited by the Treaty of Versailles, Germany remained too weak in the early years of Nazi rule to cause much trouble. By 1935, however, the German economy was recovering and Hitler began to implement his plan to restore and expand German power. Conscription was resumed and the new German air force was unveiled. Though both actions violated the Treaty of Versailles, Germany's neighbours did nothing. Hitler's first major international move occurred in 1936, when German forces re-entered the Rhineland (German land taken over by France as part of compensation after First World War), violating the Treaty of Versailles. Again, Germany's neighbours did nothing.

1.2.3.4 Britain and France: Policy of Appeasement

Between 1936 and 1938 German military spending increased dramatically and went largely unmatched and unchallenged. Instead of resisting these initial German moves, Western nations engaged in a policy of **appeasement**. Rather than risk war over demands that could be seen as moderate and legitimate, France and Germany largely given in. The policy of appeasement remains popular, in part because the idea of another war was so unpopular. The most infamous act of appeasement occurred in the fall of 1938. The problem was the presence of ethnic Germans living in a part of Czechoslovakia known as the Sudetenland. With the encouragement of Hitler and the German government in Berlin, the Sudeten Germans demanded to be unified with Germany. As the situation approached war, a conference was held in Munich in which France and Britain (without the consent of the Czechs) agreed to give Hitler what he wanted. Upon his return home, A few months later, in March 1939, Germany surprised the world again by invading and capturing the rest of Czechoslovakia. The **Munich Agreement** had not satisfied the Hitler. Now it was clear to all that his goals went well beyond revising the Treaty of Versailles. Few could escape the conclusion that war would come again.

1.2.4 SECOND WORLD WAR

After Hitler signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union, German troops invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. Britain and France declared war on Germany. After making quick work of Poland, Hitler turned westward and marched through Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and most of France, leaving Britain virtually alone to prevent total German domination of Western Europe. Though the United States provided critical supplies to Britain, isolationist sentiment kept the United States out of the war. The Germans bombed London and other parts of Britain, which many feared was a overture to an invasion. Though the bombing caused substantial damage and hardship, the anticipated invasion never came.

In 1941, two developments altered the course of the war. In June, Hitler broke

his nonaggression agreement with Stalin and invaded the Soviet Union. Then, in December, the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbour, leading the United States to declare war on Japan. In response, Japan's ally Germany declared war on the United States, bringing the United States into the European conflict as well. The United States and the Soviet Union were now allies along with Britain in the struggle against Germany.

Though the United States declared war on Germany, the vast majority of the fighting in Europe between 1941 and 1944 took place on the Eastern Front between Germany and the Soviet Union. As a result, Soviet Union suffered massive casualties which are closer to 2.5 crore. The invasion of France on June 7, 1944, opened the long-awaited second front, necessitating Hitler to fight a war on two sides. As allied troops advanced on Germany from the west and Soviet troops closed in from the east, the eventual outcome of the war in Europe became clear. In June 1945, American, British, and Soviet troops met in Berlin and Germany's defeat was final. The war against Japan continued for a few months after the German surrender, with the United State's use of atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August 1945 finally triggering Japan's surrender.

1.2.5 ORIGINS OF COLD WAR

The most important outcome of the World War II was the emergence of two superpowers—the United States and Soviet Union—as the primary actors in the international system, and the decline of Europe as the epicentre of international politics.

The second outcome of the war was the recognition of basic incompatibilities between these two superpowers in both national interests and ideology. Differences surfaced immediately over geopolitical national interests. Russia, having been invaded from the west on several occasions, including during World War II, used its newfound power to solidify its sphere of influence in the buffer states of Eastern Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. The Soviet leadership believed that ensuring friendly neighbours on

its western borders was vital to Soviet national interests. As for the United States, as early as 1947, U.S. policy makers argued that U.S. interests lay in containing the Soviet Union. The diplomat and historian published in *Foreign Affairs* the famous “X” article, in which he argued that because the Soviet Union would always feel military insecurity, it would carry out an aggressive foreign policy. Containing the Soviets, Kennan therefore wrote, should become the cornerstone of the United State’s post-war policy.

1.2.5.1 Containment and the Truman Doctrine

Along with the Kennan article, many U.S. policy makers urged the then US president Harry S. Truman to take immediate steps to counter the Soviet Union’s influence. The government of UK announced in February 1947 that it no more afford to finance the Greek military regime in its civil war against insurgents who are led by communist.

The American government’s response to this announcement was the adoption of containment, the goal of which was to stop the spread of communism. In a famous speech Truman announced the allocation of \$400 million to intervene in the war and in the process unveiled the Truman Doctrine, which termed the conflict as a fight between free peoples and totalitarian systems. Moderate and conservative parties in Europe, as well as social democrats, gave virtually unconditional support to the Western alliance. **Marshall Plan** announced in May 1947 to offer massive economic aid to all the countries of Europe devastated by war. Hence, from the end of 1947, repression, based on US geostrategic interests, became the fundamental doctrine of US foreign policy during the Cold War.

1.2.5.2 Berlin Blockade and Airlift

To rebuild the western Germany, which was in the control of US-led alliance, in early 1948, representatives of the US and many Western European governments agreed for a merger of western German areas into a system of federal government. Furthermore, as a part of the Marshall Plan, the alliance had decided to re-industrialize and rebuild the German economy.

To counter these efforts of western powers, Stalin instituted the Berlin Blockade (June 24, 1948 – May 12, 1949), one of the first major crises of the Cold War, to stop food and other supplies arriving from other countries to West Berlin. To offset Stalin plans, the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand along with several other allies undertaken one of the great acts which in a way initiated the Cold War, famously named as “Berlin Airlift”. The Berlin air lift was aimed to supply the essential and other materials required for people of West Germany. Understanding fallacy in his policy, Stalin lifted blockade in May 1949.

1.2.5.3 Ideological Differences

The United States and the Soviet Union also had major ideological differences. These differences pitted two distinct visions of society and of the international order. The United State’s democratic liberalism was based on a social system that accepted the worth and value of individual, a political system that depended on the participation of individuals in the electoral process, and an economic system, capitalism, which provided opportunities to individuals to pursue what was economically rational with little or no government interference. At the international level, this logically translated into support for other democratic liberal regimes and support of capitalist institutions and processes, including, most critically, free trade.

Soviet communist ideology also affected that country’s conception of the international system and state practices. The Soviet state embraced Marxist ideology, which held that one class (the bourgeoisie) controls the ownership of means of production and uses its institutions and authority to maintain that control. The solution to the problem of class rule, according to Marxism, is revolution, wherein the exploited proletariat takes control from the bourgeoisie by using the state to seize the means of production. Thus, capitalism is replaced with socialism. The leaders of the Soviet Union saw themselves in an interim period—after the demise of the capitalist state and before the victory of socialism. This ideology had critical international elements, as well: capitalism will try to extend itself through imperialism in order to generate more capital, larger markets, and greater control over raw materials. Soviet leaders thus

felt themselves surrounded by a hostile capitalist camp and argued that the Soviet Union “must not weaken but must in every way strengthen its state, the state organs, the organs of the intelligence service, the army, if that country does not want to be smashed by the capitalist environment”. Internationally, they believed, it must support movements whose goals are both to undermine the capitalist and to promote a new social order.

1.2.5.4 Soviet support for Anti-Colonial Movements

The defeat of Japan and Germany led to the instantaneous end of their respective imperial empires. For the other colonialists faced with the reality of their economically and politically weakened position, and confronted with indigenous movements for independence, the European states granted independence to their former colonies, beginning with Indian independence from Britain. The Soviet Union actively supported these anti-colonial movements, which further exasperated its relations with Western powers.

1.2.5.5 Extension of Cold War to Other Parts of the World

The two super powers started playing their differences indirectly, on third-party stages, rather than through direct confrontation between the two protagonists. As the number of newly independent states proliferated in the post-war world as a result of decolonization, the super powers competed for influence over these new states to extend their power to newer areas. Thus, the Cold War resulted in the globalization of conflicts to all continents, international relations became truly global.

Hence, the Cold War (1945-89) can be characterised as forty-five years of overall high-level tension and competition between the two superpowers but with no direct military conflict. The advent of nuclear weapons created a bipolar stalemate, in which each side acted cautiously, only once coming closer to the war. The Cold War, then, was a series of events that directly or indirectly pitted the superpowers against each other. Some of those events were confrontations just short of war, while others were confrontations between proxies (North Korea

vs. South Korea, North Vietnam vs. South Vietnam, Ethiopia vs. Somalia) that, in all likelihood, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had intended to escalate further. Many other issues were confronted over words which were usually ended with some kind of agreements without further escalating. Some of these confrontations involved only the United States and the Soviet Union, but more often than not, the allies of each became involved. Thus, the Cold War compromised not only superpower confrontations but confrontations between two blocs of states: the United States, with Canada, Australia, and much of Western Europe (allied in North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO); and the Soviet Union, with its Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe.

In Asia, Korea became the symbol of the Cold War. It, too, was divided geographically—between north and south—and ideologically—between communist and non-communist states. The first Asian confrontation came in 1950 as communist North Korean troops, poked by the Soviet military (hoping to improve its defence position), and marched into a weak South Korea. The Soviets never fought directly, but the United States (under the aegis of the United Nations) and the Chinese (acting on behalf of the Soviet Union) did. The North Korean offensive was eventually repelled, and the two sides became mired in a three-year stalemate. The war finally ended in 1953.

The 1962 Cuban missile crisis represents a high-profile direct confrontation between the superpowers in yet another region of the world. Originally devised by the Soviet Union to compensate for its lagging missile programme, the Soviets took the bold move of installing missiles in Cuba, 90 miles from US shores. The US saw the installation of the missiles as a direct threat to its territory: no weapons of a powerful enemy had ever been located so close to US shores. However, both superpowers showed the restraints with a small compromise as none of them wanted a direct confrontation.

1.2.5.6 Detente

The developments in post-Cuban crisis of 1962 were followed by a sort of coexistence and competition. Nuclear armoury continued to grow. The global nuclear dimension increased with the emergence of other nuclear weapon states:

Britain (1952), France (1960), China (1964), India (1974), and Pakistan (1998). Israel and South Africa also developed nuclear weapons, though the post-apartheid South African government had dismantled them. Growing concern at the proliferation of nuclear weapons led to negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968; the treaty resulted in countries of nuclear weapons are agreed to halt the arms race and non-nuclear weapon countries committed not to produced nuclear weapons. However, many countries like India and Pakistan, refused to be part of the NPT considering its discriminatory nature.

When relations soured between two communist countries, Soviet Union and China, the foundations for detente laid between Soviet Union and United States and rapprochement between United States and China. Soviet-American detente had its roots in mutual recognition of the need to avoid nuclear crises, and in the economic and military incentives in avoiding an unrestrained arms race. This new phase in Soviet-American relations did not mark an end to political conflict, as each side pursued political goals, some of which were ever more incompatible with the aspirations of the other superpower. Both sides supported friendly regimes and movements, and subverted adversaries.

December 1979, however, ended the short detente between the two superpowers. NATO agreed to deploy land-based cruise missile in Europe. Later in the month, Soviet armed forces intervened in Afghanistan to support their allies and soon became committed to a protracted and bloody struggle that many compared to America's war in Vietnam. When, the Republican Ronald Regan elected as the president of United States, the United States adopted a more antagonistic approach with Moscow on arms control, Third World conflicts, and East-West relations in general.

1.2.5.7 The Second Cold War

The US President Ronald Reagan was convinced that detente allowed the Soviet Unon to surge ahead of the United Staes in military power and expanding its political influence in the Third World, while the United States waited for Soviet restraint. His administration pursued policies that many viewed as a return to

the coldest days of the Cold War, including an ambitious increase in military spending in both the conventional and nuclear areas. The US also assisted anti-communist governments and insurgency movements in Third World countries. Most controversies were its assistance to the “contras” in Nicaragua, who were fighting to overthrow the communist government.

On the other hand, Soviet leadership was in a state of transition during Reagan’s first term. Leonid Breznev, in power since the 1960s died in 1982. After a brief stint of two other presidents, Mikhail Gorbachev became President. Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy, and his domestic reforms, created revolution, both in the USSR and Eastern Europe. At home, glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) unleashed nationalist and other forces that were to destroy the Soviet Union.

1.2.5.8 The Cold War as a Long Peace

If the Cold War is largely remembered as a series of crises and some direct and indirect confrontations, why then has the Cold War been referred to as the “long peace”? The term itself was coined by diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis to dramatize the absence of war between great powers. Just as general war was averted in nineteenth century Europe, so too has general war been avoided since World War II.

Gaddis attributes the long peace to five factors, no single explanation’s being sufficient. Probably the most widely accepted explanation revolves around the role of nuclear deterrence. Once both the United States and the Soviet Union had acquired nuclear weapons, neither was willing to use them, since their very deployment jeopardized both states’ existence. The Second explanation is that the long peace to the bipolar split in power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The distribution of power equally between the US and the USSR brought stability to the international relations. A third explanation for the long peace is the stability imposed by the hegemonic economic power of the United States. Being in a superior economic position for much of the Cold War, the United States willingly paid the price of maintaining stability. A fourth explanation

gives credit for maintaining peace not to either of the superpowers but to economic liberalism. During the Cold War, the liberal economic order solidified and became a dominant factor in international relations. Politics became transnational under liberalism and thus great powers became increasingly obsolete. Finally, Gaddis explores the possibility that the long peace of Cold War was predetermined, as just one phase in a long historical cycle of peace and war. He argued that every 100 to 150 years, war occurs on a global scale; these cycles are driven by uneven economic growth. This explanation suggests that the Cold War is but a blip in one long cycle, and specific events or conditions occurring during the Cold War offer no explanatory power.

1.2.6 THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The fall of Berlin wall in 1989 symbolized the end of the Cold War, but actually its end was gradual. The Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, and other Soviet reformers set in motion two domestic processes—*glasnost* (political openness) and *perestroika* (economic restructuring)—as early as the mid-1980s. Glasnost opened the door to criticism of political system, culminating in the emergence of a multiparty system and the enormous reorientation of the once-monopolistic Communist Party. The foundation of the planned economy, an essential part of the communist system, was completely undermined by Perestroika. At the outset, Gorbachev and his reformers sought to save the system, but once initiated, these reforms led to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev's resignation in December 1991, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992-93. This resulted obviously in the retreat of one superpower along with the bloc attached to it, leaving the United States as the only superpower.

These changes in Soviet Union mark the post-Cold War era. The first post-Cold War test of the so-called New World Order came in response to Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. Despite its long-standing relationship with Iraq, the Soviet Union (and later Russia), along with the four other members of the U.N. Security Council, agreed first to impose economic sanctions against Iraq. Then they agreed in a Security Council resolution to support the means to

restore the status quo—to oust Iraq from Kuwait with a multinational military force. Finally, they supported the sending of U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission to monitor the zone, and permitted the UN to undertake humanitarian intervention and create safe havens for the Kurdish and Shiite population of Iraq.

The end of Cold War denotes a major change in international relations, the end of one historical era and the beginning of another. Just as path breaking as the end of the Roman Empire or the development of the nineteenth century European balance of power have been events that have occurred during the last several years—within our immediate memory—the outbreak of civil wars and ethnic conflicts and the response of humanitarian intervention.

In the first few years of post-Cold War period, expectations about the future of international relations diverged. Some expected a more stable world marked by the triumph of liberal democracy, economic prosperity, peace dividends, and the reduction of war and conflict. Others feared that the relative stability and predictability of the Cold War order would be replaced by newly unleashed forces of national and ethnic conflict that might prove more dangerous than the superpower rivalry. Almost two decades into the post-Cold War era, these debates about the future world politics continue to rage without any definitive resolution. Nonetheless, it is possible to make some general observations about the shape of international relations in the post-Cold War era to which most, if not all, would subscribe.

The demise and eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union was unquestionably a major event that transformed critical aspects of international relations, especially in Europe. Germany is unified again for the first time since 1945. Former allies of the Soviet Union now seek admission into NATO. The division of Europe has ended; the iron curtain, lifted. Outside the confines of Europe, the United States and Russia retain only a fraction of the nuclear weapons they possessed at the height of the Cold War, and this number is set to go lower still. One cannot undervalue the importance of these transformations.

But the end of the Cold War did not change the whole thing, and the world of

2000 would not look totally different to someone who had been slumbering for twenty years. As John Ikenberry explains, “Only a part of the post-World War II order—the bipolar order—was destroyed by the dramatic events of 1989-91”. There are still significant elements of continuity, especially in terms of the American influence in the world and the continuation of the institutions created under American auspices during the Cold War.

Indeed, the ending of the Cold War did not bring any fundamental change in the scope of American military power and commitments throughout the world. U.S. forces remain in Japan, Korea, and Europe, though in somewhat smaller numbers, just as they were at the height of the Cold War. The passing of the Soviet military alliance in Europe, the Warsaw Pact, has not been accompanied by the end of the American alliance, NATO. The 1991 Gulf War, considered at the time of a possible indication of a “new world order”, demonstrated the continuing centrality of the United States. Though the war involved an international coalition with the blessings of the United Nations, it was fundamentally an American endeavour. The 2003 Iraq War was, with the significant exception of Great Britain, almost entirely an American undertaking. No other nation possesses the necessary combination of capability and willingness to challenge the military power of the United States. Whether one wishes to refer to this as American “hegemony”, “dominance”, or “unipolarity”, the basic point remains the same. Ian Clark highlights this point in remarking on the “essential continuity in the role of American power...There are institutions that were created during Cold War, and which were almost defining attributes of it, [that] still endure into the post-Cold War era”.

The United States also remains as the world’s largest and most powerful economy. Its economy is more than twice as large as Japan’s and three times the size of Germany’s or China’s. Increasing economic integration in Europe, however, may be creating an economic unit that, when taken as a whole, rivals the United States. The rapid growth of China and India may also pose a long-term challenge to American economic dominance. Thus, whereas there is only one real centre of military power in the world, the same cannot be said for economic power.

Randall Schweller divides the world’s power structure into “two separate parts: a unipolar security structure led by the United States and a tripolar economic one revolving around Germany [and Europe], Japan and America”.

But this economic reality was not the result of the end of the Cold War; it was the continuation of a trend that was under way long before the Berlin Wall came down. Just as important, the major economic institutions of the post-World War II or Cold War period—the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the general trading system created under American leadership—remains in place today. This, even with the emergence of new economic powerhouse, it is hard to disagree with Ikenberry’s conclusion that “the post-Cold War order is really a continuation and extension of the Western order forged during and after World War II”.

Top Economic Powers in the World

Source : United Nations, 2012

Rank	Country	GDP (Millions of US\$)
1	United States	16,244,600
2	China	8,358,400
3	Japan	5,960,180
4	Germany	3,425,956
5	France	2,611,221
6	United Kingdom	2,471,600
7	Brazil	2,254,109
8	Russia	2,029,812
9	Italy	2,013,392
10	India	1,875,213

The world, however, is a big place, and we must remember that, for the vast majority of the world’s people, life continues much as it did before the end of

the Cold War. The gap between the world's rich and its more numerous poor has not been narrowed by the passing of the Soviet Union. Large portions of humanity go to bed hungry every night and have no access to the basic requirements of life. The global environmental problems that were emerging as critical global issues before the end of the Cold War remains as serious as ever. The end of the superpower rivalry has not restored the hole in the ozone layer, ended global warming, or replenished the world's rainforests. Deadly national and ethnic conflicts continue to fume. If we are living in a new world order, it shares many similarities with the one we left behind.

On the other hand, the US-dominated global order was coming under increased challenge. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 underscored the darker side of the globalization. The experience of trying to fight a 'war' on global terrorism and of using hard coercive power to dominate weaker societies brought to the fore the limits of military power for achieving political goals.

However, the end of Cold War also left some positive dimensions in the international relations. In post-liberal era, many Third World countries moved upward in their economic growth. India, Brazil, South Africa emerged as a rising powers in the world along with some other developing countries. One of the most visible signs that something was changing concerned the increased diplomatic activism on the part of large developing countries. The intensive coalitional policies of Brazil and India in the World Trade Organization provide a good example, particularly in terms of G20 trade coalition created at Cancun in 2003 along with other developing countries. Another example is the creation of IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa Forum) to increase cooperation between these rising powers. Similarly, the four largest economies outside OECD, came together to establish a cooperative organization to challenge Western domination. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) came into existence with its own development and cooperative agenda. The financial crisis that hit the advanced capitalist core in 2007 led to these developments to take place.

**1.3 ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AS A
DISCIPLINE: CLASSICAL VERSUS SCIENTIFIC DEBATE**

- V. Nagendra Rao

STRUCTURE

1.3.0 Objectives

1.3.1 Introduction

1.3.2 Defining International Relations

1.3.3 Growth of Discipline

1.3.4 Liberal Internationalism

1.3.5 Realism

1.3.6 Rise of Behaviouralism

1.3.7 Transnationalism

1.3.8 Neo-Realism

1.3.9 Alternative Approaches to International Relations

1.3.10 Summing up Disciplinary Growth

1.3.11 Classical vs. Scientific Debate

1.3.12 Summing Up

1.3.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- Growth of International Relations
- Contributions of the Idealists in the early stage of the Disciplinary growth
- Realist criticism of Idealist assumptions
- Behavioural Revolution and its impact on the study of Discipline
- Transnationalism and interdependence approach
- Alternative approaches to study of International relations
- The debate between classical and advocates of scientific method

1.3.1 INTRODUCTION

The listing of International Relations as a subject, Department or School in the latter part of the twentieth century has prompted many to ask question what the discipline is all about. It is a basic question and any attempt to answer it should begin with the proposition that it is a part, a very important aspect, of the study of human behaviour. It is an area of study which focuses upon the political, economic, socio-cultural and other interactions among international actors (operating across national boundaries) and the inter-state system for purposes of explanation and prediction.

Originally, the study of international relations or politics was seen largely as a branch of the study of law, philosophy or history. However, following the bloodshed of the First World War there emerged an academic undertaking to appreciate how the fear of war was now equal only to the fear of defeat that had preceded the First World War. Consequently, the first university chair of international relations was founded at the University of Wales in 1919. Given such diverse origins, there is no one accepted way of defining or understanding international relations, and all over the world many adopted their own ways of understanding international relations. To define a field of study is always arbitrary and this is particularly true when it comes to international relations or politics.

1.3.2 DEFINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The terms ‘international relations’ and ‘international politics’ are often used interchangeably by many. In the last generation some have preferred to use ‘world’ or ‘global’ politics where the focus of the activity is not the state but some notion of a global community or global civilization. For many laypersons there is no real difference between these words, but technically there is more than a semantic difference as these terms can reflect a difference of focus and field of study.

A survey of the field suggests that a variety of definitions are employed. Some scholars defined international relations in terms of the diplomatic-strategic relations of states, and the characteristic focus of IR is on issues of conflict and cooperation and war and peace. However, other disagree with this view and see international relations in terms of cross-border transactions of all kinds, political, economic and social. For these scholars IR is a study of trade negotiations or the activities of NGOs like Red Cross International, or the workings of the United Nations (UN). In contemporary times of 21st century context, the focus is shifted to understanding globalization and its associated processes such as world communication, global business corporations, transport and financial systems, etc. Hence, defining the field of IR is not an easier task, involves complex structures, processes, values, norms and ideologies. However, for students of IR, how we define the discipline is also an important act. It is because how we understand and interpret the world is partly dependent on how we define the world.

The problem associated with definition of international relations is also related to the difference between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ politics. Usually the domestic laws are considered by its citizens as legitimate, hence binding and the police and courts enforce sanctions. However, the international laws contain competing legal systems of competing states, and there is no unified enforcing force with an authority to oversee the practice of international law. International politics has often been interpreted as the realm of self-help, since no international government is in existence, like the domestic government, with a monopoly on

the lawful use of force. Therefore, International Relations is too complex to be understood easily. Individuals can be the victim or victors of events but studying international relations helps each one of us to understand events and perhaps to make a differentiation. This, however, requires competency as well as empathy.

Some come to study international relations because of their interest in world events, but gradually they come to recognize that to understand their own state or region, to understand particular events and issues they have to progress beyond a journalistic view of current events. Studying international relations provides necessary tools to analyse events, and to gain a deeper understanding of some of the problems that policy-makers confront and to understand the reasons behind their actions.

1.3.3 GROWTH OF THE DISCIPLINE

The academic study of International Relations existed only its rudimentary form before the First World War. The disciplinary evolution of most of the contemporary subjects started in the second half of the 19th century. The social sciences of today are part of broader knowledge pool known as political philosophy or political economy. However, during that point of time International Relations as a discipline was not emerged. It was studied part of diplomacy, history, or law, but not as an independent area.

The devastation left by the First World War (1914–18) convinced a number of prominent thinkers that new ways of thinking about international relations was required. These thinkers saw it as essential to theorize international relations, and to raise the level of understanding of the subject beyond the notion of ‘current affairs’, and in setting this goal they established a concern with theory that has dominated the new discipline ever since.

1.3.4 LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM/IDEALISM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE DISCIPLINE

The emergence of International Relations as a separate field of study was closely related to the approach that first captured the thinking about the subject. To

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understand why idealism became dominant in the early years one only has to think about the events that led to the development of the subject, namely, the First World War. There was a widespread view that the overwhelming lesson of the war was that military force could no longer achieve its objectives. If the reason for resorting to war had traditionally been to achieve territorial conquests, to obtain markets and raw materials, or to overthrow leaders of whom one did not approve, then the events of the First World War offered a corrective. The war, achieved little reward for either side, involved huge deaths. War seemed to have become an inoperative tool of statecraft.

The inheritances of the war were so powerful that both politicians and the group of academicians wanted to study international relations to understand and prevent the war. Four main conclusions were drawn: first, war was a senseless act, which could never be a rational tool of state policy; secondly, the 1914-1918 war had been the result of leaders becoming caught up in a set of processes that no one could control; thirdly, the causes of the war lay in misunderstandings between leaders and in the lack of democratic responsibility within the states involved; and fourthly, the fundamental tensions which had provided the rationale for the conflict could be removed by the spread of statehood and democracy. These views were expressed most concisely by US President Woodrow Wilson, in his famous Fourteen Points proposal of January 1918.

This is the historical background in which international Relations as a subject evolved, hence the political and intellectual influence of this period profoundly influenced in its evolution. First of all, the discipline originated in two countries which were essentially satisfied powers following the First World War. This meant that the subject was developing in a specific type of state with a specific view of the main features of international society. The USA and the UK were, crucially, status quo powers, with interests firmly committed to allowing as little change to the new international order as possible. One of the main problems for the subject in the inter-war period was that it became increasingly identified as a status quo subject.

Secondly, the imprints of the First World War, with its wholesale destruction and loss of life, stamped the survivors with a strong conviction that such a war

must never happen again. It had been a ‘war to end all wars’. Accordingly, the subject that studied such phenomena took on a strongly normative, prescriptive character. International Relations had to be concerned with devising ways to avert such wars from occurring.

Thirdly, since the war had occurred due to misunderstanding of the leaders, the task of International relations was to devise ways to reduce misunderstandings in the future. Democracy in each of the societies and establishing international organizations to mediate were stressed as effective ways to enhance transparency and openness in the system. Subsequently, League of Nations was established to reduce tensions between international actors.

This is the reason the first approach to studying international relations has become known as Idealism, although this was not a term that the academics working in the subject at the time used themselves. As Hedley Bull has commented:

The distinctive characteristic of these writers was their belief in progress: the belief, in particular, that the system of international relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order; that under the impact of the awakening of democracy, the growth of the “international mind” the development of the League of Nations, the good works of men of peace of the enlightenment spread by their teachings, it was in fact being transformed; and that their responsibility as students of international relations was to assist this march of progress to overcome the ignorance, the prejudices, the ill-will, and the sinister interests that stood in its way.

Accordingly, the subject during the inter-war period concentrated with the issues like the prohibition of war and the establishment of an international police force, until the events of the 1930s challenged its basic assumptions.

1.3.5 THE ‘REALIST’ CRITIQUE OF LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

The events from 1930s occurred contrary to the beliefs of the Liberals. Japanese militarism in Manchuria and China, and ‘authoritarianism’ in the Spain, Nazism in Germany, Fascism in Italy, etc. grew contrary to the beliefs of the liberals. League of Nations remained ineffective from the beginning as US and USSR did not become members in its initial days.

Hence, the most influential critique of liberal internationalism came from E. H. Carr, the quasi-Marxist historian, journalist and, in the late 1930s, Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics. Carr produced a number of studies in the 1930s, the most famous of which was published in 1939 – *The Twenty Years Crisis*. This book performed the crucial task of providing a new vocabulary for International Relations theory. Liberal internationalism is renamed ‘utopianism’ (later writers sometimes use ‘idealism’) and differed with Carr’s approach which is termed ‘realism’. Carr’s major argument is that the liberal ideology’s advocacy of harmony of interests is nothing but hiding or camouflaging the real conflict in international relations – a conflict between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. A central feature of the world is scarcity – there are not enough of the good things of life to go around. Those who have them want to keep them, and therefore promote ‘law and order’ policies, attempting to outlaw the use of violence. The ‘have-nots’, on the other hand, have no such respect for the law, and neither is it reasonable that they should, because it is the law that keeps them where they are, which is under the thumb of the ‘haves’.

Although Carr produced unrelenting attack on the assumptions of idealism, it was Hans Morgenthau who did most to popularize the new approach of Realism. In his textbook, *Politics among Nations*, first published in 1948, Morgenthau proposed that international relations be studied by means of a Realist scientific approach. For Morgenthau, human nature was at the base of international relations. The base for the human nature is self-interest and power-seeking, which naturally result in aggression. The second major element in the realist view concerns the nature of international relations. ‘International politics, like all

politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever is the ultimate aim of international politics, power is always the immediate aim’.

In short, the classical realism joins a negative view of human nature with a notion of power politics between states that are functioning and acting in an anarchical international politics. This is a constant reality and there will not be any change in this situation. In fact, independent and self-help states in an anarchic international system are a stable feature of international relations, for classical realists.

The utopian liberalism of the 1920s and the realism of the 1930s–1950s represent the two competing positions in the first major debate in International Relations.

1.3.6 RISE OF BEHAVIOURALISM

The disciplinary growth of International Relations has taken altogether different turn with the emergence of Behaviouralists into the scene. They started questioning the scientific validity of Liberal notions but basic propositions advanced by the Realists as well. The Behaviouralists questioned them basically on the grounds of methodology. Hence, the second major debate in IR is based on methodology (Normative vs. Scientific). The behavioural revolution is closely associated with the rise of United States and research support extended by various organizations to develop particular models which suit to the interests of the US.

After the Second World War, the academic discipline of IR expanded rapidly. That was particularly the case in the United States, where government agencies and private foundations were willing to support ‘scientific’ IR research which they could justify as being in the national interest. That support produced a new generation of IR scholars who adopted a rigorous methodical approach. They were usually trained in political science, economics, or other social sciences, sometimes in mathematics and the natural sciences, rather than diplomatic history, international law, or political philosophy. These new IR scholars thus had a very different academic background and equally different ideas concerning how IR should be studied. These new ideas came to be summarized under the term

‘Behaviouralism’, which signified not so much a new theory as a novel methodology which endeavoured to be ‘scientific’ in the natural-science meaning of that term.

Just as scholars of science are able to formulate objective and verifiable ‘laws’ to explain the physical world, the ambition of Behaviouralists in IR is to do the same for the world of international relations. The main task is to collect empirical data about international relations, preferably large amounts of data, which can then be used for the measurement, classification, generalization, and, ultimately, the validation of hypotheses, i.e., scientifically explained patterns of behaviour. Behaviouralism is thus not a new IR theory; it is a new method of studying IR. Behaviouralism is more interested in observable facts and measurable data, in precise calculation, and the collection of data in order to find recurring behavioural patterns, the ‘laws’ of international relations. According to Behaviouralists, facts are separate from values. Unlike facts, values cannot be explained scientifically. The Behaviouralists were therefore inclined to study facts while ignoring values.

The Behaviouralists did not win the second major debate, but neither did the traditionalists. After a few years of vigorous controversy, the second great debate petered out. A compromise resulted which has been portrayed as ‘different ends of a continuum of scholarship rather than completely different games . . . Each type of effort can inform and enrich the other and can as well act as a check on the excesses endemic in each approach’. Yet Behaviouralism did have a lasting effect in IR. That was largely because of the domination of the discipline after the Second World War by US scholars, the vast majority of whom supported the quantitative, scientific ambitions of Behaviouralism. They also led the way in setting a research agenda focused on the role of the two superpowers, especially the United States, in the international system. That paved the way to new formulations of both realism and liberalism that were heavily influenced by Behaviouralist methodologies. These new formulations—neo-realism and neo-liberalism—led to a replay of the first major debate under new historical and

methodological conditions.

1.3.7 TRANSNATIONALISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE

The 1970s produced a third approach: Transnationalism which claimed that the state was no longer the dominant actor it had once been. According to the leading proponent of this view, John Herz, the state was being undermined by four factors: its susceptibility to economic warfare; the rise of international communications and the subsequent permeability of national frontiers; the development of air warfare, which could take war directly to a nation's population; and nuclear weapons, which threatened the very survival of states and their populations. The state was, therefore, Herz argued, unlikely to remain as the dominant unit of international relations for the future.

The economic integration, especially in Europe from 1950s, also increased the voices of Transnationalism. These voices started saying that states could no longer ensure economic growth unless they get integrated with other similar economies. Success in one area of integration would spill over into others, and eventually there would be a need to coordinate and collectively govern the hitherto separate economic organizations: so economic integration would lead to political integration.

In this context, the Transnationalists made the point that there are actors other than states which play a central role in international relations, the obvious example being multinational corporations. Interdependence makes the point that the increasing linkages among national economies have made them more than ever sensitive and vulnerable to events in other countries.

Transnationalism and interdependence challenge the three assumptions of Realism: states are not the only actors; the distinction between domestic and international societies is less clear-cut than before; and international politics looks to be influenced increasingly less by military factors and more and more by economic issues. The transnationalist challenge differs with the other approaches that have dominated the subject. It introduces non-state actors and

so belongs to a new pluralism in International Relations.

1.3.8 NEO-REALISM

Neo-realism emerged partly as a response to the assumptions of Transnationalism. Neo-realism belongs firmly to the Realist tradition, as its name suggests. The essence of Neo-realism is a more theoretically refined systemic or structural account of international relations. The critical mechanism employed by Neo-realism is termed as ‘hegemonic stability’. If an economic power can sufficiently dominate the international economy, it can provide a hegemonic stability which enables other states to cooperate with it and with one another. So is the case with political hegemony.

Waltz insists on explaining the behaviour of state solely at the level of the international system. There is to be no appeal to the intentions or capabilities of states, or to the human nature of their leaders. It is the international structure that determines the behaviour of each actor or state.

1.3.9 ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO IR

The debates introduced so far have concerned the established theoretical traditions in the discipline: liberalism, realism, transnationalism are considered to be part of mainstream IR Study. Currently a debate on IR is under way. It entails various critiques of the established traditions by alternative approaches, sometimes identified as post-positivism. There have always been ‘dissident voices’ in the discipline of IR: philosophers and scholars who have rejected established views and tried to replace them with alternatives. But in recent years these voices have increased in number.

For instance, the Structuralist perspective looks at international relations from the perspective of the less-developed countries. Indeed, its main proponents have come from outside the Anglo-American academic communities, often from Latin American or Africa. According to Structuralists, the state is still a dominant actor in international relations, but in a very specific sense, which is that of representing a set of economic interests. Hence there are actors other than the state, and their

exact role in international relations depends on the interests of international capital. The real actors are classes, and the location of the state within the global network of capitalism is crucial. This is usually discussed in terms of centre-periphery relations, both within and between states. It is the structural nature of centre-periphery relations that explains the nature of international politics and economics. The processes characterising international relations are those of exploitation, imperialism, and underdevelopment; the outcomes are fundamentally those of the continuing exploitation of the poor by the rich.

During the most recent period, the end of the Cold War changed the international agenda in some fundamental ways. In place of a clear-cut East/West conflict dominated by two contending superpowers a number of diverse issues emerged in world politics, including, for example, state partition and disintegration, civil war, terrorism, democratization, national minorities, humanitarian intervention, ethnic cleansing, mass migration and refugee problems, environmental security, and so forth. An increasing number of IR scholars expressed dissatisfaction with the dominant Cold War approach to IR: the neo-realism of Kenneth Waltz. Many IR scholars now take issue with Waltz's claim that the complex world of international relations can be squeezed into a few law-like statements about the structure of the international system and the balance of power. They subsequently reinforce the anti-behaviouralist critique first put forward by International Society theorists such as Hedley Bull. Many IR scholars also criticize Waltzian neo-realism for its conservative political outlook; there is not much in neo-realism that can point to change and the creation of a better world.

1.3.10 SUMMING UP DISCIPLINARY GROWTH

The field "International Relations" (commonly abbreviated IR) focuses on a variety of subject matters. The many connotations which are usually associated with the term "relations" and the quality which accompanies relating the name of the field (IR) to a broad set of subject matters subsumed under the same term in minor letters, "international relations", help explain why both IR and "international relations" are still widely accepted. Of course, this is not to say

that there is consensus. As a matter of fact, and predictably so, both the name of the field as well as any succinct description of its subject matter(s) have always been contested. Different observers have argued that the “international” ought to be replaced by “inter-state”, “transnational”, or “global” – just to name a few. Others would like to see “relations” replaced by “studies” or “politics”. A brief look at some of these alternative combinations – eg. “Inter-state relations”, “transnational politics”, or “global studies” – would give any reader a quick idea as far as different emphases is concerned even if he or she would not be familiar with the normative and theoretical underpinnings which inform these alternative descriptions of the field of study and its subject matter(s). For this very reason conceptual contestation is unsurprising: it is already an expression of the inevitable and recurring ascertainment of the borders of a field of study by the community of scholars belonging to it and claiming it as their own.

1.3.11 CLASSICAL VS SCIENTIFIC DEBATE

As we studied earlier, the debate between the Realists and Idealists dominated the scene during the interwar period, during the 1960s it has been replaced by what Morton Kaplan has called “the new great debate”. This new debate is between the two distinct intellectual styles or cultures, namely science and traditionalism. It was essentially a methodological debate revolving around the belief of Behaviouralists that IR could only advance itself by applying the methods of natural science. They believed that the field was too dominated by historians, who they labelled as Traditionalists (or Classicists), who took the view that IR should be developed through more interpretive historicist methods. Behaviouralists focus was on the observation of systems and that those analyses, and any subsequent hypotheses and/or implying of causality, should be subject to empirical testing, mainly via falsification. That way knowledge in IR could be progressively built up, allowing for greater intuitions and progress in theory development.

The battle lines were drawn between the likes of Hedley Bull on the Traditionalist side, and Morton Kaplan on the Behaviouralist. There were other recognisable figures on either side, such as Carr and Schelling, as well as divisions within

opposing camps, but Bull and Kaplan's arguments get to the heart of the matter. Though acknowledging the swift rise of scientific methods in America, Traditionalists maintained that the ebbs and flows of global politics were necessarily interpretive, as one could not impose a neat system on a field with so many variables. An opposing Hadley Bull wrote of the method, that with such "strict standards of verification and proof there is very little of significance that can be said about international relations".

According to Headley Bull, scientific approach has contributed very little to the theory of international relations. To support this claim he put forward seven propositions:

1. "By confining themselves to what can be logically or mathematically proved or verified according to strict procedures, the practitioners of the scientific approach are denying themselves the only instruments that are at present available for coming to grips with the substance of the subject. For example, does the collectivity of sovereign states constitute a political society or system, or does it not? What is the place of war in international society? Scientific method convincingly cannot answer these questions.
2. The scientific method succeeded only when it stepped beyond bounds of science.
3. The practitioners of the scientific approach are unlikely to make progress of the sort to which they aspire.
4. The followers of scientific method have done a great disservice to theory in this field by conceiving of it as the construction and manipulation of so-called "models". The freedom of the model-builder from the discipline of looking at the world is what makes him dangerous. He slips easily into a dogmatism that empirical generalization does not allow, attributing to the model a connection with reality it does not have.
5. The work of scientific school is in some cases distorted and impoverished by a fetish for measurement (overdoing of technique). The difficulty arises

where the pursuit of the measurable leads us to ignore relevant difference between the phenomena.

6. There is a need for rigour and precision in the theory of international politics, but that the sort of rigour and precision of which the subject admits can be accommodated readily enough within the classical approach. The theory of international relations should undoubtedly attempt to be scientific in the sense of being a coherent, precise, and orderly body of knowledge, and in the sense of being consistent with the philosophical foundations of modern science.
7. The practitioners of the scientific approach, by cutting themselves off from history and philosophy, have deprived themselves off the means of self-criticism, and in consequence have a view of their subject and its possibilities that is immature and arrogant”.

Bull is of the opinion that, as stated in the above seven reasons, the scientific approach is inappropriate to the study of international relations.

Behaviouralism was also criticised over what its perceived weaknesses could bring to the study of IR. It had roots in positivism and so strict application would mean rejecting factors that could not be measured, such as human perception and motivation and would also prevent the development of normative theories since they focused on empirically non-testable ‘what ought to be’. As well as a charge of failing to grasp societal nuances, criticism was also levelled at Behaviouralism’s early practice of supposedly separating theory and values from observations.

Behaviouralists countered these criticisms by largely recognising the potential value of knowledge produced by other methods of research, such as Kaplan’s acknowledgment of Bull’s contributions to arms control literature for example, but they reserved the right to test their own assumptions empirically. Behaviouralists even recognised and rectified their own perceived weaknesses, such as Hempel and Popper’s criticism of ‘narrow inductivist’ views and the

impossibility of some kind of theory or values remaining absent from observation (not that it meant all theories were equal of course), thus placing positivism on a more deductive than inductive path.

Behaviouralism never sought to be a substitute theory, but a means of discovering one and help Thomas Kuhn's idea that "a new area of research spins off from an established one on the basis of a new exemplar". Whether its proponents intended it or not however, Behaviouralism became orthodoxy and Debate victor, its key strength over Traditionalism being the ability of researchers to reproduce and analyse their colleagues' processes and findings, with impacts including the encouragement of diligent and detailed work by IR theorists, and that positivist America came to be seen as a bigger engine of political theory discourse.

Morton Kaplan offered a serious response to Bull's criticism of scientific method. Kaplan maintains that it's true that human purpose is concerned with motives. But these motives are often confirmed by careful observation analysis of the behaviour pattern of people. Kaplan also does not accept the traditionalists' argument that precision and quantification on which the scientific theorist so much insist cannot be achieved by the scientific methods. The difficulty with the traditionalists, according to Kaplan, is that they deliberately choose to ignore the significance of the evidence with which the scientific theorists work. Morton Kaplan also denies the traditionalists charge that the members of scientific school completely exclude philosophy in their analysis of international relations. Kaplan levels a counter charge against the traditionalists when he says that the traditionalists have not shown any disciplined knowledge of philosophy and have actually used the word "philosophy" as a synonym for "undisciplined speculation".

1.3.12 SUMMING UP

In sum, there are points of difference and points of agreement between Behaviouralists and Traditionalists. If, on the one hand, we stress the points of difference, we get a profound contrast between Behaviouralism and

traditionalism. The two approaches can be seen to hold categorically different conceptions of the world and fundamentally different ideas of the best way to gain knowledge of the world. On the other hand, if we stress the points of agreement, the two approaches are different ends of a continuum of scholarship rather than completely different games. Each type of effort can inform and enrich the other and can as well act as a check on the excesses in each approach. When the battle rages, the contenders tend to draw up their positions very sharply, emphasizing points of difference. When the smoke clears, more moderate voices on both sides often emphasize areas of agreement.

M.A. Political Science, Semester I

Course Title: **International Politics**

Unit – I: **International Politics: Evolution and Approaches**

**1.4 BEHAVIOURALISM AND ITS THEORIES: SYSTEMS THEORY,
GAME THEORY, COMMUNICATION THEORY**

- Suneel Kumar

STRUCTURE

1.4.0 Objectives

1.4.1 Introduction

1.4.2 Behaviouralism

1.4.3 System Theory

1.4.4 Communication Theory

1.4.5 Game Theory

1.4.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- Behaviouralism and propositions advanced by behavioural method
- System theory and its application to international relations
- Communication theory its contribution to international relations
- Game theory and its utility to study international relations

1.4.1 INTRODUCTION

Behaviouralism rose partly as a reaction against the traditional approaches of political inquiry and partly as a result of the quest in search for a more 'Scientific' knowledge about politics. Consequently, Political Scientists have in recent times, come out with a variety of approaches to meet their needs. The first breakthrough came with the emergence of the 'Behaviouralists Movement' in Political Science. Behaviouralism is particularly associated with the work of American Political Scientists after the Second World War.

1.4.2 BEHAVIOURALISM

Behaviouralism's origins can be traced back to Graham Wallas's work, *Human Nature in Politics* and Arthur Bentley's *The Process of Government*. Both were published as early as 1908. Wallas and Bentley were inclined to lay greater emphasis on the informal processes of politics and less on political institutions in isolation. Wallas sought to introduce a New Realism in political studies in the light of new findings in contemporary Psychology. The new Psychology had revealed that man was not totally a rational creature and that his political actions were not totally guided by reason and self-interest. Wallas therefore insisted on exploring facts and evidence for understanding human nature and its manifestations in human behaviour. Arthur Bentley, on the other hand, a pioneer of group approach to politics, primarily sought not to describe political activity, but to provide a set of new tools of investigation in the social sciences. Greatly inspired by Sociology, he proceeded to undertake a study of the role of pressure groups, political parties, elections and public opinion in the political process.

Charles E. Merriam was another pioneer of the behavioural approach. He is also famous as the founder of the 'Chicago School' which made substantial contribution to the Behaviouralists movement. In the article 'The Present State of The Study Of Politics' published in *American Political Science Review* (1921) and in his book '*New Aspects of Politics*' (1925), Merriam criticized contemporary Political Science for its lack of scientific rigour. In his presidential address to American 'Political Science Association' (1925), Merriam exhorted Political

Scientists to look at political behaviour as one of the essential objects of inquiry. George E. Catlin in his '*Science and Method of Politics*' (1927) advanced the case for a value-free pure science. He treated 'power' as the essence of politics and argued that analysis of power should not be inclined in favour of any particular value-system. Harold D. Lasswell, (1902-78), in his celebrated work '*Politics: Who Gets What, When and How*' (1936) proved to be a landmark in the empirical approach to politics as the study and analysis of power.

Despite these early attempts, Behaviouralism in Political Science was systematically developed only after the Second World War, particularly through the writings of American Political Scientists. David B. Truman, Robert Dahl, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, David Easton, Heinz Eulau are the most prominent personalities of the Behavioural movement in Political Science. Behaviouralism as such came to be understood as something wider than the study of political behaviour, yet political behaviour was its main focus. Behaviouralism as a movement in Political Science did not remain confined to the study of individual based political behaviour, but developed into a set of orientations, procedures and methods of analysis. In practice, it embraced all that lends a scientific character to the modern Political Science.

1.4.2.1 Foundations of Behaviouralism

According to David Easton, the intellectual foundations of Behaviouralism consist of eight major tenets:

1. Regularities: Discoverable uniformities in political behaviour which can be expressed in theory-like statements.
2. Verification: Validity of such theory like statements can be verified.
3. Techniques: Means for acquiring and interpreting data.
4. Quantification: Precision in the recording of data.
5. Values: Objective scientific inquiry has to be value free or value neutral.
6. Systematization: Close interrelationship between theory and research.
7. Pure Science: Directed towards forging a link between theoretical understanding of politics and application of theory to practical problem-

solving.

8. Integration: Integration of political science with other social sciences.

Therefore, Behaviouralism came to accord primacy to higher degree of reliability vis-à-vis higher degree of generality. In short, Behaviouralism focused on micro level situations rather than attempting macro level generalizations.

The behavioural approach to social science and political analysis, in all, are guided by two distinctive principles: these principles have been known to differentiate the Behaviouralists from other social sciences. These principles include: their insistence on the mere fact that observable behaviour, whether it be at the level of the individual or the social aggregate, should be the focus of their analysis at any point in time. They also insist that any explanation offered for that behaviour should be susceptible to empirical testing. In all these divers contexts, the central questions which the Behaviouralists seeks to answer are quite clear and simple. In Sanders' own words, "What do actors involved actually do? How can we best explain why they do it?" while we know that these are not just the only questions that Behaviouralists tackle, they however in fact believe that as far as Behaviouralists are concerned, they believe that these two questions are the most important ones when it comes to analyzing issues in political science.

The Behaviouralists insistence on empirical observation and testing of all theories etc, is what have earned the approach its characteristic feature for which the behavioural approach to social enquiry is known for today. These distinguishing characteristics for which the behavioural approach is known, has in recent times, attracted various criticisms from all and sundry. One of the major criticisms of the behavioural approach rests on the fact of association and influence which the Logical Positivist school of thought exerts on the behavioural approach. This positivist influence claims that statements which are neither definitions nor empirical are meaningless in its entire ramification. By implication, it has been argued by certain scholars that since the behavioural approach share the same mode of thought with logical positivism, it invariably becomes vulnerable to any weakness inherent in positivism.

1.4.3 SYSTEM THEORY

As a result of the Behaviouralists revolution, the term ‘system’ gained great importance in Political Science and also in International Politics. Traditionalists believe in the balance of power system. To Behaviouralists it conveys a different meaning. In behaviouralist conception, the states are regarded as actors always standing in inter-action with each other making the whole world as an organized complexity. In 1960, James Roseau argued that of all the advances that have occurred in the study of international phenomenon Perhaps none is more important than the ever-growing tendency to regard the world as an international system.

1.4.3.1 What is System?

The term ‘system’ refers to a structure of its own, having different parts which are inter-related and inter-dependent, which under-goes various processes to maintain its existence. A system, therefore, implies not only the inter-dependence of parts but also the acceptance of influence from environment and vice versa. Inter-dependence means that when the properties of a component in a system change, all other components and the system as a whole are affected. There are various kinds of systems. David Easton and G. A. Almond have used System approach for the study of political system while Mortan Kaplan has used it for the study of international system.

1.4.3.2 What is International System?

Stanley Hoffman regards international system as “...a pattern of relations among the basic units of world politics, characterized by the scope of the objectives pursued by those units and of the task performed among them as well as by the means used to achieve those goals and perform these tasks.” Spiro considers that the idea of international system is abstract, descriptive and theoretical. It contributes a perspective. The international system constitutes an expression to stimulate thought about a certain generalized image. Thus the states of the world

are conceived to be in contact and association in a complicated framework of relationships which is formed through the process of interaction. In other words it can be argued that the systems theory regards the world phenomenon in its totality through those processes of interaction operating at various levels. This theory views the world as a system which is regulative and adoptive. Each system exists for certain purposes. And, it is for the attainment of these purposes that it adopts and regulates itself to the environment.

1.4.3.3 Main Exponents and Assumptions of the System Approach

The Systems Approach conceives of states which come in contact to form a complicated relationship resulting from the phenomenon of interaction. The activities of a state are always directed towards the preservation of its national interest. But at the same time nations live with one another. They live in an international environment and participate in that environment. The behaviour of a nation is thus a two way activity of taking from and giving to the international environment. This process of exchange is called the International System.

Mortan Kaplan is the chief exponent of the international systems theory. The other important contributors to the system approach include Karl Deutsch, Charles McClelland, J. David Singer, Kenneth Boulding, David Easton and Anatole Rapport. The interpretation given by all these scholars refers to the variables of the international system, which help in a proper understanding of the interaction process. These variables are discussed as below:

- **Structure of the System:** Structure of the system refers to the pattern of relationship among the States. The pattern of relationship depends upon :(i) The distribution of capabilities referring to the evenness or unevenness; (ii) The characteristic configuration referring to un polarity, bipolarity or multi polarity and; (iii) The hierarchy within the system referring to the dominant and subordinate sub-system.
- **Components of the System:** It means actors of the system. The members or actors can be of different types such as sub-national, national,

transnational and Universal.

- **Boundary of the System:** Boundary refers to the dividing line between the environment and the system itself. Environment means all that exists or is perceived as existing outside that system. This makes it easier to draft a line between national and an international system.
- **Interaction among the Components:** The concept of system refers to the fact of interaction among its components. System theorists may differ on anything while defining a system, but they all agree on its aspect of interaction. Interaction is of different forms such as direct governmental, direct non--governmental and indirect governmental. Interaction may differ in content. It may be collaborative as well as conflicting. It is, however, not possible to have a distinct form in its true shape. Reference to one shape only means dominant traits of the interaction. Interaction may differ in intensity. For example the interaction between the actors of the West-European sub-system is of great intensity than between the actors of Africa.
- **Regulation in the System:** Regulation is the process by means of which a system attempts to maintain or preserve its identity over time as it adapts to changing circumstances. Regulation is aided by various factors such as culture, institution etc.

1.4.3.4 Morton Kaplan's International System Approach

Morton Kaplan has given most comprehensive and successful characterization of international politics in terms of systems theory. He has emphasized on the pattern of the behaviour of states. He argues that the character of state has been changing since its birth. Hence the International System has also been changing correspondingly. International System is thus never static, but dynamic. The shape system at a particular time reflects the conditions prevailing at that time.

The systems approach takes into consideration the action of nations, structure and functioning of the system, and the environmental factors that not only

condition the actions of nations but also the interaction among them and the working of the system itself. The system approach covers both the past and present of the International System. The international System has various smaller international systems at the lower scale working as sub-systems. Each sub-system affects the functioning of the bigger system and vice versa. Thus each system, in addition to being a system in itself, can be a sub-system of a larger system.

Kaplan believes that International System is the most important of all the systems. He does not regard International System as a political system. Reason being, he views that the role of decision makers in the international system is subordinate to their role in the national domestic system affirms that the behaviour of the national actors in the field of international affairs is invariably governed and guided by the basic consecration of national interest. He divides international actors into two categories – the national and supranational actors. The US, China, Russia and India are the examples of national actors while the NATO is an example supranational actors. According to Kaplan, International action takes places between international actors. It is the interaction between these two types of actors that ultimately gives birth to the International system.

According to Kaplan, there are five major international systems in International relations. These models have been described as below:-

(1) Balance of Power System

Kaplan's balance of power system is similar to the one which prevailed in the Western World in the 18th and 19th centuries. The actors who work within this system are international actors. They are also national actors. In this system there should be five or six essential actors. Prior to the First World War England, Germany, France, Italy and the United States etc. were the essential national actors. The operation of the balance of power system, according to Kaplan has six instant rules:

- Each actor should try to increase its capabilities but through negotiations and not through war.

- The foremost obligation of each actor must be to itself. It should achieve its national interest even at the risk of war, if necessary.
- The participant who is threatened of its own existence should stop fighting. It is to ensure that no essential participant is eliminated altogether.
- The participant should oppose any coalition of other participants in order to avoid predominance of that group in relation to the rest of the system.
- The participant should prevent other participants from subscribing to the supra-national principles, and;
- The defeated participants should be permitted to re-enter the system.

The balance of power system worked in the 18th and 19th centuries as an absolute system. It appeared as a rule of universal applicability. Nevertheless, this system has undergone a change as a result of the world wars. When the participants in the system, individually or collectively, do not play according to these six rules, the system becomes unstable. The moment this system becomes unstable, it is bound to be changed into a different system.

(2) The Bipolar System

The unstable balance of power system changes itself into a bipolar system. This change occurs if two national actors and their co-operating actors come to constitute dominance over two different blocs. Kaplan conceives of two types of bipolar system:-(a) the loose bipolar system and (b) the tight bipolar system.

(a) The Loose Bipolar System: The two super-powers are surrounded by a group of smaller powers and non-aligned states. The existence of non-aligned States makes the lower of the two major actors loose. The loose bipolar system differs from the balance of power system in many ways. Both the supranational actors and the national actors participate in the loose bipolar system. Supranational actors are divided into a sub-class of bloc actors like, NATO, CENTO, the Communist Bloc, and into universal actors like the United Nations. In the

loose bipolar system, each bloc has leading actor. The norms of the system among the actors differ according to their roles. Therefore, the loose bipolar system is characterized by the presence of two major bloc actors (Soviet Union and the US), non-member actors (the Non-Aligned countries) and the universal actor (UN). All of them perform unique and distinctive role within the system. This system has a great degree of inherent instability because the action of non-member actors is rarely of decisive importance.

(b) The Tight Bipolar System: The loose bipolar system will be transformed, according to Kaplan, into tight bipolar system. In this system, the non-aligned states will disappear and the system will operate only around two super blocs. But its stability will be guaranteed only when both bloc actors are hierarchically organized, otherwise the system will again revert to the loose bipolar system. The most important thing about the tight bipolar system is the virtual disappearance of the category of non-member national actors and the universal actor (UN).

(3) The Universal System

The Universal Actor System comes into existence with the extension of functions of essential actors in a Loose Bipolar System. The most striking feature of this system is that even though the national actors constantly try for more power, they are prevented effectively from going to war with each other by the UN. Hence, this system envisages that the universal actor (the United Nations) is sufficiently powerful to prevent war among national actors. But the national actors retain their individuality. The universal inter-national system will be an integrated system. It will possess integrated mechanism and will perform judicial, economic, political and administrative functions. National actors will try to achieve their objectives only within the framework of the universal actor. The national actors will use only peaceful means to get their objectives in view of the fact that the universal actor will be quite powerful to prevent national actors to resort to force. National interest will have to be subordinated to international objectives like peace and existence of humanity. This system is not likely to be achieved under the present circumstances. A long

spell of instability is bound to precede the establishment of this type of system.

(4) Hierarchical International System

It is a system in which practically the whole of the world, except one nation, is brought under the control of one universal actor. In this system, the universal actor absorbs practically the whole of the world except only one nation. The hierarchical international system can be directive as well as non- directive. It will be directive if it is formed as a consequence of world conquest by a national actor. The national actors lose their primary function of transmitting the rules of the national systems. The states become merely territorial sub-division of the system instead of being independent political systems. Once established, it will be impossible to displace this system. However, it will be non-directive if it is based on political rules generally operative in democracies. As a result, there will be great tension in a directive hierarchical system than in a non-directive system.

(5) Unit Veto System

In this system weapons play the most important role. Unit Veto System is possible only under the condition that all actors (states) possess such weapons individually as to destroy any other actor even though it cannot avoid its own destruction. It conceives of weapons of such a nature that any national actor can destroy any other before being destroyed itself. This is a very peculiar system, and corresponds to the State of nature described by Hobbes in which interests of all are opposed and in which all are at war with one another. The essence of this system is that each State will be equally able to destroy each other. The only condition in which such a system is possible is the possession by all actors of the weapons of such a nature that any actor is able to destroy any other actor, even though at the risk of its own destruction. In this system, however, universal actor cannot exist.

1.4.3.5 System Theory: Critical Evaluation

Morton Kaplan's system theory has been criticized by various scholars on the different grounds.

First of all, Kaplan's typology of five systems of international relations is arbitrary and defective. Out of five models, only two models were in actual operation. The balance of power system existed in the 18th and 19th centuries and is still working in some form or the other. Like-wise, the loose bipolar system existed in the late fifties and sixties of the 20th Century. However, the other four models pertain to future and have never come into operation. Kaplan makes only a prediction and to this extent his theory is defective.

Second, Kaplan argues that the balance of power system passes into loose bipolar system and then into tight bipolar system which in turn transforms itself into universal, international and then into hierarchical international system. But at present, in the age of loose bipolar system the trends are in favour of the stability of non-aligned states rather than in that of their disappearance. The Super-power blocs have experienced intra-bloc dissensions represented in the most acute form by China's defection from the Soviet bloc and the critical attitude of France adopted towards the US. Similar is the attitude of Great Britain. Thus, at present, in international politics, small powers are gradually asserting themselves either individually or collectively. China is also asserting itself to form one bloc. Japan also wants to assert itself. So the chances of the development of a tight bipolar system would be very dim. The transformation from loose bipolar system will be into multi polar system and not tight bipolar system.

Third, Kaplan's theory has also proved false as he envisages the transformation of the universal actor system into the hierarchical international system in which only one nation will be left as the universal actor. This sort of transformation is possible only in the revival of imperialism and colonialism. The possibility of such a revival means misunderstanding the entire process of international politics.

Fourth, Kaplan ignores the forces which determine the scale of state's behaviour. He omits altogether the forces and factors at work within the State. He also does not take into account the factors and conditions which lead nations to behave collectively. He also ignores how national interests affect the behaviour of States. This is a serious omission from the point of view of the completeness of the

system.

Fifth, this theory also fails to give the exact number of international systems. It is not clear whether all the states form one international system or they form several participating systems.

In spite of severe criticism, the System theory is significant to understand the international relations. It is not only the Morton Kaplan who has worked on systems theory but others scholars such as Charles McClelland, Stanley Hoffman, Kenneth Boulding and Harold Guetzkow have also contributed and emphasized on the significance of the system approach. Kaplan has been associated more with the systems theory, primarily due to his rigorous, systematic and highly abstract thinking on the subject. Other scholars have mostly studied it by criticizing Kaplan. Hence, this theory is a useful guide to the development of a general international theory.

1.4.4 COMMUNICATION THEORY

Communication theory gives meaning to revolution that has occurred in communications and has changed the nature of human contacts and social relations in all the parts of the world. Breakthrough in the communication field in the 20th century had great impact on the human behaviour as well as the world affairs. Modern communication technology has changed the way of life of the developed societies; rent the centuries old customs and traditions in the developing ones and moreover has altered the relationships between these two societies. In international relations due to the great advance in communications rapid changes have been occurred. They provided instruments and techniques for the transmission of information and ideas, of skills and technology and for the closer contacts among peoples and also among the states.

Communications deeply rooted in human behaviours and societies. It is difficult to think of social or behavioural events from which communication is absent. Indeed, communication applies to shared behaviours and properties of any collection of things, whether they are human or not.

We might say that communication consists of transmitting information. In fact, many scholars of communication take this as a working definition, and use Lasswell's maxim ("who says what to whom in which channel with what effect") as a means of circumscribing the field of communication. Others stress the importance of clearly characterizing the historical, economic and social context. The field of communication theory can benefit from a conceptualization of communication that is widely shared.

Communication Theory attempts to document types of communication, and to optimize communications for the benefit of all.

Many suggest that there is no such thing as a successful body of communication theory, but that we have been relatively more successful in generating models of communication. A model, according to a seminal 1952 article by Karl Deutsch ("On Communication Models in the Social Sciences"), is "a structure of symbols and operating rules which is supposed to match a set of relevant points in an existing structure or process." In other words, it is a simplified representation or template of a process that can be used to help understand the nature of communication in a social setting. Such models are necessarily not one-to-one maps of the real world, but they are successful only insofar as they accurately represent the most important elements of the real world, and the dynamics of their relationship to one another.

1.4.4.1 Walter Lippmann's Public Opinion Model

Public Opinion (1922) is perhaps Lippmann's most well-known work. It was in this piece that Lippmann first began to develop and explain his theories on the formation of public opinion. Lippmann begins this book by describing a situation in 1914, where a number of Germans, Frenchmen, and Englishmen were trapped on an island. They have no access to media of any kind, except for once every sixty days when the mail comes, alerting them to situations in the real world. Lippmann explains that these people lived in peace on the island, treating each other as friends, when in actuality the war had broken out and they were enemies.

Throughout *Public Opinion*, Lippmann explains the way that our individual opinions can differ from those that are expressed in the outside world. He develops the idea of propaganda, claiming that “In order to conduct propaganda, there must be some barrier between the public and the event”. With this separation, there is the ability of the media to manipulate events or present limited information to the public. This information may not match the public’s perception of the event. In this way, Lippmann was essentially presenting some of the first views on the mass communication concepts of gate keeping and agenda-setting, by showing the media’s power to limit public access to information.

1.4.4.2 Harold Lasswell’s Propaganda Model

Harold Lasswell (1902-1978) was a prominent scholar in the area of propaganda research. He focused on conducting both quantitative and qualitative analyses of propaganda, understanding the content of propaganda, and discovering the effect of propaganda on the mass audience. Lasswell is credited with creating the mass communication procedure of content analysis. Generally, content analysis can be defined as, “...the investigation of communication messages by categorizing message content into classifications in order to measure certain variables”. In an essay entitled “Contents of Communication,” Lasswell explains that a content analysis should take into account the frequency with which certain symbols appear in a message, the direction in which the symbols try to persuade the audience’s opinion, and the intensity of the symbols used. By understanding the content of the message, Lasswell aims to achieve the goal of understanding the “stream of influence that runs from control to content and from content to audience”.

Lasswell’s most well-known content analyses were an examination of the propaganda content during World War One and Two. In *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, Lasswell examined propaganda techniques through a content analysis, and came to some striking conclusions. He showed that the content of war propaganda had to be pervasive in all aspects of the citizen’s life in order to be effective. Furthermore, Lasswell showed that as more people were reached by this propaganda, the war effort would become more effective. “...[T]he active

propagandist is certain to have willing help from everybody, with an axe to grind in transforming the War into a march toward whatever sort of promised land happens to appeal to the group concerned. The more of these sub-groups he can fire for the War, the more powerful will be the united devotion of the people to the cause of the country, and to the humiliation of the enemy”.

Aside from understanding the content of propaganda, Lasswell was also interested in how propaganda could shape public opinion. This dealt primarily with understanding the effects of the media. Lasswell was particularly interested in examining the effects of the media in creating public opinion within a democratic system.

1.4.4.3 The Frankfurt School and Communication Theory

The Frankfurt School¹¹ was a group of critical theorists associated with the Institute of Social Research which was located first at the University of Frankfurt, then in Geneva, Switzerland, Columbia University in New York, and finally back at the University of Frankfurt, from 1949 to present. Some of the theorists associated with what became known as the Frankfurt School included Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Erich Fromm, Leo Lowenthal, and Friedrich Pollock.

The interests of the Frankfurt School theorists in the 1920s and 1930s lay predominantly in a Marxist analysis of social and economic processes, and the role of the individual and the group in relation to these processes. Their particular relevance to communication theory lies primarily in Adorno’s idea of the culture industry, and Marcuse’s concept of the “one dimensional” man.

According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the culture industry was the result of an historical process that with an increase in technology (including mass communication technology) there was an increase in the ability to produce commodities, which enabled increased consumption of goods. The consumption of mechanically reproduced cultural products—predominantly radio and film—led to formulas of producing them for entertainment purposes, and it did not occur to consumers to

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question the idea that the entertainment presented to them had an ideological purpose or purposes. Consumers adapted their needs around these cultural products, and in doing so no longer knew of anything else that they might desire, or that there might be anything else they could desire. The entertainment that they enjoyed did not reflect their real social, political, or economic interests, but instead blinded them from questioning the prevailing system. Entertainment also had the function of allowing the dominant system to replicate itself, which allowed for further expansion in production and consumption. Thus, for Adorno and Horkheimer the culture industry worked in such a way that those who were under its influence would not even notice that they were being manipulated.

For Adorno, popular culture on film and radio did not bother to present itself as art. They were instead a business, and this in turn became an ideology “to legitimize the trash they intentionally produce”. This business was based on what Adorno referred to as “Fordist capitalism,” in which mass production based on the techniques used by Henry Ford were implemented in the cultural sphere, insofar as these tendencies were based on centralization and hierarchy. Examples of this—not specified by Adorno—were the Hollywood production system, or the CBS radio network that had been associated with the Princeton Radio Research Project. Movies and hit songs were based on formulas, and “the formula supplants the work”. Mechanical reproduction ensured that there would not be any real change to the system, and that nothing truly adversarial to the system would emerge.

To sum up this section, Communication scholars define communication as the process by which people interactively create, sustain, and manage meaning. As such, communication both reflects the world and simultaneously helps create it. Communication is not simply one more thing that happens in personal and professional life; it is the very means by which we produce our personal relationships and professional experiences—it is how we plan, control, manage, persuade, understand, lead, love, and so on. Some of the models developed based on communication theory that are relevant to international relations are briefly mentioned above.

1.4.5 GAME THEORY

The Game Theory is another important theory came into prominence with the behavioural revolution. Initially it was developed by John Von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern's in their classic work *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour* in 1944. The theory which was developed to explain economic models was later on borrowed by scholars of other disciplines. A game is simply a situation in which there are two or more parties who can affect what happens, all of whom are pursuing their separate aims. Such situations provide particular challenges, both for decision makers and for students of choice. Because no actor has complete control over events, each needs to take account of the others' possible actions. Suppose actor A's most advantageous course of action depends on what actor B decides to do, and vice versa. If both realize that this is so, A will try both to anticipate and to influence B's choices, knowing that B is trying to do the same in reverse. Thus even if A and B never meet, their decisions interact, and they will find themselves in an outcome dependent on both their choices. Such situations typically bring forth possibilities for mutual threats, deceit, bluff, and counter-bluff. But these are still only one side of the story. Conflict is seldom absolute. Some common interests can almost always be discerned, so joint gains can be made by cooperating-or at least keeping conflict within limits. Thus interactive decisions are also concerned with cooperation and "collaborative advantage" and with promises as well as threats. Where aims partially diverge—as they usually do—conflict and cooperation become two sides of the same coin and cannot properly be dealt with separately.

Game models are intended to provide an analytical guide through this maze. There are various ways of representing a game, perhaps the most intuitive being as a tree of moves, in which each branch, or move, is under the control of a particular player, and the moves available at any point may depend on those already made. One can visualise the game of chess, for example, as a fantastically-complicated tree of possible moves. This extensive form model will be discussed later, but a simple tree of moves is illustrated in Figure 1. This two-player case has just seven possible outcomes (end points of the tree).




Figure 1: Structure of a simple game tree (extensive form model)

Player A moves first, choosing between moves a and b. B then chooses p or q. If B chooses q, A has a further choice either between x, y and z (if initial choice was a), or just between x and y (if initial choice was b)

Much of Game Theory-at least until recently-has been based on Von Neumann's notion of "strategy." Technically, a strategy is a complete recipe of actions, specifying what is to be done in every possible circumstance that might be encountered. In the case shown in Figure 1, for example, one single strategy for player A is to choose option "a" initially, then "y" if B chooses "p," but "x" if he chooses "q." In this way, it was argued, a series of choices could be telescoped into one single choice of strategy without any loss of generality. It was this

simplification that paved the way for the first general analyses of games. In this strategic or normal form, a game consists of the following:

- Two or more players, that is, the interested parties. For the purposes of the model, players can be individuals, groupings such as committees or cabinets, or entities such as corporations or nations.
- A set of strategies for each player, representing possible courses of action, each including all necessary conditional clauses.
- The set of possible outcomes of the game, given by considering all the combinations of strategies that the players could choose.
- A set of preference functions specifying how good or bad each outcome is for each player. Game Theory is often thought to require quantification of preferences by means of utility scales. However, many models assume only that one can define a preference order for each player, that is, outcomes are simply ranked from best to worst.

There are many types of games within the ambit of the theory. Games can have two, three, or many players. They can be played with or without communication. They may be played just once, or repeated many times. A game may include chance events as well as deliberate moves; this is modelled by introducing “nature” as a separate player, presumed to have no preferences but to act in accordance with certain probabilities. These are called **zero-sum games** since one player’s gains are other player’s loses. Co-operative Game Theory allows players to form binding coalitions. But the most fundamental distinction among types of games concerns the relationship between the players’ aims. At one extreme, their preferences may be exactly opposed, so that any gain by one must be at the other’s expense. At the other extreme, the players’ aims may exactly coincide. Their problem is then one of pure coordination in trying to achieve what they both want. These are called **coordination games**. Between these extremes are games in which the players’ interests are in partial conflict, so that they may be torn between conflict and cooperation. These are known as **mixed-motive games**.

Thinking carefully about a situation in terms of relevant players, strategies, outcomes, and preferences can be a useful exercise in itself, drawing attention to features that might otherwise be overlooked. For most Game Theorists, however, the main point is to bring some deductive analysis to bear. The first and simplest form of analysis assumes that every player knows what the game is (that is, has complete information about everyone's available strategies and preferences) but does not know what strategy has been chosen by the other player(s). The theory then provides conclusions about the decision problem. In particular, analysis determines the existence of any equilibrium: outcomes in which each strategy choice is a rational response to the other(s). Such choices are mutually reinforcing: anticipating the other players' decisions would not lead one to change one's own. Formally, there are various kinds of equilibrium, the simplest being a Nash Equilibrium, in which no individual player can achieve a better outcome by changing strategy as long as all other players' choices are held constant. Other criteria allow for moves by coalitions rather than just individual players, or suppose that any change may set off a sequence of responses and counter-responses rather than holding other players' choices constant.

Mixed-motive games are much closer to the real world of partial conflict, threats and promises, bargaining and negotiation, dispute settlement, and-arguably conflict resolution. In these games, convincing normative solutions are more difficult to find. This has led to different ways of interpreting the theory, affecting the types of conclusions drawn.

Two Illustrations

Two well-used examples will serve to illustrate these ideas. The first is the game of Chicken. This has frequently been used to model situations of international brinkmanship such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, and such a model is represented by the normal form matrix in Figure 2. Each player's possible strategies are shown along one side of the matrix: one player controls the rows, the other the columns. (A three-player game would have a 3-D matrix, and so on.) Each cell of the matrix represents a possible outcome, and in each cell are the players'

preferences. In this case, there are two players-labelled “White House” and “Kremlin”-each with just two choices-”back down” or “stand firm.” The figures shown in the cells represent preference rankings from 4 (best) down to 1 (worst). (Those for “White House” are on the left in each pair.) Though the two sides clearly do not have the same preferences, this is not a straightforward zero-sum conflict. If neither side backs down, both end up with their worst possible outcome. Note that the model requires only preference orders. It does not depend on being able to quantify the desirability of the outcomes.

Figure 2: Cuban missile crisis modelled as a game of chicken, showing matrix normal form model.

		Kremlin	
		Back Down	Stand Firm
White House	Back Down	3, 3	2, 4
	Stand Firm	4, 2	1, 1

Numbers indicate ordinal preferences (4 = “best”); those for “White House” are on left of each cell

The model, of course, draws on an analogy with games of Chicken played in cars or on motorcycles by Hell’s Angels and the like-the choice being whether to be a live but despised “chicken” by swerving first, or to risk disaster by driving on. However, the conclusions drawn can be applied to any situation-regardless of context-in which there are two sides with these preferences. There is a tricky problem of choice here. If you assume that the other side will choose in the same way as yourself, then either choice must turn out “wrong.” If she swerves,

you should have driven on, and vice versa. Analyzing the game reveals two (Nash) equilibria: “4,2” and “2,4.” That is, a “win” for either side can be stable, because the loser could only move to an even worse outcome. However, the game is symmetric between the two players, so there is no way of telling which side will establish a winning position. In practice, the model tells us to expect a race to establish commitment, each side trying to convince the other that it cannot or will not back down. Thomas Schelling provides a classic exposition of the tactics to be expected, many of which can indeed be observed in everyday life as well as in high politics.

The second game is known as Prisoners’ Dilemma. The name derives from a story about two suspected criminals held in separate cells, each given the choice of squealing or maintaining silence. In IR, it is frequently used as a simple model of arms races, and in this form it is shown in Figure 3. The game involves two (in this case, fictional) nations, Country X and Country Y, each again having just two possible strategies, “arm” and “disarm.” Four outcomes can result—an arms race, mutual disarmament, or an arms lead for one or the other side. The model supposes that both sides would most like to gain an advantage, would least like to be left behind, but would prefer mutual disarmament to an arms race. The dilemma is as follows. Given our supposition that both players know what the game is, the leaders of Country X may very well reason:

I am not sure what Country Y will do, but there are two possibilities, and either way, we do better by arming. If they disarm, arming gives us our best outcome (“4” instead of “3”). If they arm, then by doing the same, we at least avoid the worst outcome. Come to think of it, I can see that their leaders face the same problem. We must therefore expect them to arm too.

The argument from Country Y’s point of view is of course analogous. For each, arming represents a so-called dominant strategy: one that pays off whatever the other does. So it surely seems rational for each to arm, and to expect the other to do the same. Unfortunately, both players then do worse (2, 2) than they would if

they both acted irrationally (3, 3).

Figure 3: Prisoners' dilemma game as model of an arms race

		Country Y	
		Disarm	Arm
Country X	Disarm	3, 3	1, 4
	Arm	4, 1	2, 2

Numbers indicate ordinal preferences, Country X are on the left in each cell

It is no surprise that Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma are the most famous of all game models, both having acquired a huge literature of their own. Though obviously very simple in some senses (only two players, two strategies each, no conditional moves, and so on), they seem to pose genuine dilemmas for rational choice. The response to such dilemmas, however, varies in theory as well as in practice. This reflects differing views about the purposes of analysis.

1.4.5.1 Game Theory: Criticism

Forty-odd years' worth of controversy has yielded a rich literature critiquing, and defending, Game Theory. In essence, critics of Game Theory typically allege that its models are oversimplified, that the theory is inherently repellent, or that the whole notion of rational choice is unrealistic or morally unsound. Let us consider each group of charges in turn.

To many people Game Theory can appear highly quantitative. Moreover, just as numbers can repel, so can words. To describe an important problem as a “game” can be deeply offensive. The theory’s frequent association with both free-market economics and with hawkish versions of deterrence can make it unpalatable to those on the political left. As a matter of history, many pioneers of Game Theory were deeply affected by the politics of the Cold War, which is hardly surprising given the times.

Game Theory’s presumption that players (particularly, in IR, states) are to be modelled as rational actors has attracted much criticism. Rationality is often taken to imply selfishness, and rational choice theory interpreted as offering an immoral (or at least amoral) view of life.

In summary, the game paradigm need not take players to be self-interested, materialistic, or cold-blooded. However, it does unashamedly stress the importance of deliberate choices. Players are taken to be motivated by preferences for outcomes. They also recognize that they are in interaction with each other and plan accordingly. Comparative neglect of needs can be seen as an important limitation. This need not prevent one from using preference-based models, but it must be acknowledged that they only tell part of the story.

**2.1 REALISM AND NEO-REALISM: STATISM, SURVIVAL AND
SELF-HELP IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

- V. Nagendra Rao

STRUCTURE

- 2.1.0 Objectives**
- 2.1.1 Introduction**
- 2.1.2 The Roots of the Realist World View**
- 2.1.3 Classical Realism**
- 2.1.4 Hans Morgenthau's Realism**
- 2.1.5 Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism**

2.1.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- The roots of the realist world view
- The basic propositions of classical realism
- Hans Morgenthau's Realism and its assumptions

- Kenneth Waltz's structural realism and the advances it made to realist theory

2.1.1 INTRODUCTION

No single theory consistently explains the large array of international interactions, but one theoretical framework has historically held a central position in the study of IR. This approach, called realism, is defended by some IR scholars and strongly challenged by others, but almost all take it into account.

Realism (or political realism) is a school of thought that elucidates international relations in terms of power. The use of power by states against each other is sometimes called *realpolitik*, or just power politics.

Often described as the dominant worldview in the study of International Relations (IR), political realism has been implicated in every major debate in IR over the last 50 years. In describing and understanding the realist worldview, it is usual to distinguish realism from other worldviews and to split realist theories into separate subgroups.

2.1.2 THE ROOTS OF THE REALIST WORLDVIEW

Realists regard themselves as heirs to an extended intellectual tradition. It is customary to trace realism back to antiquity, with claims that its arguments can be found in important works from Greece, Rome, India, and China. The proponents of realism suggest that Thucydides' history of *The Peloponnesian War* illustrates realism's scepticism for the restraining effects of morality. Thucydides, in a speech attributed to the Athenians in the Melian dialogue notes that 'right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must'. Realists also argue that Thucydides explains Greek city-states' behaviour by their power relations, famously observing that '[t]he growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable'.

Realist point of view can also be found in Kautilya's Arthashastra from India. According to realists Kautilya 'is concerned with the survival and aggrandizement of the state' and 'clearly instructs in the principles of a balance of power system'. They further state that 'Kautilya focuses on the position of the potential conqueror who always aims to enhance his power at the expense of the rest.'

Realists also claim Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527) among their number. Starting from a deeply pessimistic view of human nature, Machiavelli argues for strong and efficient rulers for whom power and security are the major concerns. Unlike individuals, such rulers are not bound by individual morality: 'any action that can be regarded as important for the survival of the state carries with it a built-in justification'. Realists also identify themselves with Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and his notion of a 'state of nature' where the absence of overriding authority allows human appetites to be pursued without restraint – individuals engage in constant conflict, with their lives being concurrently 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short'.

Political realism's protracted existence gives it a distinct advantage over relatively younger liberal alternatives. It is important, therefore, to note that realist version of antiquarian writings are often questioned. Garst, for example, argues that Thucydides' history cannot be read as an analogue of modern realism. Similarly, Butterfield argues that Hume is mistaken in his interpretation of Polybius' account of Hiero and that 'the idea of the balance of power did not exist in the ancient world'. Despite of one's views on the longevity of realist thinking, however, there is more consensus that the millennia-long record of intergroup conflict seems to support realism's pessimistic worldview. While realism's construal of particular episodes has been disputed, even its critics (Wendt 2000) acknowledge that humankind has, in most times and in most places, lived down to realism's very low expectations.

2.1.3 CLASSICAL REALISM

Twentieth-century classical realism is generally dated from 1939 and the publication of Edward Hallett Carr's *The 20 Year's Crisis*. Classical realists are

usually characterized as responding to the then-dominant liberal approaches to international politics although some scholars disagree on how widespread liberalism was during the interwar years. In addition to Carr, work by Shuman (1933), Nicolson (1939), Niebuhr (1940), Schwarzenberger (1941), Wight (1946), Morgenthau (1948), Kennan (1951), and Butterfield (1953) formed part of the realist canon. It was, however, Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, which became the undisputed standard bearer for political realism, going through six editions between 1948 and 1985.

According to classical realism, as the desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity, states are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities. The absence of the international equivalent of a state's government is a permissive condition that gives human appetites free reign. In short, classical realism explains conflictual behaviour by human failings. Particular wars are explained, for example, by aggressive statesmen or by domestic political systems that give greedy parochial groups the opportunity to pursue self-serving expansionist foreign policies. For classical realists international politics can be characterized as evil: bad things happen because the people making foreign policy are sometimes bad.

There are some commonalities one can identify among the classical realists though the issues they have dealt were different from each other. First, they agree that the human condition is a condition of insecurity and conflict that must be addressed and dealt with. Second, they agree that there is a body of political knowledge, or wisdom, to deal with the problem of security, and each of them tries to identify the keys to it. Finally, they agree that there is no final escape from this human condition, which is a permanent feature of human life. In other words, although there is a body of political wisdom—which can be identified and stated in the form of political maxims—there are no permanent or final solutions to the problems of politics—including international politics. There can be no lasting peace between states. This pessimistic and gloomy view is at the heart of the IR theory of the leading classical realist of the twentieth century, Hans J. Morgenthau.

2.1.4 HANS MORGENTHAU'S REALISM

As the title of his 1970 collection of essays, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade*, suggests Morgenthau's career revolved around a commitment to discovering the "truth" of international politics and an assertion of the primacy of power in IR. His incessant toil in the fields of history and political theory were intended to provide the means for the discovery of this truth. Morgenthau rejected existing liberal and scientific theories of international politics for precisely this reason—they did not produce a true theory of international politics, but rather included it in a scientific philosophy and methodology that concealed rather than exposing the harsh realities of international existence. For Morgenthau, the truth about international politics was intrinsically bound to power, so much so that a commitment toward examining the central role of power in IR dominates his work. The ascendancy of power is the ultimate reality and truth of international politics as it pervades the social and political fabrics of human existence.

Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* has become the classic text of American Realism—a book that defined the field of IR in America for generations after World War Two. In this work, he proposes a theory of international politics that is designed to make the international arena less complex and understandable to the student of international politics. He does this by outlining a theory of truth about the nature of power and the practice of power in international politics. The aim of this delineation is to create the foundations for a science of international politics that would provide a rational approach for understanding global politics.

2.1.4.1 Determining "Truth" in International Relations

In the earliest phase of his career in America, Morgenthau was committed to the notion of truth derived from observational experience combined with a rational approach to the systematization of knowledge. Setting himself against the dominant European modes of thought of deduction and positivism, Morgenthau developed a thoroughgoing scepticism towards the functional blindness of the social sciences.

However, in the later part, Morgenthau got frustrated with the Rationalist models as they have become, in his understanding, too rigid and over simplistic. Morgenthau's main complaint with rationalism is its misunderstanding of the nature of social knowledge. Rationalist models are described as "idols," the product of seventeenth-century rationalism's desires for an order analogous to the order perceived in the natural world, a vision of science hopelessly outdated in the twentieth century. The array of causes and effects that characterize politics and IR are poorly served by the "arbitrary abstraction" of the single-cause pseudo scientism of the liberals and Marxists who attribute all the ills of the social world to the distribution of wealth and resources in the international environment. This form of "single-cause" theorization is derived from the rationalist mode of thought typical of the Enlightenment and is responsible for incorrect readings of international politics that cannot be expected to be relevant for more than a short period of time.

2.1.4.2 A "True" Science of International Relations

Morgenthau has a very particular notion of what constitutes "science," which rests on the distinction between being rational as opposed to rationalistic. If political cynicism and scepticism are the keys to understanding IR, the role of scientific analysis is to trim down national objectives to the measure of available resources. Economics, the most significant of the social sciences in terms of prediction, serves as a model (though not explicitly) for a science of IR as passages such as the following demonstrate: "No nation has the resources to promote all desirable objectives with equal vigour; all nations must therefore allocate their scarce resources as rationally as possible."

Morgenthau's position should be clearly distinguished from positivistic attempts to create a quantitative science of IR, a project he derided for being responsible for the replacement of genuine "theory" by "dogma." Morgenthau had determined that "good" science was the separation of truth from sham, an attempt to understand reality in a systematic and theoretical fashion. The failure of the "new" theories was that they told nothing of "the real world" and perpetuated

through their language the metaphysics of utopianism. Truth, the most important of concepts for Morgenthau, was to be found not in formulae, but in the prudential judgment that originates in philosophy and history.

2.1.4.3 *Politics among Nations: Enunciating a Realist Theory of Power*

Morgenthau's different writings on the philosophy of knowledge, theory, and the political experience of IR are distilled in his most famous work, *Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*. The rationale of this book is to uncover the "objective truth" of IR through the discovery of fundamental principles that can make political activity "knowable" through a scientific theory. It is in *Politics among Nations* that Morgenthau makes clear his philosophy of power and the logic of its operation in the international environment. The combination of a rational outline and the attempt to draw lessons from the historical record typify the approach of Morgenthau in *Politics among Nations*.

According to Morgenthau, the struggle between states leads to the problem of justification of the threat or use of force in human relations. Here we arrive at the central normative doctrine of classical realism. Morgenthau follows the tradition of Thucydides and Machiavelli: there is one morality for the private sphere and another and very different morality for the public sphere. Political ethics allows some actions that would not be tolerated by private morality. Morgenthau is critical of those theorists and practitioners, such as American President Woodrow Wilson, who believed that it was necessary for political ethics to be brought into line with private ethics.

For Morgenthau, the heart of statecraft is thus the clear-headed knowledge that political ethics and private ethics are not the same, that the former cannot be and should not be reduced to the latter, and that the key to effective and responsible statecraft is to recognize this fact of power politics and to learn to make the best of it. Responsible rulers are not merely free, as sovereigns, to act in a convenient way. They must act in full knowledge that the mobilization and exercise of political power in foreign affairs inevitably involves moral dilemmas, and sometimes evil actions. The awareness that political ends (e.g., defending the

national interest during times of war) must sometimes justify morally questionable or morally tainted means (e.g., the targeting and bombing of cities) leads to situational ethics and the dictates of 'political wisdom': prudence, moderation, judgement, resolve, courage, and so on. Those are the cardinal virtues of political ethics. They do not preclude evil actions. Instead, they underline the tragic dimension of international ethics: they recognize the inevitability of moral dilemmas in international politics: that evil actions must sometimes be taken to prevent a greater evil.

2.1.4.4 The Six Principles of Political Realism

Morgenthau has a precise idea of the purpose of theory, which is "to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible."

His six principles go against the philosophy of Liberalism. Liberalism takes as its foundational assumption the essential "goodness" of human nature: the failure of the social order is a failure to live up to rational standards, and the means by which to create order is through education, reform, and occasionally coercive violence. On the other side lies Realism, which Morgenthau epitomize as rationally imperfect, a fault that is the result of human imperfection. The world is not composed of a single vision, but is instead composed of a range of opposing and conflicting interests. Moral principles, far from being universal, can never be fully realized and can at best attain an approximate morality based on the lesser evil rather than the greater good. The purpose of the distinction is to reinforce in the reader's mind the pragmatic and grounded nature of Realist theory in contrast to the abstract, rationalistic theorization of international politics.

In what seems a peculiar decision, Morgenthau declares that it is not his intention to attempt a "systematic exposition" of the political philosophy of Realism, but rather to restrict his analysis of Realism to the presentation of six principles, "which have been frequently misunderstood."

- Politics is rooted in a permanent and unchanging human nature which is

basically self-centred, self-regarding, and self-interested.

- Politics is ‘an autonomous sphere of action’ and cannot therefore be reduced to morals (as Kantian or liberal theorists are prone to do).
- Self-interest is a basic fact of the human condition. International politics is an arena of conflicting state interests. But interests are not fixed: the world is in flux and interests can change. Realism is a doctrine that responds to the fact of a changing political reality.
- The ethics of international relations is a political or situational ethics which is very different from private morality. A political leader does not have the same freedom to do the right thing that a private citizen has. That is because a political leader has far heavier responsibilities than a private citizen. The leader is responsible to the people (typically of his or her country) who depend on him or her; the leader is responsible for their security and welfare. The responsible state leader should strive to do the best that circumstances permit on that particular day. That circumscribed situation of political choice is the normative heart of classical realist ethics.
- Realists are therefore opposed to the idea that particular nations can impose their ideologies on other nations and can employ their power in crusades to do that. Realists oppose that because they see it as a dangerous activity that threatens international peace and security. Ultimately, it could backfire and threaten the crusading country.
- Statecraft is a sober and uninspiring activity that involves a profound awareness of human limitations and human imperfections. That pessimistic knowledge of human beings as they are and not as we might wish them to be is a difficult truth that lies at the heart of international politics.

By stating these six principles, Morgenthau seeks to integrate these social forces into his theory of IR. If the units of the system are nations, the balance of power

is the system in which these units operate. This, in essence, is a rationalization of irrational (though coherent) behaviour—the operation of these social forces reduced to the simple level of the struggle for power, a single cause, and single-unit model system of description.

2.1.4.5 Systematizing International Relation: The Balance of Power

The purpose of all political activity is, according to Morgenthau, the pursuit of power. This being the case, the palpable implication of politics among nations is that they pursue power in the international environment.

The struggle for power must be based on one of two principles, the preservation of the status quo or imperialism, which has as its ultimate goal the replacement of the balance of power with domination. These principles have the effect of polarizing the international system into pro-status quo or anti-status quo powers, thus constituting the primary motor and motive of international politics. In an attempt to present a wider conception, Morgenthau presents a four-point description of the balance of power as:

1. A policy aimed at the achievement of a certain objective, that is, the preservation of the status quo.
2. The description of an actual state of affairs.
3. A description of the international system in which there is an approximately equal distribution of power.
4. Any distribution of power.

These four conceptual parameters create the theoretical identification of the balance of power as the unavoidable and stabilizing element of a society of sovereign states. The inherent logic of the balance of power is quite simple: its operation is based upon the desire for domination and the means by which to achieve this domination. He says that “This balancing of opposing forces will go on, the increase in the power of one nation calling forth an at least proportionate increase in the power of the other . . . until one nation gains or

believes it has gained a decisive advantage over the other. Then either the weaker yields to the stronger or war decides the issue”.

2.1.4.6 Diplomacy as Instrument of Peace

In opposition to the liberal and Marxist attempts to recast the world order, Morgenthau posits the alternative: the preservation and revitalization of the diplomatic system as the means to achieve international harmony. Diplomacy is described as “the instrument of peace through accommodation.” Diplomacy as the art of international governance requires alertness of how and when to use the three means of threat of force, compromise, and persuasion. The conduct of diplomacy, it would seem, is governed by rational self-interest.

The diplomat must achieve four tasks: determine objectives according to the capabilities of power; must be able to take into account the aims of other powers; the power must create policy based on the extent of the competing aims of its own objectives and other powers; finally, diplomacy must establish the correct means for the achievement of policy objectives. There are, says Morgenthau, two varieties of diplomacy, one public and crusading, the other private and business like. The operation of diplomacy in the public sphere, in this case in a parliamentary context, is ultimately counterproductive as it merely serves to poison the atmosphere in which diplomats work. Progress towards a peaceful world cannot be achieved, argues Morgenthau, until the traditional model of private diplomatic practice is restored.

2.1.4.6 Critique on Morgenthau’s Realism

Morgenthau’s approach to international relations has been attacked from a number of directions. Questions have been raised over the application of scientific methodology to the social domain. Does the social aspect of the international world really lend itself to being understood in terms of enduring objective laws and certainties?

Morgenthau’s realism was based on a priori assumptions about human nature (the rational pursuit of self-interest, utility maximization, and so on) which by

definition cannot be tested or verified to any meaningful extent. What if these assumptions are flawed or do not conform in any actual sense to a shared reality? What are the implications for Morgenthau's theory if there are no laws of politics at all, only subjective impressions?

Morgenthau's world is pessimistic and barren one. He sees strengths in a dispassionate and unethical approach to international relations when this may be little more than a cover for and rationalization of immoral and unethical behaviour.

Morgenthau's treatment of Marxism is paltry and ungenerous. His critique of theories of imperialism is simplistic and hostile. He largely ignores economic considerations in the formulation of foreign policy and says very little about the nature of capitalism and its effects on the international order. He assumes that the nation-state is a unitary actor but is completely unconcerned in its internal nature, including the composition of its commercial and state elites. Other international actors, such as non-governmental authorities and international markets, are almost entirely neglected. And though he rejects the prescriptive elements of liberal idealism, his message about the immutability of the 'laws of politics' appears equally rigid.

Kenneth Waltz parts company with what he calls the 'traditional realism' of Morgenthau by arguing that international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure. Realism, in his view, is unable to conceptualize the international system in this way because it is limited by its behavioural methodology which 'explains political outcomes through examining the constituent parts of political systems'. According to this approach, 'the characteristics and the interactions of behavioural units are taken to be the direct cause of political events'. Morgenthau explained international outcomes by focusing on the actions and interactions of the units – the principles of human nature, the idea of interest defined in terms of power, the behaviour of statesmen – rather than highlighting the systemic constraints of international politics. According to Waltz traditional realists could not explain behavior at a level above the nation-state.

2.1.4.7 Summing up Morgenthau's Realism

The Cold War forced Morgenthau to engage with more radical notions such as the prospect of political organization in the aftermath of a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons had affected a new reality in IR as the relationship between the use of violence and the attainment of rational foreign policy objectives had been removed by the introduction of weapons of total destruction, the use of which would be a “suicidal absurdity.”

The world and the philosophy that underpinned *Politics among Nations* must have seemed to him to be fading into another age by the end of his life: the system it described of diplomats working in a system still dominated by the primacy of the political relationship between nation states had been eclipsed by the prospect of nuclear war and the reality of energy crises undermining the international political system. The failure of the American policy elites to respond rationally to the Communist threat and to neglect the national interest by pursuing war in Vietnam made him question the nature of politics. If the rational outline of politics was incapable of providing an ideal type from which to analyze “deficient” reality, then the style of theorization that Morgenthau had employed in *Politics among Nations* was inadequate.

Despite this inadequacy, Morgenthau eschews fatalism and clings to the possibility of the mind throwing light, eventually leading towards the truth of a transcendent reality. What we get is a mystery compounding the riddle. What remains is a probing mind, conscious of itself and of the world, seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking, and speaking—seeking ultimate reality beyond illusion.

2.1.5 KENNETH WALTZ: NEOREALISM OR STRUCTURAL REALISM

Kenneth Waltz is the most cited author in modern IR. One major reason for that is his creation of a coherent set of provocations challenging fashionable viewpoints in significant segments of the IR community. He says, for instance, that systemic interdependence is low and that this has been beneficial, that states can be seen as

unitary actors, that non-state actors are relatively insignificant, that nuclear weapons are helpful, that superpower pre-eminence was a good thing, that the USA has behaved much like the Soviet Union in the post-war period, that the domino theory is false and much of US global activism therefore is outdated, that we don't 'live in a world of change', that bipolarity persists, etc.

Waltz is often identified with two books, *Theory of International Politics* (1979) and *Man, the State, and War* (1959)—in that order of preference. Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics from 1967 comparing British and US foreign policymaking is less well known.

Theory of International Politics is one of the last great entries in the so-called Second Great Debate of IR—that between the scientific and classical wings of international theory. It is in this text that Realism gets its definitive makeover into a rationalist, structural theory of international politics, an inversion of the epistemological position taken by two of its most important founders as a theory of international politics, E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. As referred to in the introduction, the importance of language is crucial in understanding the successful transformation of Realism from a multiplicity of various approaches (critical, dialogical, and historical in the case of Carr and Wight; philosophical and theoretical in the case of Morgenthau) toward the political philosophy of power in IR to a streamlined social science.

Waltz achieves his aim of creating a science of international politics by eliding the difficulties of an application of the methodologies of the physical to the social sciences. The distinction in Morgenthau's work between human sciences and natural sciences (which lies at the heart of Morgenthau's first major work in *English Scientific Man versus Power Politics*) is ignored by Waltz, who attempts to include the social under the scientific method associated with disciplines such as physics and microeconomics. The major problem with IR theory for Waltz is that it seldom refers to work that meets philosophy of science standards. This is a clear epistemological signposting of intent by Waltz that he intends to create a theory of international politics based on these principles.

The fundamental dilemma in both books is how to account for centuries of continuity in the outcomes of international politics, despite forceful pressures for change (from weapon systems, technology, domestic societies, etc.). And the answer in both cases points to the international structure restraining units' behaviour and interposing itself between units' intentions and international outcomes.

2.1.5.1 Anarchy, Balance of Power, Stability, and Bipolarity

For Waltz, the key feature to be explained in international politics is the persistence of its essential form over the centuries:

The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly . . . a dismaying persistence, a persistence that one must expect so long as none of the competing units is able to convert the anarchic international realm into a hierarchic one.

Waltz sets out to account for this persistence and to account for the political logic of its continuance in international politics and to provide a theory that explains the regularity of behaviour. The key concept is that of "structure", which provides an elegant and general model for understanding the international system, it also has the benefit of explaining continuity within the international system. The problem of modelizing a structure of IR that does not include a theory of the state is surmounted by Waltz with the use of an analogy to microeconomic theory. Just as the microeconomic theory can operate without a theory of the firm, so can international theory operate without necessarily investigating the nature of the state. States then become functionally similar in the model of international politics, but with the important proviso that a general theory of IR "is necessarily based on the great powers."

There are three layers of systemic structure in Waltz's theoretical understanding. The lowest layer deals with the system's ordering principle; either hierarchy as in a domestic political system or anarchy as in an international system, typically. The medium layer addresses the question of the units' functional differentiation,

i.e. whether they specialize functions among themselves or each unit seeks to take care of all functions for itself. These units happen presently to be nation-states, but this is not necessary. Anarchy as an ordering principle entails self-help behaviour among the units; as no unit can count on others to ensure its well-being and survival, it must take care of all functions by itself, in principle. No functional differentiation will occur. Still, even if all units are similar in this sense, they are not equal in terms of power (capability). The highest layer addresses the distribution of capabilities among the system's units—i.e. whether the system is bipolar, tripolar, multipolar, etc. If a system is to qualify as an international one in Waltz's conception, the only structural variation pertains to this third layer, i.e. the number of poles. Anarchy and absence of functional differentiation at the two former layers are parameters rather than variables.

In analogy to economic theory, Waltz then addresses what happens to 'behaviour and outcome' in the system, as its number of poles change (like the structure of a market shifting from duopoly to oligopoly to perfect competition). But as a prerequisite to this analysis, it is argued that balancing is a universal behavioural trait during anarchy (provided that units wish to survive and prosper). Balancing means that alliances are formed or other efforts are made that balance off the most powerful states (in contrast to bandwagoning behaviour that supports the winner). The formation of balance of power is typically the unintended consequence of behaviour motivated by other reasons. The nature of this behaviour varies with the number of poles in the system. From the viewpoint of systemic outcome/peacefulness, it is argued that a few poles are better than many, and two are better than a few. There are several reasons for this. For instance, the fewer poles there are, the less the risk of miscalculations leading to war. Internal balancing (each superpower regulating its own balancing strength; for example, through rearmament) is easier to control than balancing through alliance formation. Systemic interdependence—which may provoke conflict—is especially low during bipolarity, as the two poles are likely to be quite self-sufficient. Each of the two poles has a stake in the system and they are therefore likely to carry responsibility in the management of common global problems. Essentially, Waltz considered the bipolar situation at his time of writing as the best of all worlds.

According to Waltz Anarchy explains a continuity of behaviour (i.e. power balancing) despite unit-level changes and processes. It leads to testable hypotheses concerning the extent and nature of inter-state cooperation over a range of issue-areas, and the balance of power as a process. Having dealt with anarchy, which is constant over time, Waltz moves on to consider the other structural component of international political systems, the distribution of capabilities. Whilst anarchy explains recurring patterns of behaviour over time, the distribution of capabilities changes across systems, not within them. Indeed, since both anarchy and states do not change, the number of great powers is the only systemic constituent in the theory that varies.

This claim rests upon his argument that the balance of power operates differently in multipolar and bipolar systems. In the former, the politics of power are external. States rely on alliances to maintain their security. Alliances are formed on the basis of certain common interests among their members to ward off a common threat. However, such a system is intrinsically unstable, because ‘there are too many powers to allow any of them to draw clear and fixed lines between allies and adversaries and too few to keep the effects of defection low’. Thus, no state can be absolutely sure about who is more threatening to whom. Military interdependence forces each state to subordinate its national interests to maintain the co-operation of its alliance partners. However, by doing so it may be dragged into war against its wishes. ‘One’s allies may edge toward the opposing camp’. Among a small group of militarily interdependent states, there is always a danger of miscalculation and defection between alliance partners, both of which may pull all the states into conflict.

Waltz illustrates all these drawbacks by focusing on the alliance diplomacy in the years before the First World War. In contrast, Waltz argues that, in a bipolar system, military interdependence is low. The inequality between the superpowers and everyone else, including their alliance partners, compels each of them to maintain the balance by relying on their own devices. The United States and the Soviet Union do not depend on anyone else to protect themselves. The rigidity of alliances in a bipolar world allows greater strategic flexibility by the

superpowers. Miscalculation is minimized, both by the clarity of threats and the self-reliant means with which each superpower must develop a strategy to cope with these threats. Furthermore, in a bipolar system, the rivalry between the two superpowers is global in geographical scope and comprehensive across all issue-areas. As a result, Waltz argues that the post-war bipolar system is preferable to multipolarity. When reduced to two superpowers, it seems, the balancing process terminates in a stable outcome.

Finally, Waltz turns to the management of international affairs, which embodies global issues and problems that transcend territorial boundaries. These require inter-state co-operation if they are to be solved. However, apart from recognizing some of these problems, which Waltz calls the four **P**'s—proliferation, pollution, poverty, and population—he has very little to say in substantive terms. Instead, he confines his attention to the likelihood of their being coped with in the contemporary system. Given the condition of anarchy, attempts to manage transnational problems through international organizations and supranational agencies will only be marginally successful.

To Conclude, Waltz's main aim is to provide an empirical theory of international politics that is suitable to its subject-matter, to avoid the 'reductionism' that he believes is so incorrectly omnipresent among scholars regardless of their methodological predispositions, and to compare the stability of different international political systems. In complete contrast to Morgenthau, he concludes that the contemporary bipolar system is characterized by a comparatively low level of economic and military interdependence and that the hegemony of the superpowers both enhances international stability and provides the best political framework for the constructive management of international affairs.

2.1.5.2 Critique on Waltz's Structural Realism

A major problem with Waltz's unit-structure relationship is that it leaves little or no room for systematic change induced by the units themselves. Waltz convinces that states are virtually powerless to alter the system in which they

find themselves trapped.

Waltz also denies that greater levels of economic interdependency among states pose a threat to the condition of anarchy despite the present situation in which the trading state is substituting the military state.

The appeasement of core of liberal-democratic countries and the increasing number of states choosing liberal democratic orders poses a challenge for neo-realism's debate that the units can do little to alter the structure of the system.

The epistemological critiques of neo-realism by Ashley and Cox expose the conservative ideology which underwrites Waltz's theoretical approach. Both adopt a critical approach to neo-realism highlighting the extent to which it naturalizes the international system by treating structures which have a specific and transitory history as if they were 'permanent', 'normal' or 'given' political fixtures. This not only has the effect of legitimizing the status quo, it also obstructs arguments for another forms of political community which are more sensitive to changing social and ethnic identities and the exclusionary character of political boundaries. Cox places neo-realism in the category of 'problem-solving theory' which takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and political relations and institutions to which they are organized, as the given framework for action. The general aim of the problem-solving theory is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble. Problem solving theory fails to question the pattern of relationships and institutions in question and can 'fix limits or parameters to a problem area' which in turn limits 'the number of variables which are amenable to relatively close and precise examination.' For Cox, neo-realism reduces international relations to great management by legitimating a political order which favours the powerful and is hostile to change.

2.1.5.3 Summing up Waltz's Neo-Realism

Waltz wanted to present a scientific explanation of international politics which is a big step beyond the political and moral theories of classical realism. He

cannot avoid implying normative concerns, however, and he cannot escape from making what are implicitly normative assumptions. His entire theory rests on normative foundations of a traditional–realist kind. Thus, although he makes no explicit reference to values or ethics and avoids normative theory, the basic assumptions and concepts he uses and the basic international issues with which he is concerned are normative ones. In that respect his neo-realism is not as far removed from classical realism as his claims about scientific theory imply. This serves as a reminder that scientific explanations can frequently involve norms and values.

M.A. Political Science, Semester I

Course Title: **International Politics**

Unit – II: **Major Theories**

**2.2 LIBERALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CORE VALUES
(COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE, COOPERATION THROUGH
INSTITUTIONALISM)**

- V. Nagendra Rao

STRUCTURE

2.2.0 Objectives

2.2.1 Introduction

2.2.2 Liberalism – Historical Evolution

2.2.3 Liberalism in the Twentieth Century

2.2.4 Complex Interdependence

2.2.5 Neo-Liberalism

2.2.5.1 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

2.2.6 Criticism on Liberalism

2.2.7 Summing Up

2.2.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- The historical evolution of Liberalism
- The influence of liberalism on 20th century international relations
- The linkage between liberal ideology and interdependence
- The basic propositions of neo-liberalism
- Criticism on liberalism

2.2.1 INTRODUCTION

Liberal thought about the nature of international relations has a long tradition dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During these centuries liberal philosophers and political thinkers debated the difficulties of establishing just, orderly and peaceful relations between peoples. One of the most systematic and thoughtful accounts of the problems of world peace was produced by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant in 1795 in an essay entitled “Perpetual Peace”. Kantian thought has been profoundly influential in the development of liberalism in IR.

Liberalism holds that human nature is basically good and that inherent goodness makes societal progress possible. Evil or unacceptable human behaviour, such as war, is, according to liberals, the product of inadequate or corrupt social institutions and of misunderstandings among leaders. Thus, liberals believe that war or any other aggressive behaviour is not inevitable and can be moderated through institutional reform. Through collective action, states can cooperate to eliminate the possibility of war.

The origins of liberal theory are found in Enlightenment optimism, as portrayed by Immanuel Kant, as mentioned above, nineteenth century political and economic liberalism, and twentieth century Wilsonian Idealism.

There have been many innovations in liberal theory since the 1970s which are reflected in a number of distinctive strands of thought within liberalism. For

example, idealism, pluralism, interdependence theory, transnationalism, liberal internationalism, liberal peace theory, neo-liberal institutionalism and world society approaches. In the 1970s a liberal literature on transnational relations and world society developed. So called 'liberal pluralists' pointed to the growing importance of multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), pressure groups, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), as evidence that states were no longer the only significant actors in international relations. Liberal pluralists believed that power, influence and agency in world politics were now exercised by a range of different types of actors.

Furthermore, by the 1980s conflict was not the major process in international relations as, increasingly, cooperation in pursuit of mutual interests was a prominent feature of world politics. Terms much in vogue in contemporary International Relations literature (and in the media), such as 'globalisation' or 'multiculturalism', while not intrinsically liberal, have liberal adherents or interpretations and have received growing attention from liberal scholars. In more recent years liberals have made important contributions to the study of international relations in the areas of international order, institutions and processes of governance, human rights, democratisation, peace and economic integration.

Liberalism, as an 'ism', is an approach to all forms of human organisation, whether of a political or economic nature, and it contains within it a social theory, philosophy and ideology. The result is that liberalism has something to say about all aspects of human life. In terms of liberal philosophy, liberalism is based upon a belief in the inherently good nature of all humans, the ultimate value of individual liberty and the possibility of human progress. Liberalism speaks the language of rationality, moral autonomy, human rights, democracy, opportunity and choice and is founded upon a commitment to principles of liberty and equality, justified in the name of individuality and rationality. Politically this translates into support for limited government and political pluralism. We will study the main assumptions of liberalism below. First, we need to consider further the

historical and intellectual origins of liberal thought.

2.2.2 LIBERALISM – HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

Many philosophers and movements have contributed to the theory of liberalism that has been so important to the contemporary study of international relations. These include John Locke, with his seventeenth century questioning of claims to political authority based on birth, social status, privilege and divine right.

The basic notion behind ‘classical liberalism’ is that government intervention should be kept to a minimum, emphasizing instead the role of the individual and the primacy of the mechanism of the free market. Three key ideas underline liberal thought:

1. That there is great value to be derived from the free expression of the individual personality;
2. That such expression can be made valuable both to those who express it and to society, and
3. That institutions and policies that protect and foster both free expression and confidence in that freedom must be upheld.

Liberals believe that a harmony of self-interest between individuals can be achieved when state oppression is minimised. The key mechanism for any liberal is the market. Taking part in market activities is seen as a positive-sum game in which every participant gains. Such notions found their beginning in the work of Adam Smith (1723-90) and his theory of the ‘invisible hand’. Smith held that society was such that, although individuals did indeed take action that would secure them advantage, the greatest benefit to society as a whole would be achieved by allowing them to do so.

Hence, the historical tradition of liberalism views politics as the rational management of a naturally harmonious community. This shapes liberal notion of war and international relations. Nineteenth century liberals argued that war is ‘the natural state of men ignorant of the laws of political economy’. In other words, if free trade were encouraged, the likelihood of political conflict and war would diminish.

Because war undermines productive capacity and saps national wealth and power, peace is logically in the interest of every state. They also objected to armed peace because armaments, with the consequences of increased taxation and an ever-growing public debt, would also harm national welfare. In liberal opinion, peace should therefore be secured not through militarism but by free trade. For liberals, war is not an outgrowth of conflicting national interests, but arises from ‘national interest ill understood.

2.2.2.1 Kant and Peace

Liberal theories of IR try to explain how peace and cooperation are possible. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant 200 years ago gave three answers. The first, based on the reciprocity principle, was that states could develop the organizations and rules to facilitate cooperation, specifically by forming a world federation resembling today’s United Nations. This answer forms the foundation of present-day liberal institutionalism.

Kant’s second answer, operating at a lower level of analysis, was that peace depends on the internal character of governments. He reasoned that republics, with a legislative branch that can hold the monarch in check, will be more peaceful than autocracies. This answer, along with Kant’s related point that citizens of any country deserve hospitality in any other country, is consistent with the reciprocity principle, but also relies on the identity principle. It explains states’ preferences based on the social interactions within the state. A variation in Kant’s answer, namely that democracies do not fight each other, is the basis of present democratic peace theory.

Kant’s third answer, that trade promotes peace, relies on the presupposition that trade increases wealth, cooperation, and global well-being—all while making conflict less likely in the long term because governments will not want to upset any process that adds to the wealth of their state. Moreover, as trade between states increases, they will find that they become mutually dependent on one another for goods. This mutual dependence between states is referred to as economic interdependence.

2.2.3 LIBERALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The liberal notions of peace and democracy also find support in the economic pacifism that was so prevalent before 1914. Its principal arguments aimed at the potential costs of war and the actual costs of armaments being too high for military options to be a rational means for pursuing national interests. Even if militarily victorious, a state cannot increase its wealth by the acquisition of new territories or by weakening the enemy's commerce and industry because the newly gained subjects are still competing with the victor and can now take advantage of a beneficial trading relationship.

However, some of the liberals were sceptical that free trade would deliver peace. For instance, J. A. Hobson, argued that imperialism was becoming the primary cause of conflict in international relations. For Hobson, imperialism resulted from under-consumption within developed capitalist societies.

The First World War shifted liberal thinking towards a recognition that peace is not a natural condition but is one which must be built. The US President Woodrow Wilson is a known liberal during this period. He stated that peace could only be secured with the creation of international institutions to regulate the international anarchy. Like domestic society, international society must have a system of governance which has democratic procedures for coping with disputes, and an international force which could be mobilized if negotiations failed. In his famous 'fourteen points' speech, addressed to Congress in January 1918, Wilson argued that 'a general association of nations must be formed' to preserve the coming peace. The League of Nations, was the general association which liberals willed into existence.

Outside of the military-security area, liberal ideas made an important contribution to global politics even during the Cold War. The principles of self-determination, championed by liberal internationalists for centuries, signalled the end of empire. The protection of individuals from human rights abuses was enshrined in the three key standard setting documents: the 1948 Universal Declaration, the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights. Even the more radical calls in the mid-1970s for a “New International Economic Order” emanating from Third World countries contained within it the liberal ideals of justice and fairness.

2.2.4 LIBERALISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Interdependence remained and still remains to be an attribute of many aspects of human activity. Historically, the term has been employed readily in the social, political and security realm as it has been specifically in the economic sphere. The increased interest in the idea of interdependence from the mid-1970s onwards, however, owes mostly to the increasing concerns about the apparent growth of international economic interdependence and the impact of human activity on the natural environment.

One school of thought equates interdependence with the pattern of interconnectedness among peoples. Interdependence, by such a definition, is to be identified simply in the patterns of association and interaction among actors of various kinds.

The traditional approach to interdependence defines it in terms of the existence of significant dependencies between or among those who experience the phenomenon. Interdependence is thus seen as a condition of mutual dependencies between two or more actors or agents. The dialectical relationship between dependence and interdependence can be explained in the following definition:

Dependence exists for any actor when a satisfactory outcome on any matter of significance for that actor requires an appropriate situation or development elsewhere.

Interdependence exists for a grouping of two or more actors when each is depended on at least one other member of that group for satisfactory outcomes on any issues (s) of concern.

Variable patterns of dependence and imbalanced levels of interdependence are common within contemporary international relations and lie at the heart of much

of the unevenness of power and influence, and advantage and disadvantage, within the international system.

Basically these liberals argue that a high division of labour in the international economy increases interdependence between states, and that discourages and reduces violent conflict between states. There still remains a risk that modern states will slide back to the military option and once again enter into arms races and violent confrontations. But that is not a likely prospect. It is in the less developed countries that war now occurs, according to Rosecrance, because at lower levels of economic development land continues to be the dominant factor of production, and modernization and interdependence are far weaker.

During the Second World War, David Mitrany set forth a functionalist theory of integration, arguing that greater interdependence in the form of transnational ties between countries could lead to peace. Mitrany believed, perhaps somewhat naïvely, that cooperation should be arranged by technical experts, not by politicians. The experts would devise solutions to common problems in various functional areas: transport, communication, finance, and so on. Technical and economic collaboration would expand when the participants discovered the mutual benefits that could be obtained from it. When citizens see the improvements in welfare measures that resulted from efficient collaboration in international organizations, they would transfer their loyalty from the state to international organizations. In that way, economic interdependence would lead to political integration and to peace.

Ernst Haas developed a so-called neo-functionalist theory of international integration that was inspired by the intensifying cooperation that began in the 1950s between the countries of Western Europe. Haas builds on Mitrany, but he rejects the notion that ‘technical’ matters can be separated from politics. Integration has to do with getting self-interested political elites to intensify their cooperation. Integration is a process whereby ‘political actors are persuaded to shift their loyalties . . . toward a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states’ (Haas 1958: 16). This

‘functional’ process of integration depends on the notion of ‘spillover’, when increased cooperation in one area leads to increased cooperation in other areas. Spillover would ensure that political elites marched inexorably towards the promotion of integration. Haas saw that happening in the initial years of West European cooperation in the 1950s and early 1960s.

2.2.4.1 Complex Interdependence

Theories of interdependence have seen a revival since the 1970s due to a new momentum in West European cooperation. The new theories of interdependence have come to surface; the most important one among these is Complex Interdependence.

A striving attempt to set forth a general theory of what they called ‘complex interdependence’ was made in the late 1970s in a book by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr, *Power and Interdependence*. They argue that post-war ‘complex interdependence’ is qualitatively different from earlier and simpler kinds of interdependence. Previously, international relations were directed by state leaders dealing with other state leaders. The use of military force was always an option in the case of conflict between those national leaders. The ‘high politics’ of security and endurance had priority over the ‘low politics’ of economics and social affairs. Under conditions of complex interdependence, however, that is no longer the case, and for two reasons. First, relations between states nowadays are not only or even primarily relations between state leaders; there are relations on many different levels via many different actors and branches of government. Second, there is a host of transnational relations between individuals and groups outside of the state. Furthermore, military force is a less useful instrument of policy under conditions of complex interdependence.

Consequently, international relations are becoming more like domestic politics: ‘Different issues generate different coalitions, both within governments and across them, and involve different degrees of conflict. Politics does not stop at the water’s edge’. In most of these conflicts military force is irrelevant. Therefore, power resources other than military ones are of increasing importance, for

example, negotiating skills. Finally, under complex interdependence states become more preoccupied with the 'low politics' of welfare and less concerned with the 'high politics' of national security.

Complex interdependence clearly implies a far more friendly and cooperative relationship between states. According to Keohane and Nye, Jr, several consequences follow. First, states will pursue different goals simultaneously and transnational actors, such as NGOs and transnational corporations, will pursue their own separate goals free from state control. Second, power resources will most often be specific to issue areas. For example, in spite of their comparatively small size, Denmark and Norway will command influence in international shipping because of their large merchant and tanker fleets, but that influence does not easily translate to other issue areas. Third, the importance of international organizations will increase. They are arenas for political actions by weak states, they animate coalition formation, and they oversee the setting of international agendas.

Where do we situate this complex interdependence in time and space? On the time dimension, it appears to be linked with social modernization or what Keohane and Nye, Jr, call 'the long-term development of the welfare state', which picked up speed after 1950. In space, complex interdependence is most apparent in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand: in short, the industrialized, pluralist countries. The relevance of complex interdependence grows as modernization unfolds, and it is thus especially applicable to the relations between advanced Western countries. Keohane and Nye are nevertheless at pains to emphasize that realism is not irrelevant or obsolete:

It is not impossible to imagine dramatic conflict or revolutionary change in which the use of threat of military force over an economic issue or among advanced industrial countries might become plausible. Then realist assumptions would again be a reliable guide to events.

In other words, even among industrialized countries of the West an issue could

still become 'a matter of life and death', because even that world is still in some basic respects a world of states. In that eventuality, realism would be the more relevant approach to events.

Realists claim that any issue can become a matter of life and death in an anarchic world. Interdependence liberals will reply that is too simplistic and that a large number of issues on the international agenda are important and basic items in line with the complex interdependence assumptions. Therefore, interdependence liberals suggest a compromise:

The fitting response to the changes occurring in world politics today is not to dishonour the traditional wisdom of realism and its concern for the military balance of power, but to realize its inadequacies and to supplement it with insights from the liberal approach.

Interdependence liberals are thus more even-handed in their approach than some other liberals for whom everything has changed for the better and the old world of violent conflict, unrestrained state power, and the dictatorship of the national interest is gone forever. However, in adopting this middle-of-the-road position interdependence liberals face the problem of deciding exactly how much has changed, how much remains the same, and what are the precise implications for IR.

2.2.5 NEO-LIBERALISM

The intellectual foundations of modern neo-liberalism stem largely from the writings of the 1960s of Fridrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman. To a great extent, Hayek and Friedman were responding to the emergence of Keynesianism in Western capitalist societies and to the socialism that evolved in the former USSR, China and other nations following World War II.

In the eyes of the neo-liberals, the victory of democracy and markets over authoritarianism and statist economies was coupled with efforts to promote open economies and open policies stressing the necessity of thorough going eco

reforms supporting export-led industrialization policies.

The neo-liberal approach in International Relations, although largely borrows the core of the ideas from the economic counterpart, however, their focus is mostly on interdependence and institutionalism. In the study of International Relations, the neoliberal approach differs from earlier liberal approaches in that it concedes to realism several important assumptions—among them, that states are unitary actors rationally pursuing their self-interests in a system of anarchy. Neoliberals say to realists, “Even if we grant your assumptions about the nature of states and their motives, your pessimistic conclusions do not follow.” States achieve cooperation fairly often because it is in their interest to do so, and they can learn to use institutions to ease the pursuit of mutual gains and the reduction of possibilities for cheating or taking.

Despite the many sources of conflict in IR, states cooperate most of the time. Neoliberal scholars try to show that even in a world of unitary rational states; the neorealists’ pessimism about international cooperation is not valid. States can create mutual rules, expectations, and institutions to promote behaviour that enhances cooperation.

In particular, reciprocity in IR helps the emergence of international cooperation despite the absence of central authority. Through reciprocity, not a world government, norms and rules are enforced. In international security, reciprocity underlines the gradual improvement of relations sought by arms control agreements and peacekeeping missions. In international political economy (IPE), in which cooperation can create great benefits through trade, the threat to restrict trade in retaliation for unfair practices is a strong incentive to comply with rules and norms. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), function on this principle—states that defect on their obligations by increasing tariffs must suffer punishment by allowing other states to place tariffs on their goods.

Neoliberals argue that reciprocity can be a useful approach for achieving cooperation in a situation of conflicting interests. If one side expresses

willingness to cooperate and promises to reciprocate the other's cooperative and conflictual actions, the other side has an incentive to work out a cooperative bargain. Because reciprocity is relatively easy to interpret, the vow of future reciprocity often need not be stated explicitly.

2.2.5.1 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism

As is evident from the earlier discussion, one of the ways in which liberalism has contributed to our understanding of international relations is through various works on the nature of institutions and world order. Obviously, the themes of cooperation and complex interdependence are strongly suggestive of how liberals see the regulatory and facilitating role played by institutions in international relations. In more recent years, neo-liberal institutionalists have developed a fairly sophisticated analysis of the nature of world order and the crucial role played by institutions and various regimes in regulating relations between states, as well as other actors. In this section we will discuss liberal ideas that have emerged in such context in more depth.

The roots of neo-liberal institutionalism are found in the functional integration scholarship of the 1940s and the 1950s and regional integration studies of the 1960s. These studies suggest that the way towards peace and prosperity is to have independent states pooling their resources and even surrender some of their sovereignty to create integrated communities to promote economic growth or respond to regional problems. The European Union is one such institution that began as a regional community for encouraging multilateral cooperation in the production of coal and steel. Proponents of integration and community-building were encouraged to challenge dominant realist thinking because of the experiences of the two world wars. Rooted in liberal thinking, integration theories promoted after the Second World War were less idealistic and more pragmatic than the liberal internationalism that dominated policy debates after the First World War.

Neo-liberal institutionalists see 'institutions' as the mediator and the means to achieve cooperation among actors in the system. The core assumptions of neo-

liberal institutionalists include:

- States are key actors in international relations, but not the only significant actors. States are rational or instrumental actors always seeking to maximize their interests in all issue areas.
- In this competitive environment states seek to maximise absolute gains through cooperation. Rational behaviour leads states to see value in cooperative behaviour.

Neo-liberal institutionalists arrive at the same result as liberals do—cooperation—but their explanation for why cooperation occurs is different. For classical liberals, cooperation emerges from establishing and reforming institutions that permit cooperative interactions and prohibit coercive actions. For neoliberal institutionalists, cooperation emerges because of actors having continuous interaction with each other; it is in the self-interest of each to cooperate. Institutions may be established, affecting the possibilities for cooperation, but they do not guarantee cooperation.

For neoliberal institutionalists, security is essential and institutions help to make security possible. Institutions provide a guaranteed framework of interactions and suggest that there will be an expectation of future interactions. These interactions will occur not just on security issues but on a whole suite of international issues including human rights, the environment, immigration, etc.

With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, liberalism as a general theoretical perspective has achieved new credibility. Two particular areas stand out. First, researchers of the democratic peace are trying to determine why democracies do not fight each other. A variety of liberal explanations provide the answer. One argument is that democracies are pacific toward each other because democratic norms and culture inhibit the leaders; the leaders hear from a multiplicity of voices that tend to restrain decision makers and therefore reduce the chance of war. Another argument is that transnational and international institutions that bind democracies together through dense network act to constrain behaviour. Each explanation is based

on liberal theorizing. Yet democratic peace scholars do not always depend on liberal explanations. According another view, the democracies did not fight each other after World War II because they had a common enemy, the Soviet Union.

Second, post-Cold War theorists like Francis Fukuyama see not just a revival but a victory for international liberalism, in the absence of any workable theoretical alternative. He admits that some groups will continue to have complaints against each other. But major conflict is less frequent than in earlier eras. For the first time, Fukuyama argues, the possibility exists for the ‘universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human governance’.

2.2.6 CRITICISM ON LIBERALISM AND ITS CORE ASSUMPTIONS

One set of criticism centres around a fundamental contradiction between economic and political liberty. This criticism is centred on liberal support for the free market and the institutions of private property, both of which appear to be central to the liberal conception of freedom and choice. Critics argue that the operation of free markets and the private ownership of property and resources lead to the progressive concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands. This inevitably leads to the concentration of power among the wealthy, which in turn encroaches greatly upon the liberty and meaningful choices available to poorer groups. Left-liberals have taken this criticism on board, and support a limited form of state intervention and welfarism in the interest of redistributing wealth.

The liberal view can, then, be reasonably criticised as simply providing a justification to the way things are; the observation that the ‘liberal’ system is of benefit to a very narrow section of humanity. For example, liberal pluralists generally provide a benevolent view of international institutions, MNCs and the whole liberal free-trade ethos which dominate today’s international political economy.

In recent years there have been numerous attacks on the notions of universalism

found in liberal thought. It has been argued that the characteristics held to be essentially 'human' are actually specific to a particular group of people at a particular period in history. So-called 'universalism' actually expresses the particular experience of dominant groups in the West, so the argument goes. Liberalism gives us a linear view of human progress and development. Again, this is because liberalism tends to universalise Western experience. In development theory, for example, liberals have suggested that poorer states are further 'behind' in the development process, but essentially on the same road and travelling in the same direction as richer, more developed countries. It has been countered that much of the wealth of today's rich Western nations has been based historically on the exploitation of the natural resources and cheap labour of the global South. Green thinkers also argue that liberal development strategies are resulting in environmental degradation, thus adding to the woes of already poor countries.

In much the same way as most major perspectives in International Relations, liberalism can be said to be a Western paradigm. This is to say, the core assumptions of liberalism were formulated by early liberal scholars, such as those discussed above, who were exclusively from the West. While in contemporary International Relations students and scholars from all over the world and with varied interests can be classed as liberals or use liberalism in some form, they are essentially using a perspective which is founded on Western assumptions. Thus, liberalism has been criticised by some as being culturally specific as opposed to truly international.

2.2.7 SUMMING UP

The liberal tradition in IR is closely connected with the emergence of the modern liberal state. Liberal philosophers, beginning with John Locke in the seventeenth century, saw great potential for human progress in modern civil society and capitalist economy, both of which could flourish in states which guaranteed individual liberty. Modernity projects a new and better life, free of authoritarian government, and with a much advanced level of material welfare.

Liberals recognize that individuals are self-centred and competitive up to a point. But they also believe that individuals share many interests and can thus engage in collaborative and cooperative social action, domestically as well as internationally, which results in greater benefits for everybody at home and overseas. In other words, conflict and war are not inevitable; when people employ their reason they can achieve mutually beneficial cooperation not only within states but also across international boundaries. Liberal theorists thus believe that human reason can triumph over human fear and the lust for power.

In their conceptions of international cooperation, liberal theorists emphasize different features of world politics. Transnationalist liberals highlight transnational nongovernmental ties between societies, such as communication between individuals and between groups. Interdependence liberals pay particular attention to economic ties of mutual exchange and mutual dependence between peoples and governments. Institutional liberals underscore the importance of organized cooperation between states.

The criticism on liberalism is centred on liberal support for the free market and the institutions of private property. Critics argue that the operation of free markets and the private ownership of property and resources lead to the progressive concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer hands. This inevitably leads to a concentration of power among the wealthy, which in turn impinges greatly upon the liberty and meaningful choices available to poorer groups. Liberalism has also been criticised by some as being culturally specific, to the Western experiences, as opposed to truly international.

**2.3 CONSTRUCTIVISM: IMPORTANCE OF IDENTITY AND NORMS
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

- V. Nagendra Rao

STRUCTURE

2.3.0 Objectives

2.3.1 Introduction

2.3.2 Origin and Development of Constructivism

2.3.3 Philosophical Foundations

2.3.4 Constructivism and Alexander Wendt

2.3.5 Constructivism and Social Theory

2.3.6 Core Assumptions of Constructivism

2.3.7 Critical Evaluation

2.3.8 Summing Up

2.3.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- **Origin and development of Constructivism in international relations**

- Philosophical foundations of Constructivism
- Role of Alexander Wendt in developing Constructivist theory for International Relations
- Core assumptions of Constructivism
- Criticism against Constructivist assumptions

2.3.1 INTRODUCTION

Constructivism focuses on the socially constructed nature of world politics. It is a set of postulations about the world and human motivation and agency. Contrary to realism, institutionalism and liberalism, constructivism accentuates on the social and relational construction of what states are and what they want. Different approaches of international politics have focused on power politics, cooperation, conflict, or any other substantive phenomena. In other words, all the theoretical “paradigms” of international relations are absorbed by power. Power is seen as stimulus, cause, or effect in the international politics. However, scholars associated with the constructivist paradigm argue that the variables of interest to scholars like military power, trade relations, international institutions or domestic preferences are not important because they are objective facts about the world, but they have certain social meanings. Constructive paradigm explains the importance of identity and norms to explain the behaviour of the state. The social meanings are constructed from a complex and specific mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs which academicians need to comprehend if they are to explain state behaviour. Since the constructivists emphasize on the issues of identity and belief, therefore sometimes constructivist theories are also called ideational. The perception of friends and enemies, in-groups and out-groups, fairness and justice all become key determinants of a State’s behaviour.

Constructivism, which reached the shores of IR in the 1980s, describes the dynamic, contingent and culturally based condition of the social world. It has major implications for the understanding of knowledge, including scientific knowledge, and how to achieve it. Constructivism thus has the potential to

transform the understanding of social reality in the social sciences.

2.3.2 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

The term “constructivism” was introduced for the first time in international relations by Nicholas Greenwood Onuf in 1989. He contended that much like individuals, states are living in a “world of our making”, where many entities such as “social facts” are made by human action, as opposed to “brute facts” that do not depend for their existence on human action but rather are phenomena of human condition. In the late 1980s and 1990s many other thinkers as Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Gerard Ruggie and Peter Katzenstein also wrote alternative works which led to the development of constructivism as a substantive theory of international behaviour. The end of the Cold War set the stage for the rise to prominence of the constructivist school of thought in IR. This caused a profound remoulding of debates within the dominant discourse of international relations theory. Core concepts of the constructivism are “discourses,” “norms,” “identity,” and “socialization”. These concepts are frequently used in contemporary discussions over various issues of international concern including globalization, human rights and security policy. According to Maysam Behraves, this theoretical event was prompted by the following major developments in the international relations:-

- Challenging persuasion of critical theorists by leading rationalists to move beyond meta-theoretical critique of rationalism and produce substantive theories;
- Failure of neo-realists and neo-liberals to predict the end of the Cold War and the consequent challenge to explanatory and analytical capacities of their theories;
- Emergence of a new generation of critical theory-inclined scholars who moved to explore the untapped potentials of theoretical and conceptual scholarship in international relations; and
- Enthusiasm shown by disappointed rational choice-oriented theorists in IR to welcome alternative constructivist perspectives.

Some theorists consider that constructivism belongs to, or is an “outgrowth” of the critical discourse of international relations theory. Nevertheless, constructivism differs from critical theory in its simultaneous engagement with meta-theoretical scholarship and in its endeavour to apply the characteristically counter-rationalist insights of critical theory such as the theorization of humans as “socially embedded, communicatively constitutive and culturally empowered” beings to aspects and issues of world politics that were irregular to neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Adler notes that constructivism as an alternative theory of IR holds the middle ground between rationalist theories such as realism, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, and interpretive epistemologies such as post-modernism, Frankfurt School-oriented critical theories and feminism. He contends that the true middle ground between rationalist and relativist interpretive approaches is occupied by constructivism. Constructivism is of the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.

2.3.3 PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

Constructivism has deeper roots; it is not an entirely new approach. It also grows out of an old methodology that can be traced back at least to the eighteenth-century writings of the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico. According to Vico, the natural world is made by God, but the historical world is made by Man. History is not some kind of unfolding or evolving process that is external to human affairs. Men and women make their own history. They also make states which are historical constructs. States are artificial creations and the state system is artificial too; it is made by men and women and if they want to, they can change it and develop it in a new way.

Immanuel Kant is another forerunner of social constructivism. Kant argued that we can obtain knowledge about the world, but it will always be subjective knowledge in the sense that it is filtered through human consciousness. Max Weber emphasized that the social world (i.e., the world of human interaction) is

fundamentally different from the natural world of physical phenomena. Human beings rely on ‘understanding’ of each other’s actions and assigning ‘meaning’ to them. In order to understand human interaction, we need a different kind of interpretive understanding. Is patting another person’s face a punishment or a caress? We cannot know until we assign meaning to the act. Weber concluded that ‘subjective understanding is the specific characteristic of sociological knowledge’. Constructivists rely on such insights to emphasize the importance of ‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’

Constructivists were also enthused by theoretical developments in other social science disciplines, including philosophy and sociology. In sociology, Anthony Giddens proposed the concept of *structuration* as a way of analysing the relationship between structures and actors. According to Giddens, structures (i.e., the rules and conditions that guide social action) do not decide what actors do in any mechanical way; an impression one might get from the neorealist view of how the structure of anarchy limits state actors. The relationship between structures and actors involves inter-subjective understanding and meaning. Structures do limit actors, but actors can also transform structures by thinking about them and acting on them in new ways. The notion of structuration therefore leads to a less rigid and more dynamic view of the relationship between structure and actors. IR constructivists use this as a starting point for suggesting a less rigid view of anarchy.

Scholars of ‘Constructivism’ do not accept any social features of life as given. Instead, while they acknowledge that human beings are always situated in particular contexts which inform their actions, they also reproduce, or construct, their ‘world’ through their actions. The world we live in is therefore always contextual. This is in stark contrast to neo-realism, which argues that the basic features of the international system are universal, and have been operating in history as well as at present, in the ancient Greek system of city states as much as during the Cold War. The process of construction, in turn, is a ‘social’ process – it cannot be done by one person alone, but only in the collaboration with others. The term ‘constructivism’ therefore does not imply voluntarism. Individuals are always part of broader settings which they can shape, but only within the specific

context.

Constructivism in International Relations was developed as a response to the post-Cold War reality in which both realism and liberalism failed to explain why Soviet Union got disintegrated. Many scholars of international relations became critical of Rationalism with which both neo-realism and neo-liberalism overloaded and how this failed to comprehend the contemporary reality of international politics. Many schools of thought such as Critical Theory, Postmodernism, and Feminism started questioning dominant assumptions of the earlier theories such as the centrality of states, the anarchical conditions of international relations, power politics, self interests, etc.

Between these two radical poles (one dominated by neo-realists and other by neoliberals), social constructivists see themselves as occupying the middle ground. In a prominent article, published in 1997 by the *European Journal of International Relations*, Emanuel Adler identified social constructivism as occupying the space between the individualist account of rationalism, which starts from the individual subject, and the holism of structuralism, which focuses on all-encompassing accounts of world politics; between the agency oriented explanations of rationalism and the focus on structure in structuralism; and between the materialism integral to rationalism and the ideationalism in cognitive approaches (and, in Adler's, however mistaken, view, in many reflectivist works). In addition, social constructivism was to provide the via media by accepting some of the ontological insights of reflectivism, as well as respecting the epistemological concerns, but without giving up the aim to understand, and possibly even to explain, concrete outcomes of international politics.

2.3.4 CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ALEXANDER WENDT

Alexander Wendt is the chief advocate of constructivism in international relations theory. Wendt wrote an article titled "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics" which was published in International Organization in 1992 had laid the theoretical foundations for challenging what he observed to be a flaw shared by both neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists

who were giving more importance to the materialism in international relations. He argued that even the power politics which is the core concept of realism is also a socially constructed one and not given by nature and hence, capable of being transformed by human practice. Wendt further developed these ideas in his central work, *Social Theory of International Politics* published in 1999. In this work he articulated the central tenets of constructivism and drawing on the philosophical views of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Immanuel Kant puts forward three cultures of anarchy characterized respectively by “enmity,” “rivalry,” and “friendship.” For Wendt, constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims:

- States are the principal units of analysis for international political theory;
- The key structures in the state system are inter-subjective rather than material; and
- State identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature as claimed by the realists or domestic politics as neo-liberals maintain.

Despite being a state-centrist scholar of international politics, Wendt criticizes neo-realists and neo-liberals for glorifying the structure of states system. He holds that states are intentional and corporate actors whose identities and interests to a great extent are determined by domestic politics rather than the international system. He argues that as states change so does the international structure.

2.3.5 CONSTRUCTIVISM AS SOCIAL THEORY

In social theory, constructivists emphasize the social construction of reality. Human relations, including international relations, consisting of thoughts and ideas and not essentially of material conditions or forces. This is the philosophically idealist element of constructivism which contrasts with the materialist philosophy of social science positivism. According to constructivist philosophy, the social world is not a given: it is not something ‘out there’ that

exists independently of the thoughts and ideas of the people involved in it. It is not an external reality whose laws can be discovered by scientific research and explained by scientific theory, as positivists and behaviourists argue. The social and political world is not part of nature. There are no natural laws of society or economics or politics. History is not an evolving external process that is independent of human thought and ideas. It means that sociology or economics or political science or the study of history cannot be objective 'sciences' in the strict positivist sense of the word.

Everything involved in the social world of men and women is made by them. The fact that it is made by them makes it comprehensible to them. The social world is a world of human consciousness: of thoughts and beliefs, of ideas and concepts, of languages and discourses, of signs, signals, and understandings among human beings, especially groups of human beings, such as states and nations. The social world is an inter-subjective domain: it is meaningful to people who made it and live in it, and who understand it accurately because they constructed it and they are at home in it.

The social world is in part constructed of physical entities; note that the quote by Wendt mentions 'material resources' among those elements that constitute social structures. In that sense materialism is a part of constructivism. But it is the ideas and beliefs concerning those entities that are most important—what those entities signify in the minds of people. The international system of security and defence, for example, consists of territories, populations, weapons, and other physical assets. But it is the ideas and understandings according to which those assets are conceived, organized, and used—e.g., in alliances, armed forces, and so on—that is most important. The physical element is there. But that element is secondary to the intellectual element which infuses it with meaning, plans it, organizes it, and guides it. The thought that is involved in international security is more important, far more important, than the physical assets that are involved, because those assets have no meaning without the intellectual component; they are mere things in themselves.

Wendt illustrates the constructivist view with the following statement: ‘500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons’ because ‘the British are friends and the North Koreans are not’. Therefore, it is less the material fact of numbers of nuclear warheads that matter; what matters is how the actors think about each other, i.e., their ideas and beliefs. Material facts enter the picture but are secondary to ideas.

Therefore, it is helpful to emphasize the contrast between a materialist view held by neo-realists (and neoliberals) and the ideational view held by constructivists. According to the materialist view, power and national interest are the driving forces in international politics. In this view, ideas matter little; they can be used to rationalize actions dictated by material interest. In the ideational view held by social constructivists ideas always matter. ‘The starting premise is that the material world is indeterminate and is interpreted within a larger context of meaning. Ideas thus define the meaning of material power’.

The core ideational element upon which constructivists focus is inter-subjective beliefs (and ideas, conceptions, and assumptions) that are widely shared among people. Ideas must be widely shared to matter; nonetheless they can be held by different groups, such as organizations, policymakers, social groups, or society. ‘Ideas are mental constructs held by individuals, sets of distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes that provide broad orientations for behaviour and policy’. There are many different kinds of ideas. Nina Tannenwald identifies four major types: ‘ideologies or shared belief systems, normative beliefs, cause–effect beliefs and policy prescriptions’.

2.3.6 CORE ASSUMPTIONS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

Social constructivism can nowadays legitimately be seen as one of the mainstream approaches to International Relations – and, indeed, perhaps as the most important one. Constructivism focuses on the social construction of world affairs. The major argument of constructivist school of thought is that the international system is “socially constructed”. It “consists of the ways in which human beings think and interact with one another.”

The constructivist school of thought holds that international politics as a sphere of interaction is shaped by the actors' identities and practices and influenced by constantly changing normative institutional structures. It maintains that states' goals, either material/objective such as security and economic development, or immaterial/subjective such as international recognition and standing, are generated by their social corporate identities or how they view themselves in relation to other actors in the international community. Constructivists do not agree with the claim of (neo) realists who give stress on the materialism and contend that international politics is shaped by the rational-choice behaviour/decisions of states who pursue their interests by making utilitarian calculations to maximize their benefits and minimize their losses.

For constructivists, actors of the international relations are intrinsically "social" beings whose identities and interests are "the products of inter-subjective social structures". Contrary to this, both realists and liberalists view international actors as inherently pre-social "atomistic egoists" whose interests are formed prior to social interaction and who initiate such an interaction solely for material gains.

The difference between the neorealist and constructivist arguments is primarily one derived from their views of the nature of structure. Neo-realists consider the international structures as made "only of distribution of material capabilities," whereas the constructivists opine that are "also made of social relationships" which are themselves constructed by three elements of "shared knowledge, material resources and practices." Due to this factor constructivist theorists advocate a sociological rather than a micro-economic structuralism. For the constructivists, social construction of the world politics is its creation through a process of interaction between agents such as individuals, states, non-state actors and the structures of their broader environment that is, through a process of mutual constitution between agents and structures.

The constructivists hold that there is no pre-given "nature" to international anarchy, but it is states themselves that determine anarchy's nature. Moreover, anarchy alone does not make much sense in International relations. It cannot be

itself bring about a predetermined state of affairs among state actors. Rather, under anarchy different social structures and arrangements, cooperative and conflictual can be formed and defined on the basis of actors' social identities, and accordingly, the way they construct their national interests and devise relevant means to secure them. Opposite to this argument, neo-realists holds that "anarchy" as a determining condition of international system that by itself renders competition and conflict endless strong possibilities, and thus the international system a more conflictual than peaceful environment.

Constructivism holds the view that states' identities and interests in international politics are also subject to change. According to constructivists, anarchy lacks a constant "nature" and is shaped by actors' identities and interests. Moreover, identities and interests too lack such fixity and stability and are determined by states' actions and practices. Thus, for constructivist to examine how states' identities and interests are constructed as well as the role their certain international interactions play in this regard, rather than taking anarchy for granted and ascribe the condition of a group of states to the inescapable requirements of anarchy. Because existence of international system is not distinct from the "human conceptions" of it. The socio-cultural dimensions of international politics are as significant as economic and security dimensions.

The core assumptions of Constructivism, particularly in the context of international relations can be summarized as following.

- While the rationalist neo-neo theories tried to explain certain outcomes in international politics, most social constructivists instead prefer to describe their task as 'understanding'. This refers back to the work of German sociologist Max Weber, who set out the task of sociologists to understand the subjective motives and world views of actors, which are important factors having an impact on our social world.
- Social constructivists try to bridge the gap between structure and agency-centred theories and argue that structure and agency are mutually dependent. As a consequence, most social relations are relatively stable,

but the continuous reproduction of structures brings with it the potential for change.

- Social constructivists emphasise the role of norms in people's behaviour. Foreign policy, for instance, is not only a matter of national interest, but also of acceptable behaviour in the international society. Some social constructivists also stress ideas. These are often treated as individual beliefs, whereas norms have a much more social quality, i.e. they exist beyond the individual.
- Apart from norms, social constructivists emphasise the role of institutions. In line with their interest in the relationship between structure and agency, social constructivists analyse institutions with a particular focus on processes of institutionalisation, i.e. the development of a pattern of practices, and on socialisation, i.e. the adoption of norms and patterns of behaviour by actors new to institutions. For instance, when analysing European integration, social constructivists are interested in the development of further integration not only in the formal sense but also through the establishment of routines among officials in the European.
- The focus on norms and institutions does not mean that social constructivists disregard the role of interests (remember: they situate themselves in the middle ground!). There are two ways in which interests enter social constructivist research. First, they are not taken for granted. Instead, social constructivists concern themselves with how interests are formulated, and in particular the role of institutions, norms and ideas in this process. Second, social constructivist work often analyses the interplay between ideas and interests. In other words, they are not only concerned with the impact of institutions, norms and ideas on interests, but they also ask to what extent interests account for particular ideas (or institutions), and how they in turn are shaped by them.

2.3.7 CRITICAL EVALUATION

In a nutshell, constructivist theory gives importance to non-materialist/subject factors in international relations. This theory claims that significant aspects of international relations are historically and socially constructed, rather than unavoidable consequences of human nature or other vital characteristics of world politics. By rejecting the argument of neo-realists that anarchy is a structural condition inherent in the system of states, the Constructivist school of thought holds, in Alexander Wendt's words, that 'Anarchy is what states make of it'. Moreover, the constructivist theory also holds that it is possible to change the anarchic nature of the international relations. Despite the fact that this theory is forming "a new mainstream" in international relations theory, some scholars believe that, this is "an oppositional movement within IR theory." However, it is also seen as "a genuinely radical alternative" to such traditionally ingrained IR theories as neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Without any doubt, it can be argued that it is a distinctive approach to international relations which stresses the social, ideational and inter-subjective character of world politics.

Constructivism was criticised by both realists as well as critical theorists though they have major differences in terms of understanding contemporary international relations.

Neo-realists are doubtful about the significance that constructivists attach to norms, in particular international norms. Such norms surely exist, but they are routinely overlooked if that is in the interest of powerful states. Neorealists are not ready to accept that states can easily become friends due to their social interaction. The major problem that states face in anarchy, according to neo-realists, is a problem that is not sufficiently analysed by constructivists; it is the problem of uncertainty.

Some Marxists are critical of constructivism. Wallenstein's world system theory focuses on the material structure of global capitalism and its development since the sixteenth century. That analysis leaves no room for the social interface

analysed by constructivists. Robert Cox's neo-Marxist view of 'historical structures' makes more room for 'ideas' and will thus be more considerate to a constructivist approach.

2.3.8 SUMMING UP

Social constructivism is one of the infantile 'major' theories in International Relations. As we will see, its main attraction as well as its major difficulty is that it tries to occupy the 'middle ground' in International Relations. Its proponents thus acknowledge the influence of both structures and agency, and focus on how they influence each other. Social constructivists endeavour to find a practical answer to the postmodern challenge to scientific knowledge in order to be able to carry out empirical research. In addition, they are interested in the interplay of interests and ideas, as well as in the impact of norms, culture and institutions on international politics. Typical themes addressed by social constructivist work are, therefore, the construction of national interests, the spread of human rights, the impact of international organisations on state identities (and vice versa), or the development of different forms of international society.

**2.3 MARXIST THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: IMPERIALISM (LENIN), HEGEMONY
(GRAMSCI), WORLD SYSTEMS/ CORE VS PERIPHERY
(WALLERSTEIN), THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE
(CRITICAL THEORY)**

- V. Nagendra Rao

STRUCTURE

- 2.4.0 Objectives**
- 2.4.1 Introduction**
- 2.4.2 Marxist Understanding of Development of Capitalism**
- 2.4.3 Imperialism (Lenin)**
- 2.4.4 Hegemony (Gramsci)**
- 2.4.5 World Systems Theory**
- 2.4.6 The Politics of Knowledge (Critical Theory)**
- 2.4.7 Summing Up**

2.4.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

Directorate of Distance Education, University of Jammu, M.A. Political Science, Semester-I, International Politics : Theory and Issues.

- The importance of Marxist theories in international relations
- Lenin's understanding of imperialism
- Gramsci's contribution to the notion of Hegemony
- Wallerstein's World Systems Theory
- The contribution of Critical Theory in understanding the politics of knowledge.

2.4.1 INTRODUCTION

Karl Marx (1818-1883) was truly the last of the great critics in the Western intellectual tradition. His ideas exerted a decisive influence on all aspects of human endeavour, and transformed the study of history and society. By developing a theory of praxis, i.e. unity of thought and action, Marx brought about a sea change in the entire methodology of the social sciences. He was a brilliant agitator and polemist, a profound economist, a great sociologist, an incomparable historian. Marx was the first thinker to bring together the various strands of socialist thought into both a coherent world view and an impassioned doctrine of struggle.

Marx perceived Capitalism as a transient form of class society in which the production of capital predominates, and dominates all other forms of production. Capital is not a thing, not simply money or machinery, but money or machinery inserted within a specific set of social relations, based on private property, whose aim is the expansion of value (the accumulation of capital). Capitalism is therefore built on a social relations of struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class. Its historical prerequisite was the concentration of ownership in the hands of the ruling class and the consequential and 'bloody' emergence of a property-less class for whom the sale of labour power is their only source of livelihood. Capitalism therefore combines formal and legal equality in exchange with subordination and 'exploitation' in production. Like Weber, Marx portrayed capitalist society as the most developed historical organization of production. Unlike Weber, Marx thought that Class Struggle and competition between capitals would intensify, producing ever deeper bouts of crisis, and that at some point

capitalism would either degenerate into barbarism or progress to ‘socialism’.

2.4.2 MARXIST UNDERSTANDING OF DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM

To explain Marxism in IR, we need to start with Marx’s main theory for the development of capitalism: historical materialism. Marx claims that in Western Europe capitalist society began to evolve in the sixteenth century and was making giant strides towards maturity in the eighteenth century. Industrial capitalism, which Marx dates from the last third of the eighteenth century, finally establishes the domination of the capitalist mode of production: “At first trade is the precondition for the transformation of guild and rural domestic crafts into capitalist businesses. As soon as manufacture becomes somewhat stronger, and still more so large-scale industry, it creates a market for itself and uses its commodities to conquer it. Trade now becomes the servant of industrial production, for which the constant expansion of the market is a condition of existence”.

For many analysts, Britain’s dominance of the world economy in the mid- to late nineteenth century is seen as constituting the high point of the laissez-faire phase of capitalism. This phase took off in Britain in the 1840s with the repeal of the Corn Laws, the Navigation Acts and the passing of the Banking Act. The state adopted a liberal form which encouraged competition and fostered the development of a ‘self-regulating’ market society. Liberal and conservative thinkers have been keen to identify this particular phase of capitalism with the essence of capitalism itself.

World War I marked a turning point in the development of capitalism. After the war, international markets shrank, the gold standard was abandoned in favour of managed national currencies, banking hegemony passed from Europe to the United States, and trade barriers multiplied. The Great Depression of the 1930s brought the policy of laissez-faire (non-interference by the state in economic matters) to an end in most countries and for a time cast doubt on the capitalist system as a whole. The performance of capitalism since World War II in the

United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan, however, has given evidence of its continued vitality.

Despite the fact that capitalism is still surviving in contemporary times, a Marxist would still stress that IR is not just about states' foreign policy or the behaviour of politicians, but more about survival (or more broadly, life), reproduction, technologies and labour. If this is correct then the separation between the political and economic, or public and private, is problematic because those categories hide the ways in which states and foreign policies are determined by the social relations and structures of the global economy – such as multinational corporations or international financial institutions. Put differently, Marxism fundamentally questions what 'the international' is in IR. Whether it is anarchy for realists or international society for the English school, Marxists argue that such concepts are problematic because they make us believe in illusions or myths about the world. For example, the concept of anarchy creates the mirage that states are autonomous agents whose rational behaviour can be predicted. However, this ignores the endurance of regional inequalities and the structural and historical links between states, violence and the key actors of the global political economy.

There are many people developed theories based on Marxism, to improve Marxist foundations to understand contemporary relations. In the following sections, you will be studying some of them.

2.4.3 IMPERIALISM (LENIN)

Anglo-American liberal historians simply assumed the 'imperialism' of the social theorists to be close synonyms for 'colonialism' – referring to the acquisition by European powers of formal domination over non-European territories and peoples. So colonialism can be defined as the conquest and control of other people's land and goods. But colonialism in this sense is not merely the expansion of various European powers into Asia, Africa or the Americas from the sixteenth century onwards; it has been a recurrent and widespread feature of human history. At its height in the second century AD, the Roman Empire stretched from Armenia

to the Atlantic. However, there is crucial distinction between these two: whereas earlier colonialisms were pre-capitalist, modern colonialism was established alongside capitalism in Western Europe.

Modern colonialism did more than extract tribute, goods and wealth from the countries that it conquered—it restructured the economies of the latter, drawing them into a complex relationship with their own, so that there was a flow of human and natural resources between colonised and colonial countries. This flow worked in both directions—slaves and indentured labour as well as raw materials were transported to manufacture goods in the metropolis, or in other locations for metropolitan consumption, but the colonies also provided captive markets for European goods. Thus slaves were moved from Africa to the Americas, and in the West Indian plantations they produced sugar for consumption in Europe, and raw cotton was moved from India to be manufactured into cloth in England and then sold back to India whose own cloth production suffered as a result. In whichever direction human beings and materials travelled, the profits always flowed back into the so-called ‘mother country’.

Lenin’s pamphlet, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, tried to account for the outbreak of war between the leading capitalist states due to imperial rivalry. Lenin had not set out to account for European colonization of the tropics. On the contrary, he specified that imperialism commenced only when colonization ended. Moreover, the virtually complete territorial division of the world by the great powers was, for Lenin, only one of a number of facets of imperialism. Concurrent anti-competitive division of raw materials and world markets between large corporations were not causes but analogues of concurrent territorial division. Lenin regarded monopoly and finance capitalism as the causes of territorial rivalry. The crucial feature of imperialism was that spatially extensive development of the capitalist system was no longer possible, and the great powers and their capitalists alike were therefore caught up in a zero-sum game consisting in highly conflictual re-division of territory and markets alike.

2.4.4 HEGEMONY (GRAMSCI)

In many ways, it was the work of the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci that made it possible to think about how ideologies can cut across different classes and how, also, the same class can hold many, even contradictory, ideologies. Gramsci's views do not form part of a finished philosophy and are scattered in his various prison diaries or Prison Notebooks, written between 1929 and 1935. Gramsci questioned the primacy of the economic (conceptualised as 'base' in classical Marxist thought) over the ideological (conceived of as 'superstructure') because he was trying to understand the failure of the revolution in Western Europe, despite the economic conditions being ripe for the same. This does not mean that Gramsci ignored the role of economic changes. But he did not believe that they alone create historic events; rather, they can only create conditions which are favourable for certain kinds of ideologies to flourish.

Gramsci makes a crucial distinction between 'philosophy' and 'common sense'—two floors or levels on which ideology operates. The former is a specialised elaboration of a specific position. 'Common sense', on the other hand, is the practical, everyday, popular consciousness of human beings. Most of us think about 'common sense' as that which is obviously true, common to everybody, or normative. Gramsci analyses how such 'common sense' is formed. It is actually a highly contradictory body of beliefs that combines 'elements from the Stone Age and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of the human race united the world over'. Common sense is thus an amalgam of ideas 'on which the practical consciousness of the masses of the people is actually formed'.

While exploring nuances of ideology, Gramsci formulated his concept of 'hegemony'. Hegemony is power achieved through a combination of coercion and consent. Playing upon Machiavelli's suggestion that power can be achieved through both force and fraud, Gramsci argued that the ruling classes achieve domination not by force or coercion alone, but also by creating subjects who 'willingly' submit to being ruled. Ideology is crucial in creating consent, it is the

medium through which certain ideas are transmitted and, more important, held to be true. Hegemony is achieved not only by direct manipulation or indoctrination, but by playing upon the common sense of people.

Gramsci's ideas have been employed by a wide range of writers to analyse race and colonialism. Scholars at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies have used Gramsci to analyse contemporary political formations in Europe, as has the Subaltern Studies group of Indian historians to revise existing theories of nationalism and postcolonial social formations. Similarly Latin American and South African historians find Gramsci useful in thinking about the nature of the colonial and postcolonial state. Today, historians are increasingly interested in probing how colonial regimes achieved domination through creating partial consent, or involving the colonised peoples in creating the states and regimes which oppressed them. The dimension of Gramsci's work that has most inspired revisionary analyses of colonial societies is his understanding that subjectivity and ideology are absolutely central to the processes of domination.

2.4.5 WORLD SYSTEMS THEORY

World-systems theory draws on the intellectual tradition of Marxism-Leninism in focusing on the structures of dominance and dependence in the international system. For world-systems theorists, the key actors in the international arena are not states, but the classes that are involved in the prevailing capitalist structure – the exploiters and the exploited. The foundations of the world-systems theory was laid down by Immanuel Wallerstein.

Wallerstein was an Africanist who, in studying Africa, realized that underdevelopment there could not be explained or cured by the liberal capitalist theories coming from the West. He sought to explain the division of the world between a relatively small wealthy core, and an impoverished and underdeveloped periphery. A small semi-periphery held states that moved beyond poverty and instability, but could not become as wealthy and dominant as core states.

It is here, in its explanations of semi-periphery that the world-system theory

moves beyond dependency theories core-periphery dichotomy. This ‘middle-class’ of states called as ‘semi-periphery’ was seen as necessary for the economic growth and political stability of the system as a whole, situated as it was between the core and periphery in terms of economic power. Semi-peripheral states have societies that are in the process of industrializing and diversifying their economies. Wallerstein argued that there were limited opportunities for upward movement within the capitalist world system and, under such circumstances, industrialization was the only way for states to move to the core. World-system theory, then, provides an explanation for the industrialization that has taken place in some of the developing countries. In addition, semi-peripheral states play a critical role in the world system because their existence means that the core states are not constantly pitted against the periphery states. Indeed, Wallerstein attributes the survival of the system to the existence of these semi-peripheral states, arguing that they have acted as a cushion between the exploiting core states and the exploited periphery. The semi-peripheral states do this because by playing the role of both exploited and exploiter, they diffuse both the anger and revolutionary activity of the peripheries. Indeed, Wallerstein sees the semi-periphery as a structural prerequisite for stability in the international system. When and if this ceases to be the case, then the international system will disintegrate. Thus, all countries are fundamentally and inescapably constrained, Wallerstein argues, by the international system as a whole. Moreover, the semi-periphery provides secure investment locations for core capital whenever core wages become inflated by well-organized labour movements.

In essence, Wallerstein posits capitalism as a world system with relations between the core and periphery structured so that the core exploits the periphery for cheap resources and labour, turning those goods into valuable finished products for consumption in the core. Some finished goods are sold back to the periphery, but consumed by governmental elites whose interests are more in line with those of the core than those within their own country. The elites in third world states thus find it in their interest to perpetuate structures that benefit the core (one reason corruption is prevalent throughout third world governments). Because post-colonial states are often fictions with no strong sense of national identity,

people go into government more to get rich than out of any idealistic notion of helping their state develop.

For Wallerstein and the numerous world systems theorists who followed in his wake, this world system functions in part through the control of a *hegemon* who can dominate the system and enforce its rules. First it was the Netherlands, then Great Britain, and finally the US. The world-system is always characterised by a single division of labour that is producing for a world market. Wallerstein further concluded that a world division of labour based on trade relations has historically given rise to regional economic specialization and to an international structure of unequally powerful nations. Particular states have become increasingly used to securing favourable 'terms of trade', through measures that include military threats and interventions. The tendency of politics to serve economic ends has thus accelerated the unequal distribution of wealth within the global system. For this reason, the capitalist system became increasingly polarized into a core of wealthy, technologically advanced countries and a periphery of poor countries from which key primary goods and capital were extracted on unfavourable terms. Thus, core countries enjoyed a position of global dominance as the result of their structural relations within the world economy, a position that helped to sustain a constant accumulation of new advantages by the core nations. Likewise, peripheral countries encountered structural constraints on their political economies that prevented there being any fundamental change in their disadvantaged positions. For this reason, uneven development was endemic within the capitalist world system.

The world-systems theory has been effective in predicting the ongoing division between rich and poor states and the limitations of the semi-periphery (Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, India, etc.), but seemed overly pessimistic about the health of global capitalism. Like all Marxian theories, it claims that capitalism as it operates in the real world contains contradictions which lead to intermittent crises. The most dangerous is the problem of over-production which can lead to a credit crisis that can cause systemic failure.

2.4.6 THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (CRITICAL THEORY)

During the 1930s, the Frankfurt School developed a critical and interdisciplinary approach to cultural and communications studies, combining political economy, textual analysis, and analysis of social and ideological effects of capitalism. The main proponents of this theory are Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Friedrich Pollock. They coined the term “culture industry” to signify the process of the industrialization of mass-produced culture and the commercial imperatives that drove the system. The critical theorists analyzed all mass-mediated cultural artefacts within the context of industrial production, in which the commodities of the culture industries exhibited the same features as other products of mass production: commodification, standardization, and massification. The culture industries had the specific function, however, of providing ideological legitimation of the existing capitalist societies and of integrating individuals into its way of life.

Furthermore, the critical theorists investigated the cultural industries in a political context as a form of the integration of the working class into capitalist societies. The Frankfurt school theorists were among the first neo-Marxian groups to examine the effects of mass culture and the rise of the consumer society on the working classes which were to be the instrument of revolution in the classical Marxian scenario. They also analyzed the ways that the culture industries and consumer society were stabilizing contemporary capitalism and accordingly sought new strategies for political change, agencies of political transformation, and models for political emancipation that could serve as norms of social critique and goals for political struggle.

The Frankfurt school focused intently on technology and culture, indicating how technology was becoming both a major force of production and formative mode of social organization and control. In a 1941 article, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology”, Herbert Marcuse argued that technology in the contemporary era constitutes an entire “mode of organizing and perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behaviour patterns, an instrument for control and domination”. In the realm of

culture, technology produced mass culture that habituated individuals to conform to the dominant patterns of thought and behaviour, and thus provided powerful instruments of social control and domination.

In retrospect, one can see the Frankfurt school work as articulation of a theory of the stage of state and monopoly capitalism that became dominant during the 1930s. This was an era of large organizations, theorized earlier by Austro-Marxist Rudolf Hilferding as “organized capitalism”, in which the state and giant corporations managed the economy and in which individuals submitted to state and corporate control. This period is often described as “Fordism” to designate the system of mass production and the homogenizing regime of capital which wanted to produce mass desires, tastes, and behaviour. It was thus an era of mass production and consumption characterized by uniformity and homogeneity of needs, thought, and behaviour producing a mass society and what the Frankfurt school described as “the end of the individual”. No longer was individual thought and action the motor of social and cultural progress; instead giant organizations and institutions overpowered individuals. The era corresponds to the staid, conformist, and conservative world of corporate capitalism that was dominant in the 1950s with its organization men and women, its mass consumption, and its mass culture.

Robert Cox also occupies a distinguished position among critical theorists due to his pioneering work aimed at adopting a rejuvenated neo-Gramscian perspective focusing on the role of power structures and social blocs formed around them.

Building upon the Gramscian notion of hegemony, Cox contends that in order to become truly hegemonic, a state would have to establish and protect a world order which is universal in conception. In other words, this would not be an order in which a dominant state exploits others, but an order which will be perceived by subordinate states as compatible with their interests. *A world-hegemony entails a social structure, an economic structure and a political structure*, and it emerges as a result of a widely appreciated sense of supremacy in the inter-state system, global political economy, as well as social and ecological

systems. International organizations are the primary mechanisms in this framework through which universal norms of a world-hegemony are clearly expressed.

3.1 NATIONAL POWER AND NATIONAL INTEREST: CHANGING DYNAMICS

- V. Nagendra Rao

STRUCTURE

2.4.8 Objectives

2.4.9 Introduction

2.4.10 Power and the Study of International Relations

2.4.11 Elements of National Power

2.4.12 The Power Analysis Revolution

2.4.13 Summing up Power Analysis

2.4.14 National Interest

2.4.15 Historical Evolution of the Concept of National Interest

2.4.16 Birth of Realism and National Interest

2.4.17 Vital and Secondary Interests

2.4.18 Related Aspects

2.4.19 National Interest in the Era of “World Politics”

2.4.20 Summing Up

3.1.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- The importance of ‘power’ analysis in studying international relations
- Elements of national power
- Dimensions of power
- Concept of National Interest and its historical evolution
- The difference between vital and secondary interests
- The transformation of the concept of national interest in the era of “world politics”

3.1.1 INTRODUCTION

Most definitions of politics involve power. Most international interactions are political or have implications for politics. Thus, it is not astounding that power has been prominent in discussions of international interactions from Thucydides to the present day. The long history of discussions on the role of power in international relations, however, has failed to generate much agreement. Scholars disagree not only with respect to the role of power but also with respect to the nature of power. One scholar, Kenneth Waltz, notes that power is a key concept in realist theories of international politics, while accepting that ‘it’s proper definition remains a matter of controversy’. Robert Gilpin describes the concept of power as ‘one of the most upsetting in the field of international relations’ and suggests that the ‘number and variety of definitions should be a discomfiture to political scientists’. There is, however, a widespread consensus among international relations scholars on both the necessity of addressing the role of power in international interactions and the unsatisfactory state of knowledge about this topic. Although it is often useful to distinguish among such power terms as power, influence, control, coercion, force, persuasion, deterrence, compellence, inducement and so on, it is possible to identify common elements underlying all such terms. Robert A. Dahl has suggested that fundamental to most such terms is the basic intuitive notion of A causing B to do something that B otherwise would

not have done. Although alternative definitions of power thrive, none rivals this one in extensive acceptability. In the following discussion, the term ‘power’ will be used in a broad generic sense that is interchangeable with such terms as ‘influence’ or ‘control’ unless otherwise indicated. This usage is not intended to refute the validity or the utility of distinguishing among such terms for other purposes.

3.1.2 POWER AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

International politics has been defined in terms of influencing ‘major groups in the world so as to advance the purposes of some against the opposition of others’. Although the term ‘power politics’ has unpleasant connotations for some, such a definition implies that the term is superfluous. From this perspective, all politics is power politics in the sense that all politics involves power. This is not to say that politics is only about power.

Traditionally, the study of international politics supposed the existence of national states with conflicting policies, placing a high value on maintaining their independence, and relying primarily on military force. The states with the most military power were designated ‘Great Powers’, and the ‘game’ of international politics was ‘played’ primarily by them. Noting that only a few states possessed the military capabilities to support their foreign policies effectively and these are the states that ‘alone constitute the Great Powers’.

In the eighteenth century, ‘the power of individual states was conceived to be susceptible of measurement by certain well-defined factors’, including population, territory, wealth, armies and navies. In the subsequent years, this approach evolved into the ‘elements of national power’ approach to power analysis reflected in Hans J. Morgenthau’s influential textbook *Politics Among Nations*.

States were depicted as seeking to maximize the power relative to each other, thus producing a ‘balance of power’ or as seeking to produce a balance of power. Each version of balance of power theory shared the assumption that it was

possible to add up various elements of national power, sometimes called ‘power resources’ or ‘capabilities’, in order to calculate the power distribution among the Great Powers. A modern version of this approach is found in Kenneth N. Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* (1979).

3.1.3 ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Morgenthau identified nine elements of national power, including geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, quality of diplomacy, and quality of government. Each of these elements was evaluated in terms of its potential contribution to a country’s ability to fight a war. Morgenthau viewed all nations as constantly preparing for war, fighting a war, or recovering from war.

Power is historically linked with military capacity. Nevertheless, one element of power alone cannot determine national power. Part of the problem stems from the fact that the term power has taken on the meaning of both the capacity to do something and the actual exercise of the capacity. And yet a state’s ability to convert potential power into operational power is based on many considerations, not the least of which is the political and psychological inter-relationship of such factors as government effectiveness and national unity.

In this context, the elements of national power, no matter how defined, can be separated only artificially. Together, they constitute the resources for the attainment of national objectives and goals.

Closely allied to all this is the fact that national power is dynamic, not static. No particular power factor or relationship is immune to change. Over the last century, in particular, rapid changes in military technologies have accelerated this dynamism. The United States’ explosion of a nuclear device instantly transformed its power position, the nature of war, and the very conduct of international relations. A war or revolution can have an equally abrupt effect on power. The two world wars devastated Europe, facilitated the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union, and set the developing world on a road to decolonisation,

thereby dismantling in less than 50 years a system that had been in continuation for over three centuries. Economic growth can also rapidly change a state's power position, as was the case with Japan and Germany after 1945. In addition, the discovery of new resources, or their depletion, can alter the balance of power. Certainly OPEC's control over a declining supply of oil, coupled with its effectiveness as a cartel, caused a dramatic shift in power relations after 1973.

Such shifts are not always so immediately perceptible. Power is what people believe it is until it is exercised. Reputation for power, in other words, confers power regardless of whether that power is real or not. At the same time, there are examples throughout the history of states that continued to trade on past reputations, only to see them shattered by a single event.

Evaluation of national power is difficult. The basic problem, as we have seen, is that all the elements of power are often interrelated. In other words, like all strategic endeavours, more art than science is involved in the evaluation of where one state stands in relation to the power of other regional and global actors.

3.1.4 THE POWER ANALYSIS REVOLUTION

The 'elements of national power' approaches portray power as a possession or property of states. This approach was challenged during the last half of the twentieth century by the '**relational power**' approach, developed by scholars working in several disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, sociology, economics and political science. Some would regard the publication of *Power and Society* by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan as the watershed between the old 'power-as-resources' approach and the new 'relational power' approach, which developed the idea of power as a type of causation. This causal notion conceives of power as a relationship in which the behaviour of actor A at least partially causes a change in the behaviour of actor B. 'Behaviour' in this context need not be defined narrowly, but may be understood broadly to include beliefs, attitudes, opinions, expectations, emotions and/or predispositions to act. In this view, power is an actual or potential relationship between two or more actors

(persons, states, groups, etc.), rather than a property of any one of them.

The shift from a property concept of power to a relational one constituted a revolution in power analysis. Despite the ancient origins of the study of power, Dahl maintains that ‘the systematic empirical study of power relations is remarkably new’. He attributes the ‘considerable improvement in the clarity’ of power concepts to the fact that ‘the last several decades have probably witnessed more systematic efforts to tie down these concepts than have the previous millennia of political thought’.

3.1.4.1 Dimensions of Power

Power was no longer viewed as monolithic and uni-dimensional, but rather as multidimensional. This view gave a sanction for the possibility that power could increase on one dimension while simultaneously decreasing on another. Among the more important dimensions of power were the following.

Scope: Scope refers to the aspect of B’s behaviour affected by A. This calls attention to the possibility that an actor’s power may vary from one issue to another. Thus, a country like Japan may have more influence with respect to economic issues than with respect to military issues.

Domain: The domain of an actor’s power refers to the number of other actors subject to its influence. In other words, how big is B; or how many Bs are there? Thus, a state may have a great deal of influence in one region of the world, while having little or no influence in other parts of the world.

Weight: The weight of an actor’s power refers to the probability that B’s behaviour is or could be affected by A. Thus, a country that has only a 30 per cent chance of achieving its aims in trade negotiations is less powerful than one with a 90 per cent chance, *ceteris paribus*. This dimension could also be labelled the ‘reliability’ of A’s influence.

Costs: Both the costs to A and the costs to B are relevant to assessing influence. Is it costly or cheap for A to influence B? Is it costly or cheap for B to comply

with A's demands? Some have suggested that more power should be attributed to an actor that can exercise influence cheaply than to one for whom it is costly. If A can get B to do something that is costly for B, some would contend that this is indicative of more power than if A can only get B to do things that are cheap for B. Even if A is unable to get B to comply with its demands, it may be able to impose costs on B for non-compliance. Some have argued that this should be viewed as a kind of power.

Means: There are many means of exercising influence and many ways to categorize such means. One scheme (Baldwin, 1985) for classifying the means of influence in international relations includes the following categories:

1. Symbolic means. This would include appeals to normative symbols as well as the provision of information. Thus one country might influence another either by reminding them that slavery is bad or by informing them that AIDS is caused by HIV.
2. Economic means. Increasing or reducing the goods or services available to other countries has a long history in world politics.
3. Military means. Actual or threatened military force has received more attention than any other means in international relations.
4. Diplomatic means. Diplomacy includes a wide array of practices, including representation and negotiation.

Which dimensions of power should be specified for meaningful scholarly communication? There is no single right answer to this question. The causal concept of power, however, does imply a minimum set of specifications. The point is well put by Jack Nagel:

Anyone who employs a causal concept of power must specify domain and scope. To say 'X has power' may seem sensible, but to say 'X causes' or 'X can cause' is nonsense. Causation implies an X and a Y – a cause and an effect. If power is causation, one must state the outcome caused.

Stipulating domain and scope answers the question ‘Power over what?’

The idea that a meaningful specification of a power relationship must include scope and domain is widely shared by power analysts committed to social science.

The multidimensional character of power makes it complicated to add up its various dimensions in order to arrive at some overall estimate of an actor’s power. Although there are some similarities between political power and purchasing power, one important difference is the lack of a standardized measuring rod for the former. Whereas money can be used to measure purchasing power, there is no analogous standard of value in terms of which to add up the various dimensions of power so as to arrive at an overall total. For this reason, estimates of an actor’s ‘overall power’ are likely to be controversial.

3.1.4.2 The Potential Power Problem

The elements of national power approach to power analysis are a variant of the power-as resources approach. In this approach, power resources are treated as if they were power itself. One problem with this approach is that what functions as a power asset in one situation may be a power liability in a different situation. Planes loaded with nuclear bombs may be worse than useless in a situation calling for planes with conventional weapons with insufficient time to unload the nuclear weapons and reload the planes with conventional ones. And the same accumulation of arms that are useful for deterring one country may trigger an arms race with another. Similarly, what constitutes a ‘good hand’ in card games depends on whether one is playing poker or bridge. Discussions on the capabilities of states that fail to designate or imply a framework of assumptions about who is trying to get whom to do what. It makes no more sense to talk about state capabilities in general than to talk about state power without specifying scope and domain. If one wants to estimate the potential power of Guatemala, it is essential to know whether it involves a border dispute with El Salvador or a trade agreement with the United States.

3.1.4.3 The Fungibility Problem

‘Fungibility’ refers to the ease with which power resources are useful in one issue-area can be used in other issue-areas. Money in a market economy is the classical fungible resource. Indeed, fungibility (that is, liquidity) is one of the defining characteristics of money. In a market economy one does not usually need to specify the scope or domain of the purchasing power of money because the same euro (yen, dollar, rupee, etc.) can be used to buy a car, a meal, or a book.

Some scholars have suggested that the fungibility of power resources increases as the amount increases. Thus, power is said to be more fungible for powerful states than for weaker states. It is not clear what this means or why it might be true. It is, of course, true that more power resources allow one to do more things, that is, influence more actors and or more issues.

3.1.5 SUMMING UP POWER ANALYSIS

Power has figured importantly in discussions of international interaction since the time of Thucydides. Despite the long tradition of power analysis in international politics, scholarly agreement on the nature of power and its role in international relations is lacking. The two principal approaches to power analysis in international interaction have been the ‘power as resources’ (or ‘elements of national power’) approach and the ‘relational power’ approach. The latter was developed during the last half of the twentieth century by scholars in philosophy and a variety of social science disciplines. Both approaches are evident in contemporary international relations scholarship.

Although power is an ancient focus in the study of international relations, there are many opportunities for further research. These include (1) the treatment of power as a dependent variable; (2) the forms of power; (3) institutions and power; (4) domestic politics and power; (5) strategic interaction; and (6) power distributions in different issue areas.

Although scholarly agreement on the nature and role of power in international

interaction is unlikely in the near future, research along the lines suggested above may nevertheless enhance the understanding of important dimensions of international behaviour.

3.1.6 NATIONAL INTEREST

The analytically relevant basic unit of international politics today more than ever is the Nation State. No intelligible hypothesis of inter-State relations, behaviour and motivations in contemporary international life can be built safely on the valid premises that foreign policy and foreign operations are intrinsically conditioned by the fact of projecting national identities and national interests.

The concept of national interest is used in both political analysis and political action. As an analytic tool, it is employed to describe, explain, or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing policies. Both usages, in other words, refer to what is best for a national society. They also share a tendency to confine the intended meaning to what is best for a nation in foreign affairs.

3.1.7 HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST

The roots of the concept of "National interest" can be traced at least back to the pessimistic realism of Machiavelli in the 15th century. As such, it represents a refutation of earlier Western sources in Hellenic idealism, Judeo-Christian biblical morality, and the teachings of medieval churchmen such as Thomas Aquinas. You may have splendid moral goals, argued Machiavelli, but without sufficient power and the willingness to use it, you will accomplish nothing.

The national interest has a much longer history as an instrument of action than as a tool of analysis. According to a historian [Charles A. Beard] who traced past uses of the term, political actors made claims on behalf of the national interest as early as the sixteenth century in Italy and the seventeenth century in England. At that time claims made in the name of "the will of the prince,"

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“dynastic interests,” and other older catchwords began to lose their effectiveness as a new form of political organization, the nation-state, came into being and served as the political unit to which men owed their allegiance. Thus, the old terms were gradually replaced by new ones that reflected the new loyalties. The national interest was one of these, as was “national honour,” “the public interest” and “the general will.” Beard also found that “the term, national interest, has been extensively employed by American statesmen since the establishment of the Constitution.”

Many decades elapsed, however, before the national interest attracted attention as a tool of analysis. Not until the twentieth century, when two world wars made it clear that mass publics had both a vital stake in foreign affairs and played a vital role in them, did analysts focus on the national interest as a concept which could be used to describe, explain, and assess the foreign policies of nations. Beard was himself one of the first to develop the concept for this purpose and to distinguish it from the “public interest,” which through convention has come to be used in reference to the domestic policies of nations.

3.1.8 BIRTH OF REALISM AND NATIONAL INTEREST

With the flight of scholars from Europe in the 1930s, however, American universities became exposed to what were called “realist” approaches that utilized national interest as their primary building block. The truly powerful mind of Realism, as he called his approach, the man who more than any other acquainted Americans with the idea of national interest, was the German émigré Hans Morgenthau. Bringing the wisdom of Machiavelli and Clausewitz with him, Morgenthau told Americans that they must arm and oppose first the Axis and then the Soviet Union not out of any abstract love of liberty and justice, but because their most profound national interests were threatened. “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power,” he wrote.

According to Hans Morgenthau, “as long as the world is politically organised into nations, the national interest is indeed the last word in international politics”. National Interest acquires a theoretical primacy because “for a general theory of

politics, the concept of interest defined as power serves as the central focus, while a theory of international politics must be focused on the concept of the national interest”. This is inevitable since “the idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics, as such, unaffected by the circumstances of time and place . . . yet while the concern of politics with interest is perennial, the connection between interest and the national state is a product of history”.

3.1.9 VITAL AND SECONDARY INTERESTS

Morgenthau saw two levels of national interest, the “vital” and the “secondary”. To preserve the first, which pertains to the very life of the state, there can be no compromise or hesitation about going to war. Vital national interests are relatively easy to define: security as a free and independent nation and protection of institutions, people, and fundamental values. Vital interests may at times extend overseas should one detect an expansionist state that is distant now but amassing power and conquests that later will affect you. Imperialist powers that threaten your interests are best dealt with early and always with adequate power.

Secondary interests, those over which one may seek to compromise, are harder to define. Typically, they are somewhat removed from your borders and represent no threat to your sovereignty. Potentially, however, they can grow in the minds of statesmen until they seem to be vital. If an interest is secondary, mutually advantageous deals can be negotiated, provided the other party is not engaged in a policy of expansionism. If he is engaged in expansionism, compromises on secondary interests will not calm matters and may even be read as appeasement.

The concept ‘National Interest’ connotes those “vital interests” of basic and common concern to the totality of the nation which transcend sectional, group, class’ and other sub-national interests. While its formulation in State policy is inevitably made by the ruling elite and, therefore, in the ultimate analysis is subject to the particular interests, prejudices and bias of that elite, yet a large measure of agreement if not also a consensus is possible in the political climate of our times in which public opinion and democratic action are determining factors of political life in most countries of’ the world. National Interest is similar

to “the great generalities” of politics, but nevertheless it is possible to prepare a fairly elaborate inventory of National Interest based on what Morgenthau calls, “residual meaning”. In broad categories, National Interest may be grouped variously from differing perspectives into analytical dualities like: objective and subjective, permanent and transient, universal and specific, vital and auxiliary, necessary and variable, policy-oriented and ethically oriented, security-oriented and welfare oriented.

These alternatives are often overlying and capable of grouping into differing patterns of permutation and combination on an empirical basis, because no a priori classification and grouping will stand the test of operational reality. Thus, for instance, the objectivists regard National Interest as permanent, unchanging and related to Power and make a distinction between National Interest and passion and opinion. Subjectivists affirm that National Interest includes values other than Power. They cite disagreements between the individual and groups of individuals concerning the definition and ambit of National Interest.⁶ Thus, for example, ‘permanent’ interests are usually grouped together with ‘universal’ and ‘vital’ and likewise ‘transient’ interests are usually grouped with ‘specific’ and ‘auxiliary’. It is possible to visualise and indeed detect that ‘transient’ interests could be ‘vital’ and also ‘specific’ and ‘auxiliary’ interests could also be ‘specific’ and ‘transient’. The salient point to remember is the flexibility of possible combinations in a situation of real choice.

3.1.10 RELATED ASPECTS

Four other related aspects have to be stated at the outset.

First: National Interest is not and ought not to be counter posed to morality or values. In fact the relevant aspect of morality and values in National Interest has essentially a political and social connotation. Seen thus, in the words of Morgenthau, the “national interest itself has moral dignity, because the national community is the only source of order and the only protector of minimal moral values in a world lacking order and moral consensus beyond the bounds of the national state. So it is that both politics and morality demand for the nation ‘but

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one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action: the national interest' “. This point is emphasised differently by Arnold Wolfers when he argues: ‘We are never really dealing with interests vs. values, for these, interests are themselves values”.

Second: National Identity, National Welfare and National Security are the three fundamental or hard-core, aspects of National Interest.

Third: the content and configuration of National Interest which go on changing are determined by the interaction of three basic factors – the total cultural context, political traditions, institutions and dominant political forces, and world political, economic, technological, military and ideological conditions’.”

Fourth: The perception, cognizance and articulation of National Interest are done by a combination of elites (Gabriel Almond particularly mentions four elites - political, bureaucratic, interest and communication - as decisive in the formulation of a foreign policy),’ reflecting the divergence of interests in a given society; but its formulation in operative State policy is essentially the function of the ruling elite which, in an ideal situation attempts through the available processes of decision-making to evolve a national consensus through the reconciliation or fusion of sub-national, sectional and group interests. It may, however, be understood that no definition of National Interest will be complete and comprehensive without covering both the national and the international fields. For, National Interest is not just a factor which is to be identified and formulated in Foreign Policy alone, but is basically a value whose preservation and promotion in national domestic policies give it the validity and authenticity for projection in the country’s international or foreign policies, thereby creating the normal continuum between internal and external policies.

3.1.11 NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE ERA OF “WORLD POLITICS”

A growing number of observers of world affairs have called attention to two seemingly disparate but mutually related trends which together, it is suggested; represent the “erosion” of the nation- state and interstate relations as we have

known it over the past three hundred years. These trends are, first, disintegrative tendencies within existing national units (i.e., increasing demands for greater regional autonomy, crises of authority, and ineffectiveness of problem-solving institutions) and, secondly, integrative tendencies beyond the nation-state level (i.e., increasing interdependencies, transaction flows across national boundaries, and proliferation of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations).

The four major trends that are inherent in contemporary “world Politics” are (1) the diffusion of power, (2) the shrinking and linking of the globe, and (3) interdependence and loss of control. These trends, according to some scholars, demanding redrafting the concept of national interest.

3.1.11.1 Diffusion of Power

Perhaps no trend has been more commented upon recently than the diffusion of power within the international system. The “cobweb” theory that became popular during the 1970s view the diffusion of power in the international system as consisting primarily in the proliferation of non-state (sub-national and trans-national) actors as at least semiautonomous agents capable of shaping events and competing with national actors for influence in world politics. According to Cobweb theorists, national power everywhere is being undermined and diluted by both ever narrower interpretations of the “national interest” on the part of some sub-national groups and ever broader interpretations on the part of other societal elements which have developed cross-national affiliations and identities through membership in multinational corporations and other organizations transcending national borders. A corollary here is that an increasing number of problems in the contemporary world are seen as either generated by non-state forces or dealt with through non-state means and that world politics is becoming a series of fragmented, discretely defined issue-areas (e.g., air safety) in which outcomes are determined by a congeries of forces including both nation-states and other actors (international organizations).

3.1.11.2 Shrinking and Linking of the Globe

Another trend which has questioned the relevance of traditional concept of national interest is what can be called the “shrinking and linking” phenomenon. According to one popular line of analysis, modern transportation and communication technology has facilitated increased flow of people, goods, and ideas across national boundaries, with the result that the world has become smaller in terms of both physical distances and social distances. Persons residing in nation-states located in one corner of the globe are becoming increasingly sensitive to and affected by what goes on inside of and between nations situated in other corners of the globe. “Cultural diffusion” is seen more occurring at an even faster rate than “power diffusion” as a homogenization process is producing a world society of universally shared values and tastes.

Translated into political terms, this “shrinking and linking” phenomenon is associated with notions of “permeability” and “penetration” or, to use James Rosenau’s phrase, “linkage politics.” That is, nation-states are being stripped of their hard outer shells and are becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influences which do not follow the normal paths of interaction. What is referred to here is not merely foreign governmental intervention in the political affairs of a state common enough occurrence in the past-but rather a more subtle and pervasive enmeshment of external elements in the entire national life of a society. As the boundaries between national political systems and their international environments continue to deteriorate, distinctions between foreign and domestic policy become further blurred.

3.1.11.3 Interdependence and Loss of Control

The “diffusion of power” and “shrinking and linking” themes are closely related to a third theme, namely “interdependence and loss of control.” One version of the latter theme is the “spaceship earth” notion of a tiny planet of people with interlocking and inseparable destinies moving aimlessly through time and space. A more muted expression of the same theme is the view that governments have become increasingly incapable of managing their national destinies, of controlling

events within their own boundaries, much less outside them, since the problems they are called upon to solve—economic inflation, pollution, skyjacking, etc.—spill over national boundaries and are caused by factors beyond the control of any single national actor. The paralysis of the central institutions of states in the face of their inability to cope with these problems has contributed to what many observers see as widespread crises of authority within nation-states and surrender of de-facto national sovereignty in the international system.

Increased interdependence among nations has meant that their efforts to achieve desired goals for themselves have tended to become “collective goods” problems, problems which require joint action among various actors who find they cannot singly produce desired “goods” (or avoid undesired “evils”) insofar as their individual actions result in benefits and losses that cannot be withheld from others.

3.1.12 SUMMING UP NATIONAL INTEREST

As the above discussion indicates, the contemporary debates on the concept of ‘national interest’ are caught between two extremes. At one extreme, globalisation is claimed to have ended the period of the state system as the organising framework for international relations. This outcome is premised on several influences, including a reduced territorial sovereignty (degrading the capacity of the state to retain domestic control); sharp constraint on state activities, in extent and depth (resulting from increasing interdependence across the international system); and, expanded influence of international non-government organisations in shaping the international system. The other extreme asserts the pre-eminence of each state in performing legal, social, and political and security roles—even ascribing an increased importance in light of recent international terrorism and religious extremism.

However, many argue that whatever may be the changes in the contemporary international relations, the concept of national interest as an analytical tool to understand the international politics continues as long as “state-centric” system exists.

3.2 COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE

- Suneel Kumar

STRUCTURE

- 3.2.0 Objectives**
- 3.2.1 Introduction**
- 3.2.2 Defining the Concept of Collective Security**
- 3.2.3 Basic Assumptions of Collective Security**
- 3.2.4 Prerequisites for Collective Security**
- 3.2.5 Distinction between Collective Security and Collective Defence**
- 3.2.6 Collective Security under League of Nations**
- 3.2.7 The United Nations and Collective Security System**
- 3.2.8 Critical Evaluation of Collective Security System**
- 3.2.9 Summing Up**

3.2.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- The meaning and definition of Collective Security
- Basic assumptions of Collective Security
- Prerequisites for ensuring Collective Security
- Differentiation between Collective Security and Collective Defence
- How collective security practiced under League of Nations and United Nations
- Critical evaluation of Collective Security

3.2.1 INTRODUCTION

Collective security is one of the most significant devices for the maintenance of peace and deterring the aggression in international affairs. This is a kind of security system in which all states work together to provide the security for all by the actions of all against the aggressor(s) that might challenge the existing order by using force. Theoretically, the notion of “collective security” has been propounded by philosophers and peace activists such as Michael Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant, William Randal Cremer, Frederic Passy and Woodrow Wilson to create a peaceful world order. The term “collective security” was incorporated as a principle in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations to deter any member state from acting in a manner likely to threaten or disturb the peace and security of the other states. This is achieved by setting up an international cooperative organization, under the patronage of international law which led to the emergence to a kind of international collective governance, although limited in range and efficiency. In the 19th century, states tried to preserve the peace through the balance of power system. However, the policy of balance of power and counter-balance of power degenerated with a system of opposing alliances which ultimately divide the Europe into two hostile camps. Thus, it failed to preserve the peace for a long time. In the 20th century after the end of the First World War, collective security was adopted first through the League of Nations and then the United Nations to

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maintain the peace and order in international relations. Collective security is considered better than the balance of power for maintaining peace; the latter involves alliances and counter alliances, burdensome armaments, shady territorial deals, political rivalries instability often resulting in war.

3.2.2 DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF ‘COLLECTIVE SECURITY’

Different scholars have defined Collective Security in the following ways:

- Collective security as George Schwarzenberger, says is a “...machinery for joint action in order to prevent or counter any attack against an established international order.”
- Encyclopedia Britannica defines collective security as a “...system by which states have attempted to prevent or stop wars. Under a collective security arrangement, an aggressor against any one state is considered an aggressor against all other states, which act together to repel the aggressor.”
- Charles Schleicher views collective security as, “...an arrangement among states in which all promise, in the event of any member of the system engages in certain prohibited acts against another member, to come to the latter’s assistance.”
- F.H. Hartman considers collective security is “...basically a mutual insurance plan.”
- Palmer and Perkins opine that collective security “...clearly implies collective measures for dealing with threats to peace.”
- According to Hans J. Morgenthau, “One for all and all for one is the watch word of collective security.”

In brief, it can be argued that collective security is a device of power management in international relations by which a state’s security is guaranteed by a collectivity of all states. It accepts the universality of aggression. In this system, all the states are committed to pool their power and eliminate the aggression. It is conceptual

manifestation of the principle of “one for all and all for one.” Collective security system presupposes the existence of an international organization of states under whose flag a global preponderance of power can be created for the meeting the aggression. Thus in the working of collective security, security is not the concern of an individual state to be taken care of by armaments and other elements of national power. It becomes the concern of all states that will take care collectively the security of each of them as though their own security were at stake.

3.2.3 BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

A. F. K. Organski in his book *World Politics* (1960) lists five basic assumptions underlying the theory of collective security:

First, in an armed conflict, member nation-states will be able to agree on which nation is the aggressor. Second, all member nation-states are equally committed to contain and constrain the aggression, irrespective of its source or origin. Third, all member nation-states have identical freedom of action and ability to join in proceedings against the aggressor. Fourth, the cumulative power of the cooperating members of the alliance for collective security will be adequate and sufficient to overpower the might of the aggressor. Fifth, in the light of the threat posed by the collective might of the nations of a collective security coalition, the aggressor nation will modify its policies, or if unwilling to do so, will be defeated.

Apart from the above given five assumptions of Collective security as suggested by A.F.K. Organski, other assumptions that can be added are given below:

- Wars are likely to occur in all the times to come.
- International security and peace is the common objective of all the states and that security of each is interlinked to each others’ security inseparably. Hence all the states are always willing to defend international peace and security against any violation by an aggressor.
- An international collective preponderance of power can always be created

against the aggressor and such collective preponderance of power can always outweigh the power of the aggressor.

- The existence of an international organization is very much required to create collective preponderance of power.

3.2.4 PREREQUISITES FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY

For collective security to operate as a device for the preventing of war, as stated by eminent scholar Hans J. Morganthau describes in his book *Politics Among Nations*, must fulfill the following three prerequisites:-

1. The collective security system must be able to assemble military force in strength greatly in excess to that assembled by the aggressor(s) thereby deterring the aggressor(s) from attempting to change the world order defended by the collective security system.
2. At least those states which join such system must have the same conception of security which they are supposed to defend. In other words, those states, whose combined strength would be used for deterrence, should have identical beliefs about the security of the world order that the collective is defending.
3. States must be willing to subordinate their conflicting interests to the common good defined in terms of the common defence of all member-states.

3.2.5 DISTINCTION BETWEEN COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

Due to certain common features, collective security system is often confused with the collective defence system. Despite the fact that both involve collective action and are committed to deter the aggression, these are two different security arrangements. These can be distinguished as below:

1. The scope of collective security is much wider than the collective defence system. Collective security system is a global system whereas collective

defence system is regional arrangement which is limited to the security of some members. Collective defence arrangement is normally formalized by a treaty and an organization, among participant states that commit support in defence of a member state if it is invaded by another state outside the organization. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the best known collective defence organization. Article-5 of the NATO Charter calls on member states to assist another member under attack. This article was invoked after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. In accordance to this provision of the NATO Charter, after September 11 attacks, the other NATO members provided assistance to the US War against Terrorism in Afghanistan.

2. In the collective security system, aggressor or potential threat to the peace and security is unknown whereas in collective defence arrangement, enemy is known in advance. Hence in collective defence system there is a possibility of advance planning against the potential aggressors. The same cannot be possible in case of the collective security system.
3. Collective security is useful for the member states as it does not involve risky commitments. On the other hand, collective defence system has its roots in multiparty alliances and entails risks along with benefits. By combining and pooling resources, it reduces any single state's cost of providing fully for its security as the smaller members of NATO, for example, have flexibility to invest a greater proportion of their budget on non-military priorities, such as education or health, since they can count on other members to come to their defence, if required. However, collective defence involves risky commitments as the member states can become embroiled in costly wars benefiting neither the direct victim nor the aggressor. For example during the First World War, countries in the collective defence arrangement known as the Triple Entente comprising of France, Britain, Russia were pulled into war quickly when Russia started full mobilization against Austria-Hungary, whose ally Germany subsequently declared war on Russia.

3.2.6 COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

International co-operation to promote collective security originated in the forerunner of the League of Nations, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), was formed in 1889. The organization was international in scope with a third of the members of parliament, in the 24 countries with parliaments, serving as members of the IPU by 1914. Its aim was to encourage governments to solve international disputes by peaceful means and arbitration. The structure of IPU was comprised of a Council headed by a President was later reflected in the structure of the League of Nations.

First attempt to provide collective security at large scale in modern times was done after the end of First World War through the formation of the League of Nations. Collective Security was the idea that nations should group together in condemnation of any aggressor and pursue sanctions against them, whether economical, diplomatic, or military. This idea was enshrined in the following articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations:-

1. As per Article-10 the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.
2. Article-11 provides that any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League. The League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
3. Article-16 says that “Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of

the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations.... It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.”

There was, however, a major flaw in the League’s proposal of Collective Security. The US preferred to be isolate in international affairs and did not become the member of the League of Nations. Britain and France were in a very weak state in terms of the military might. Further the Great Depression had forced them to bring down the defence expenditure which ultimately compelled them to adopt the policy of appeasement towards the Germany, Japan and Italy. Moreover, the provisions of Covenant of the League of Nations itself provided a weak system for decision-making and for collective action. Despite all this, the League settled minor disputes, such as the Aaland Islands in 1920 and Upper Silesia in 1921. However, most disputes were settled by other means and when the serious issues such as Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935 arose, the League failed to protect these states from aggression. The failure of the League of Nations to punish the aggressors and maintain peace in general ultimately resulted into the Second World War.

3.2.7 THE UNITED NATIONS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

After the end of Second World War, with formation of United Nations, new collective security arrangement was created through the UN Charter. The United Nations in its ‘Preamble’ showed determinedness to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war and thus, in the Article-1 of its Charter called for the prevention of aggression and removal of threats to the international peace. To achieve this objective, the United Nations further, provided a comprehensive framework of collective security in the Chapter-VII of its Charter. The Chapter-VII entitled, “Action With Respect To Threats To The Peace,

Breaches Of The Peace and Acts of Aggression” includes total 13 articles from article 39 to 51.

In Article-39 the UN Security Council has been authorized to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security. Further provision has been made in the article-40 regarding the provisional measures to be taken for the maintenance or restoration international peace and security. Article-40 says that in order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the collective security measures, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. As per this article many times Security Council called for a cease-fire between conflicting parties. For example this measure was taken in Indonesia in 1947-48, In Palestine conflict in 1948 and during the Korean War in June 1950.

The UN Charter also makes provisions for the enforcement measures in its articles-41 and 42. Article-41 authorizes the Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These measures can be the complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. If the Security Council considers that measures provided for in Article-41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, then in such situation as per Article-42 it may take such actions by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of the United Nations.

In the article 43-50 includes the provisions related to the UN armed forces and military staff committee. Since the United Nations has no permanent army, all members of the United Nations have been asked to make available armed forces,

assistance, and facilities to the Security Council, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. It has been further provided that plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. The Military Staff Committee would advise and assist the Security Council on all questions related to the military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. The Military Staff Committee includes the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. The Military Staff Committee is responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

Besides the above given provisions, in Article-51, right to self-defence has been given to the members states. This article provides:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

3.2.7.1 Collective Security in Practice under United Nations

Despite the fact that collective security involving cooperation among the great powers was revived through the UN Charter, it succumbed to the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States divided the world into competing spheres of influence which created a new balance of power system while undermining the

universal collective security.

The United Nations provided collective security only once during the Cold War in 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea. During the Korean War, the United Nations responded with collective security against aggression. On 25 June 1950, the United Nations Security Council unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea, with the UN Security Council Resolution No. 82. As the Soviets were temporarily absent from the Council's meetings since January 1950, protesting against the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the UN Security Council, the United States obtained the approval of the Security Council for the use of military force to defend South Korea from aggression. A major war ensued in Korea. The United Nations forces turned back the North Korean "aggressors" and then invaded the North. The UN forces succeeded in pushing back the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. Nevertheless, the China supported the North Korea for its own interests. This made collective security system complicated. UN forces led by American General MacArthur wanted to cross the 38th parallel to punish the aggressor North Korea. This was opposed by many countries. Many countries were reluctant to continue the collective security operation against the North Korea thinking that it could escalate the war in which US would pursue its own agenda of the containment of Communism. This made the Korean crisis a dispute between the communist and capitalist world. Thus, ultimately, the armistice was negotiated in 1953, but the Korean War discredited the collective security system.

From the Korean War to the end of the Cold War, the United Nations served as an international forum for US-Soviet rivalry rather than as an organization to implement the collective security. Although the UN had been more involved with attempts to resolve international disputes than the League of Nations such as Suez Crisis of 1956, Lebanon Crisis of 1958, the Congo Crisis of 1960 and Cyprus problem of 1964, in each of which UN forces were active, however, its provision of security of collective security was weakened by the Cold War. The end of the Cold War opened another opportunity for the United States to use the United Nations for collective security. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990,

President George Bush organized a broad coalition, including the Soviet Union, to stop this aggression and restore Kuwait's sovereignty. For the first time since the Korean War, now that the United States provided leadership in the United Nations to use military force in the Persian Gulf. It was the Persian Gulf War of 1991 when US President Bush had proclaimed a "new world order" of global collective security.

During the Cold War period, due to the ineffectiveness of the UN collective security system, collective defence system became more prominent in the international affairs. The United States pursued regional collective defence system, which the UN Charter permitted. In 1949, the US formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by entering into a long-term military alliance with western European states. Further, it formed collective defence system in Pacific and Asia, including Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) in 1951 and in South East Asia (SEATO) in 1954. The Soviets also responded in 1955 through the Warsaw Pact.

3.2.7.2 Uniting for Peace Resolution

The Soviet Union started to participate in the meetings of Security Council from 1st August, 1950, Hence, it had become difficult to take any further decision on Korean crisis. Hence, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the resolution 377A, the "Uniting for Peace", on 3rd November, 1950. This resolution was initiated by the United States in October 1950 as a means of circumventing further Soviet vetoes during the course of the Korean War. The Uniting for Peace Resolution which is also known as "Acheson Plan" states that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore

international peace and security. To facilitate prompt action by the General Assembly in the case of a dead-locked Security Council, the resolution created the mechanism of the “emergency special session”. The emergency special session can be called upon the basis of either a procedural vote in the Security Council, or within twenty-four hours of a request by a majority of UN Members being received by the Secretary General. In procedural votes, the permanent members of the Security Council do not have the ability to block the adoption of draft resolutions, so unlike substantive matters, such resolutions can be adopted without their consent.

Hence the collective security system was strengthened by the Uniting for Peace resolution of the UNGA.

3.2.8 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

Collective security system has proved ineffective in the context of the maintenance of security and peace in international relations due to certain flaws, shortcomings and weakness. First of all, The UNO is a voluntary organization and therefore, its decisions are not binding upon its members. This made the implementation of collective security system unworkable and unrealistic. Second, the UN has not permanent military force that it can deploy immediately to thwart an aggression. Third, Article-27 of the UN Charter also nullifies its Chapter-VII. As per this article, all the five permanent member of the Security Council has right to veto the proposals before the Council which redundant the collective security system. During the Cold War era, many times super powers used the veto mechanism and made collective security system ineffective.

However, to some extent, the United Nations has filled the void created by the failure of its efforts to the institution of the collective security with a technique knows as ‘peace-keeping.’ Although the UN Charter does say anything about the peace-keeping, this techniques has been used repeatedly to deal with various conflicts in international relations. In fact, nowadays, peace-keeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries

navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. The UN Peacekeeping is guided by three basic principles:

1. Consent of the parties;
2. Impartiality;
3. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

Peacekeeping is flexible and over the past two decades has been deployed in many configurations. Currently, there are at least 17 UN peace-keeping operations deployed on four continents. In the absence of an effective collective security system, the peace-keeping operations have built up a demonstrable record of success including winning the Nobel Peace Prize.

3.2.9 SUMMING UP

The case for collective security rests on the claim that regulated, institutionalized balancing predicated on the notion of all against one provides more stability than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each for his own. Under collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression. Stability-the absence of major war-is the product of cooperation. In a world of balancing under anarchy, states fend for themselves according to the dictates of a hostile international environment. Stability emerges from competition. The key question is whether regulated balancing predicated upon the notion of all against one, or unregulated balancing predicated upon the notion of each for his own, is more likely to preserve peace.

3.3 GEOPOLITICS: CLASSICAL, MODERN AND CRITICAL

- Suneel Kumar

STRUCTURE

- 3.3.0 Objectives**
- 3.3.1 Introduction**
- 3.3.2 Defining Geopolitics**
- 3.3.3 Classical Geopolitics**
- 3.3.4 Modern Geopolitics**
- 3.3.5 Critical Geopolitics**

3.3.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- The meaning and definition of Geopolitics
- Basic assumptions of Classical Geopolitics
- Modern Geopolitics and changing contours
- The Critical Geopolitics and its presumptions

3.3.1 INTRODUCTION

If geography is the study of the Earth and International Relations is the study of the World, then geopolitics is the study of turning the Earth into the World. Geopolitics, like political geography, deals with concepts such as power, politics, and policy, and space, place, and territory. It embraces an innumerable multitude of interactions within these various fields. The field of geopolitics emerged and became a part of the intellectual tradition and an expression of state interest and identity politics in the geographical institutions and universities in the rival empires of the late nineteenth century. This was a period that saw the growth of imperialist institutions and associations that sought to legitimize territorial aggrandizements of colonial powers. Hence in this context, geography was elevated to a science and treated as a scientific discipline. Various writings and thoughts regarding the influence of geography on the state and its foreign policy were emerged during this period from the this context and intellectuals such as Alfred Mahan, Halford Mackinder, Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Karl Haushofer, Nicholas Spykman, and George Kennan, as well as some others made significant contribution to this field of study.

Leopold von Ranke is the founding father of the first work of geopolitical character. In his work entitled 'Die grossen Machta' of 1833, he analyzed the relationship of great powers in the past and potential future. The term 'geopolitics' was coined by Rudolf Kjellen in 1899. He was a Swedish political scientist. Kjellen was inspired by the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel. Ratzel published his book 'Politische Geographie' (political geography) in 1897. This book was later popularized in English by the Austro-Hungarian historian Emil Reich and the American diplomat Robert Strausz-Hupe. Although Halford Mackinder had a pioneering role in the field, he never used the term 'geopolitics' himself. The term was systematically developed and raised to a doctrine of international relations by the German philosopher Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) during the period of Europe's intensifying inter-state rivalries after the turn of the century. It had the objective of emphasizing the primary determination of the political by space. Since the 1970s, it is supposed to capture in its formally

neutralized version ‘power struggles over territories for the purpose of political control over space.’

Since the formal inception of geopolitics as a concept in 1899, it has enjoyed a contested and controversial intellectual history. As geographer Dodds argues over the last hundred years, many intellectuals have attempted to chart the complex history of geopolitics, nevertheless only a few have managed to capture the historical and political complexities of the field. As Semra Rana Gokmen points out throughout the twentieth century, academic works on geopolitics have often been conflicting, contradictory and confusing. Largely, this was due to the variety of approaches applied to the historical examination of this intellectual field and contemporary analyses of world politics.

3.3.2 DEFINING THE GEOPOLITICS

Geography as a discipline has many branches: agricultural geography, anthropogeography, cultural geography, economic geography, electoral geography, historical geography, human geography, industrial geography, Marxist geography, medical geography, macro-geography, micro-geography, social geography, rural geography, urban geography, welfare geography, and political geography. Political geography developed as a branch of the discipline of geography and was in common in use until the invention of geopolitics in 1899. Political geography argued that states’ politics emanated from their geography. As territory is one of the constitutive elements of states, geography is essential to inter-state politics. That is why the age of discovery was sponsored by states. That is why Napoleon, who argued that every state pursues the politics of its own geography, founded the first chair of geography at the Sorbonne University. Political geography is the study of the effects of political actions on human geography, involving the spatial analysis of human phenomena. Traditionally political geography was concerned with the study of states, their groupings, global relations, frontiers and boundaries. Hence to some extent, geopolitics can be termed as a subject-matter of the political geography. However various sources provide the definitions

of geopolitics in the following ways:

The originator of the term, Rudolf Kjellen, defined geopolitics as “the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space.” This definition contains two elements – power and space – which are essential within the concept of geopolitics. The key role for the state as only powerful entity is very archetypal for the definition of Kjellen. Famous geopolitical theorist Karl Haushofer defines geopolitics as “an ambitious science.” He says, “Geopolitics is the new national science of the state,... a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes, based on the broad foundations of geography, especially of political geography.” This reflects that Haushofer considered Political Geography as an essential part of the Geopolitics. Charles B. Hagan considers “geopolitics is a contemporary rationalization of power politics.” Since the geopolitics has always had a national bias, Peter Taylor puts it as a combination of history (political processes) and geography. According to this outlook:

[g]eopolitics is the analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other hand, political processes. (...) Both geographical settings and political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the other. Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction.

Colin Flint explained the historical development of the concept of geopolitics extensively and argued that power has always had a central role in definition, although its meaning has been subject to several changes. He argues:

Geopolitics, the struggle over the control of spaces and places, focuses upon power.(...) In nineteenth and early 20th century geopolitical practises, power was seen simply as the relative power of countries in foreign affairs, In the last twentieth century, (...) [d]efinitions of power were dominated by a focus on a country’s ability to wage war with other countries. However, recent discussions of power have become more sophisticated.

Flint further has further noted that “...geopolitics is a way of ‘seeing the world and disagrees with those geopolitical analysts that pretend that one individual can fully understand the world.” A key figure of the School of Critical Geopolitics, Gerard Toal says that “...geopolitics is discourse about world politics, with a particular emphasis on state competition and the geographical dimensions of power.”

Thus, on the basis of above given definitions one can argue that geopolitics is part of both Political Geography and International Relations. Haushofer has focused on the former while Taylor on the latter.

Since the emergence of the concept of geopolitics by the end of the 19th century power and space have played a crucial role in the definition of geopolitics. In the beginning definitions of geopolitics included only the state as the powerful entity however current definitions appreciate the power of other entities as well. In this context it can be said that the definition of the geopolitics depends on time and location. More than a relationship between power politics and geography, the term ‘geopolitics’ incorporates the underlying assumptions:

- That states are the primary actors in the system;
- That a military-economic competition exists between them for the raw materials needed for national power
- That states and alliances are able to ‘balance’ one another either through physical occupation or by securing political influence within a geographical space, and;
- That geography represents perhaps the greatest determinant of political relationships.

3.3.3 CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS

The theories formulated by the founding scholars are today labeled as ‘classical’ geopolitics. Although classical geopolitics is not a unitary and coherent approach, yet all geopolitical founding scholars have built their theories upon certain shared

assumptions and world outlook. The period of classical geopolitical theories lasts from the beginning of the 20th century to the Second World War.

3.3.3.1 State as a Living Organism: Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen

The earliest classical school of geopolitics conceives state as a living organism and its borders as flexible. According to this perspective, borders of the state change in the course of the life of the state. A state enlarges its territory when its strengths are growing at the expense of older states in decline. Moreover, in pursuance of social Darwinism, this school accepts that the evolution of political organism is determined by its environment.

Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen are two eminent contributors to this school of thought. German philosopher Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) expressed some of the dominant trends in classical geopolitics including racial and environmental determinism. Influenced by the writings of Charles Darwin, Ratzel postulated that the state resembles a biological organism. According to him, state is a living organisms whose life cycle extends from birth through maturity and, ultimately, decline and death. Therefore, to prolong its existence, the state requires nourishment, just as an organism needs food. This sustenance is provided by the acquisition of territories that provide adequate space for the members of the state's dominant nation to thrive, which is what Ratzel called 'lebensraum' (living space). Ratzel argues that if a state is confined within permanent and static boundaries and deprived of overseas domains, it can atrophy. Thus territory is an essential life giving force for state. Ratzel argued that a state has to grow, to expand, and to establish living frontiers. Hence frontiers are dynamic and subject to change. Ratzel gave the earliest and most complete definition of the term 'raum', or room. Alternatively understood as "space," this concept of 'raum' relates to Ratzel's conceptualization of organic state theory and states as spatial organisms that require the room or space in which growth and expansion is possible. Borders become insignificant in that a developing state or one that is advancing is likely to require annexation of territories that are controlled by other less powerful states. Ratzel contended that contemporary Germany should strive to secure additional

land and resources so that it was better able to secure the survival of the nation-state in the face of eastern races and their traditions of mobile existence. Ratzel visualized the existence of an inevitable struggle for life among the states. According to him, such a struggle requires a state to grow or to die, losing or gaining influence in direct proportion to its capacity for defeating or overcoming its rivals. This ideology of Ratzel has been instrumental in fostering German expansionism during the First World War and Second World War and also for fostering the Germanic notion of racial superiority based on culture and military capacity for expansion. Ratzel influenced the ideas of Rudolf Kjellen and Karl Haushofer.

Rudolf Kjellen, as a student of Friedrich Ratzel, invariably viewed the geopolitical world through the lens of Aryan ideology and commitment to the expansion of the Germanic empire. In his most significant work, 'The State as a Living Form', Kjellen argued that as the 20th Century progressed, a number of forces would unite to force Europe and particularly Central Europe to build an alliance of states under the protection of a powerful Germany. Kjellen adopted the concepts of 'Reich' and 'Volk'. He considered 'Reich' as a composite of Raum/ Lebensraum or "living room" and "space" and the establishment of a strategic military shape that could be defended by a strong military and overseen via a centralized governmental body. The concept was later asserted as a key justification for German expansionism under the Nazis. The concept of Volk was adopted by Kjellen for the reference of the racial construction of a state as revolving around a specific ethnic group. He stressed on the significance of the culture as an organizing factor in statehood. His idea of the nation-state was infused with nationalism to promote the national interests. For Kjellen, promotion of national interests was to promote the interests of a particular racial community. He saw geo-politics and ethno-politics as complementary activities in which the state must engage to survive, prosper and expand its sphere of influence.

3.3.3.2 Continental Power: Sir Halford John Mackinder and Karl Haushofer

After the publication of Ratzel's initial ideas, other geographers began to analyze the overall organization of power in the world. They focused on the study of the

physical geographic map with a view toward determining the locations of most strategic places on Earth. In this context the British Geographer, Sir Halford J. Mackinder in 1904, in an article titled “The Geographical Pivot of History” which was published in the Royal Geographical Society’s Geographical Journal formulated the Heartland Theory. His next major work, ‘Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction’, published in 1919 also presented his theory of the Heartland. Mackinder suggested that the control of Eastern Europe is vital to control of the world. He formulated his hypothesis as:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island;
Who rules the World Island commands the World.

Mackinder’s Heartland, also known as the Pivot Area, is the core area of Eurasia, and the World-Island is all of Eurasia (both Europe and Asia). Mackinder was concerned with power relationships at a time when Britain had acquired a global empire through its strong navy. Mackinder’s contemporary were emphasizing on the oceans considering them as a paths to colonies and trade, and the key to world domination. However, contrary to this Mackinder argued that a land-based power, not a sea power, would ultimately rule the world. Thus, the concepts of continental power assume the dominance of the land over the sea, that is, the dominant states will be those in the area of Eurasia. According to Mackinder the contiguous and vast territory is a factor, which decides the power nature of the state. Mackinder believed the world is divided into two parts: the World Island which comprises the joint continent of Europe, Asia and Africa, surrounded by the World Ocean and islands satellites consisting of North America, South America, Australia, Japan, the Sunday Islands and Great Britain.

Mackinder drew particular attention to the north-eastern part of World Island, the so-called pivot area also referred to as axis area or geopolitical bolt, around which the history of great civilization takes place. With time, Mackinder decided to change the name of World Island to Heartland, defined as the central zone, the core country. The heartland covered the central and northern part of World Island, which is Russia, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, part of Mongolia and north-

western China. According to Mackinder, this area is surrounded by two zones: the continental zone of the inner crescent and the island outer crescent. The former consists of Europe, the Mediterranean, Middle East, India and China. The latter consists of Great Britain, both Americas, Africa south of the Sahara Desert, Australia, Indonesia and Japan. Mackinder argued that all great territorial expansions come from Heartland. These next head for the zones out of which, due to advantageous conditions, develop the greatest civilizations, that is, to Europe, Middle East, India and China. He claimed that so far none of these zones had been captured because of the low potential of Heartland, that is, the region is too poor or has too severe climate. Mackinder updated his concept at the end of Second World War. He emphasized that while in previous periods the railway increased its ability of movement inside the continental power, now advances in aviation could also make such movement possible as well as being able to hit the bridgeheads formed at the peripheries, without the fear of destruction of aviation bases by the sea powers. Addressing, in a way, the slowly forming new world order, Mackinder re-drew the area of the Heartland to the East. Its western border went along the line: Leningrad-Moscow-Stalingrad. Mackinder admitted the geopolitical significance of the so-called Middle Ocean, that is, Northern Atlantic which was the contact point among the United States, Great Britain and Europe. One of Mackinder's personal objectives was to warn Britain that its traditional reliance on sea power would become a weakness as improved land transport opened up the Heartland for invasion and / or industrialization.

German geographer, Karl Haushofer also represents the continental power concept. He divided the world model into four pan-regions – Pan-Europe, Pan-America, Pan-Russia and Pan-Pacific – that were to go meridian ally, from the north to the south. Haushofer argued that the regions should be characterized by political, economic and cultural unity. Pan-Europe included the Mediterranean, Africa, Middle East as far as the Persian Gulf. Pan-America consisted of both Americas. The remaining two regions were Pan-Russia, stretching to the south and including the territory of India, and Pan-Pacific consisting of China, Indonesia and Australia. It was to be led by Japan. Haushofer also selected the

Mediterranean states which, within the confines of autonomy, were to function in Pan-Europe. Haushofer also considers lebensraum (life space) as an indispensable factor for state development. Like Mackinder, he also recognized the basic importance of Central-Eastern Europe. However, instead of the independence of the countries situated in this area, he was interested for an alliance between Germany and Russia to establish the control of Germany over the Central Europe.

3.3.3.3 Concept of Sea Power: Alfred Thayer Mahan

Concepts of sea power are in opposition to the concepts arguing the dominance of the land states over the sea ones. Alfred Thayer Mahan gave emphasis on the significance of sea power as a major factor in geopolitics. He was convinced that beginning with the 'Age of Exploration', the states that achieved great power status did so because they mastered sea power. Mastery of commercial activities that elide on seaborne transportation according to Mahan was critical not only in times of war but also in times of peace. He felt that any country building a fleet that could destroy an enemy's main force in a single battle would become a hegemonic force. Mahan considered factors such as the length of coastline, number and character of harbors, shape of coast, industrial facilities and control over significant waterways and strategic points as the indicators of the power of a state. He also attributed an important role to issues such as the size of the population, national character and the will and decisiveness of the government. The sea is above all, the means of transport which causes that the sea power is more important than the land one, and maritime trade constitutes main source of nation's wealth. Mahan argued that the most significant decisions concerning international order are taken in the region of the north semi-sphere, the borders of which are determined by Suez Canal and Panama Canal. The strip of Asia, between the 30th and 40th parallel was characterized as the area generating the biggest conflicts. At the same time this area was to separate the Russian zone of influence from the British one.

3.3.3.4 Peninsula Power/Rimland : Nicholas Spykman

Nicholas Spykman was a political scientist who founded the classical realist school. He drew heavily upon geographical concepts to identify the ways in

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which geopolitical interactions are structured and developed. His work is based on assumptions similar to Mackinder's, including the unity of world politics and the world sea. He extends this to include the unity of the air. Spykman adopts Mackinder's divisions of the world, renaming some:

- The Heartland;
- The Rimland, i.e., an intermediate region, lying between the Heartland and the marginal sea powers; and
- The Offshore Islands & Continents.

Spykman argues that a Rimland separates the Heartland from ports that are usable throughout the year and are not frozen up during winter. Spykman suggested this required that attempts by Heartland nations particularly Russia to conquer ports in the Rimland must be prevented. Spykman modified Mackinder's formula on the relationship between the Heartland and the Rimland. He claimed:

Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia.

Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.

This theory can be traced in the origins of Containment policy of the United States towards Soviet Union.

3.3.4 MODERN GEOPOLITICS/GEOPOLITICS IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

During the Cold war period a bi-polar world order had been emerged. The confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union started to have a global character. Both powers were in favour of the maintenance of status quo that had been established after the Second World War. The conflict between the two blocs accelerated resulting into arms race, and suddenly it was obvious that even the slightest ignition could result in the total annihilation of the human race. The act of scaring away started to play a significant role. His made confrontational actions by the opponent impossible because of the possession of nuclear weapons and the threat of their potential use. In such circumstances, the politics of US and the

Soviet Union was dominated by the strategy. Although the Cold War international order was centered around the military factor, yet other factors including political, ideological and economic ones were also played a significant role.. The cultural and civilization factor became important in the next decade. There also existed something which was called the negative comprehension of safety. International organizations and corporations started to exert influence on world's order but the state-centric approach still prevailed. In such circumstances geostrategy replace the geopolitics. Due to the Cold War period, the following geopolitical concepts emerged.

3.3.4.1 Concept of Air Power: G. Renner and Alexander De Seversky

G. Renner was the founding father of the air power. He presented the analysis of state power in the context of its access to the sea created two centres – the Soviet Union and the United States. They had the possibility of confrontation through the Arctic Ocean. Thus this became some sort of bolt of world's strategic balance. This concept was developed and propagated by Alexander de Seversky. He divided world into 'industrial hearts' that is the US and the SU. The US was to govern the western hemisphere and the SU was to rule Eurasia. His concept was based upon the close of location of the economic centres of the two powers. Important thing was that both the powers possessed the analogical level of power concentrated on the northern areas of America and Eurasia.

3.3.4.2 Concept of Geopolitical Division of World: Saul B. Cohen

Saul B. Cohen focused his geopolitical analysis on the forces that have been unleashed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of the bipolar world. He proposes that there are a number of geostrategic regions that are of enormous significance in shaping international relations. He sees these regions as loosely consisting of the Maritime, Heartlandic, Russian, and East Asian as well marginalized regions such as much of South America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Other important geostrategic regions are found in the Eurasian heartland and in the Americas, particularly in North America. He believes that these geostrategic regions are significant in that they are centres of economic activity

which are networked with one another and are capable of creating a map of dynamic equilibrium. Cohen (2003) also makes use of the related concepts of gateways and shatterbelts. A shatter belt is a region of the world wherein enormous political volatility exists and wherein conflict is endemic and dominant world powers are often seen as threatening entities which must be resisted. Cohen considers the Middle East as an excellent example of a contemporary shatter belt wherein tensions run high and the potential for conflict that could spread outside the region is also present. Gateways, in comparison, are seen as points of entry into autonomous or semi-autonomous heartlands. Eastern Europe, the Trans-Caucasus, and Central Asia are gateways that have at times also been shatterbelts. Cohen contend that ideological and economic forces that were once stifled by the competition in the Cold War are now free and are becoming responsible for new conflicts in the world. It is this kind of tension that he sees as creating a world that is polarized along economic lines as well as ideological lines. Cohen suggests that globalization and the diffusion of technology will favor accommodation even within the highly volatile shatterbelts. Cohen's (2003) analysis identifies a new hierarchy of geopolitical units. These units range from the sub-national to the geo-strategic and global. By emphasizing the interaction between these units, Cohen argued that a new world order is likely to develop as a consequence of new economic activities.

3.3.4.3 Concepts of Geo-political Division of World: Immanuel Wallerstein and Alfred Sauvy

Along with the increased role of economics in modern international relationships, the space and the location of a state began to be analyzed in terms of economic regions. In this context, the best-known division of the world was introduced by Immanuel Wallerstein. He argues that the inter-regional and transnational division of labour, which divides the world into core countries, semi-periphery countries, and the periphery countries. Core countries focus on higher skill, capital-intensive production, and the rest of the world focuses on low-skill, labor-intensive production and extraction of raw materials. This constantly reinforces the dominance of the core countries. Nonetheless, the system is dynamic, in part as a

result of revolutions in transport technology, and individual states can gain or lose the core, semi-periphery, periphery status over time. For a time, some countries become the world hegemon; during the last few centuries, as the world system has extended geographically and intensified economically, this status has passed from the Netherlands, to the United Kingdom and most recently, to the United States. The states forming the semi-peripheries may get promoted to the core or fall down to the peripheries. In order to achieve this, they may apply three development strategies: the strategy of the use of opportunity, strategy through the invitation and strategy of own forces. He argued that those countries play the role of the system stabilizer. Their absence could result in the fast polarization of the system and eventually, in its disintegration. Wallerstein emphasized that trade based on the rules of free market benefits exclusively the core states. At the same time for the countries of the peripheries, this means the increase in unemployment and the collapse of local businesses, because in the conditions of the free market, they are forced to exploit the products of lower development in the production processes and import more advanced products from better developed countries. Wallerstein advised the states on the peripheries to implement protectionist measures. He thought that they should open their markets, when they reach a higher level of development.

When the division of the world into capitalistic and socialistic states was already common, the term of the Third World was appeared to describe the states situated in Africa, which at that time did not engage into political and ideological conflicts between the West and the East. Alfred Sauvy was the first scientist who used the term 'Third World' in 1952. He emphasized that this area was ignored and exploited by the rest of the world. Very soon this term was used to refer to the countries situated in Asia, Latin America and Oceania. The term the Third World was replaced by the division of the world into poor South and rich North, which, significantly, included the states of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus above divisions of world were based on development only. These divisions ignored other significant factors such as ideology and politics.

3.3.5 CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS/GEOPOLITICAL IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

In the post-Cold war era, again geopolitics became important, due to the emergence of multipolar international order. In this environment, the United States-Soviet Union dichotomy that had outlined the system of power balance ceased to exist. Besides, new non-governmental actors came into possession of weapons of massive destruction. Their behaviour often escaped rational evaluation and calculations. Proliferation of low-intensity conflicts occurred. New asymmetrical dangers appeared, posing new threats for the state security. Facing new threats and globalization processes, the state lost control over incidents taking place on its territory. The protective function of the borders weakened and the borders themselves became more penetrable and guaranteed free flow of goods, services, ideas, values and technologies. Moreover, individual policies of the state became the parts of various international regimes. In these circumstance economic, cultural, civilizational, ecological and political factors which were less significant during the Cold War, became more important in the new geopolitical global structure. New, qualitative features of the international environment also changed the approach towards the space. K. Szezerski draws attention to the fact that the world of new technologies creates the surface in non-existing space which does not require any real limitation of place. Thus the special relations shall be understood in the categories of communicational and mental closeness and distance. A. Wolff-Poweska also interprets the space in similar way. She argues that globalization processes and increasing interdependence have led to considerable disappearance of the traditional function of the border which was, as she writes: one of the main pillars of geopolitical categorization. Thus countries competing for specific, strategically important areas, should assume relativization of the space and location⁵⁴. Because of growing integrative tendencies, numerous vivid social, economic and political problems are solved above states' borders. Thus the states lost control over many phenomena occurring on their territory. This fact affects the gradual change in awareness and political thinking concerning space. Huge landmass which is considered as the guarantee of state power by the classical geopolitical thinkers

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has lost its significance. Changes that occurred on the territory of Europe and Asia after the end of the Cold War showed that space is the product of politics undergoing constant change. Everything which is connected with space is due to of history and human activity. Thus it cannot be perceived as a variable determining politics in general. That is why states started perceive the space as a tool serving the realization of individual interests. Such interests include, for example, winning new areas rich in energy resources and overcoming the divisions into the zones of wealth and poverty. In these circumstances, it was assumed that geopolitics now conceptualizes space in material and non-material dimensions in order to analyze the international situation and select possibilities, goals and politics. Moreover, the state is not the main or the only subject of studies as it comes to geopolitics. It also concentrates on non-state participants of international relationships. Part of the parameters of the world international order found its reflection in the modern geopolitical concepts.

3.3.5.1 Concept of geopolitical division of the world model: Zbigniew Brzezinski

Brzezinski treated earth's space as a field of game that is chessboard on which the fight for world hegemony and the expansion of influence zones takes place in the most strategically important regions of the world. He concluded that main actors on the chessboard are the United States as the hegemon; Russia, China, France, Germany and India as the global active players; Great Britain, Japan and significant but inactive players and Ukraine, Turkey, South Korea, Iran and Afghanistan as so called geopolitical bolts –the states important geopolitically with respect to their geographical location. Independent of the above division, is Brzezinski theory of so-called crisis arch the vast region stretching from the Atlantic to the India Ocean. Brzezinski warns that this is the region, where conflicts may have a completely new face which starts to immerse between Middle and Central East and Pakistan and Afghanistan. He argued that lack of stability in this geographical arch may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the states in the area of Eurasia. The areas important from the perspective of the interaction among the states were described by Brzezinski as geopolitical

bolts. Geopolitical bolts according to one American politician are the states, whose importance results from their key geographical location and their potential lack of stability. According Brzezinski geopolitical bolts obtain particular roles because they may enable or block geostrategic players in their access to important territories, among other things. In addition, in certain situations, they may become the protective shield for a state or even the whole region or imply for them serious political and cultural consequences.

3.3.5.2 Geopolitical Division of the World: Leszek Moczulski

Like Brzezinski, Moczulski also considered geopolitical bolts to be an important element of the modern geopolitical structure. According to him, they function as the regions, axis states or pivot area. The most important historic and political processes develop around it. Moczulski gave the example of the Mediterranean as the axis zone. Italy is the axis state for this area. He also drew attention to the fact that smaller areas may also become geopolitical bolts, such as, for example, the areas at the mouth of the Vistula, Rhine or Mosel rivers. Axis functions may also periodically be played by the states, such as for example, in the 19th century, Prussia. Moczulski also defined terms such as the core areas, geopolitical bolts and buffer zones. The core areas are the centres around which the processes of special integration focused. For Western Europe such an area was the strap along the Rhine and Mosel, prolonged to North Italy and the coasts of the North Sea. Geopolitical bolts connect spaces or divide various regions. Yet another role is played by buffer zones. As argued by Moczulski, these are situated between the zones of great geopolitical activity and thus prevent expansions from various directions. That is why, even if they have considerable potential, they are not able to expand further. Ukraine was assumed to be the buffer zone protecting Europe against Asia.

3.3.5.3 Geo-Cultural and Civilization Division of the World: L. Moczulski, A.J. Toynbee, F. Koneczny and Samuel P. Huntington

In deliberations about cultural and civilization factors it should be emphasized that the basic unit for geopolitics is the so-called great civilization described as the civilization circle, that is, the upper rung of hierarchical cultural system. In

the different scholars, there is no consensus on the division of civilizations. L. Moczulski distinguished four great civilizations on the Euroasian continent: European, Islamic, Indian and Far East (Chinese) one. Within them or on their margins, proper civilizations developed. The example of such a civilization is the Japanese one being a derivative of Chinese civilization. Moczulski carried out the more detailed specification of this division. Great European civilization was divided into two proper civilizations: eastern and western ones. Further, within the Western civilization there are Latin and German ones. At the same time the Eastern civilization comprises the Byzantium one. Hence Moczulski emphasizes that non-complete civilizations have been formed in isolated areas. They are the defective sort of proper civilizations. These have mainly developed in Africa and continental Asia. Another scholar A.J. Toynbee distinguished 23 civilizations. The majority of these are already a thing of the past and only five of them remain: Western (Christian), Eastern (Byzantium-Orthodox), Islamic, Hindu and Chinese one. F. Koneczny talks about seven civilizations: Latin, Byzantium, Arabic, Jewish, Turanian and Brahmin ones. He emphasizes that the interaction and penetration between civilizations most frequently take place in the touching zones. Samuel P. Huntington in his article, "The Clash of Civilizations?"(1993) and his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*(1996) argued that post-Cold War conflict would most frequently and violently occur because of cultural rather than ideological differences. That, whilst in the Cold War, conflict occurred between the Capitalist West and the Communist Bloc East, it now was most likely to occur between the world's major civilizations — identifying seven, and a possible eighth: (i) Western, (ii) Latin American, (iii) Islamic, (iv) Sinic (Chinese), (v) Hindu, (vi) Orthodox, (vii) Japanese, and (viii) the African. This cultural organization contrasts the contemporary world with the classical notion of sovereign states. To understand current and future conflict, cultural rifts must be understood, and culture — rather than the State — must be accepted as the locus of war. Thus, Western nations will lose predominance if they fail to recognize the irreconcilable nature of cultural tensions. Huntington argued that this post-Cold War shift in geopolitical organization and structure requires the West to internally strengthen itself culturally, by abandoning the imposition of its ideal of democratic universalism and its incessant military interventionism. The identification of Western

Civilization with the Western Christianity was not Huntington's original idea, it was rather the traditional Western viewpoint and subdivision before the Cold.

In nutshell, it can be concluded that the classical geopolitical concepts analyzed space predominantly in the context of geographical conditions. Vast territory, maritime, land or peninsula location determined the position and power of the state. The space was assumed to be the main determinant of its development. The balance of power sanctioned by the division of the world into influence zones of the United States and the Soviet Union as well as arms race between these powers resulted in the increased importance of the military factor. Geopolitics was replaced by geo-strategy. The term of geostrategic region appeared at that time. Economic factors became more and more important. Applying the economic criterion to the division of the world, Wallerstein distinguished between the core, semi-peripheries and peripheries. Also political and ideological factors turned out to be vital in the analysis of the geopolitical structure. Qualitative changes in the multipolar international environment that emerged in the post-Cold war era, globalization processes and international relationships, so-called asymmetric dangers, conflicts of low intensity, change of border function created a completely new character for space. It cannot be solely perceived as the variable determining politics but rather a tool serving the realization of particular interests. The cultural and civilization factor are important as the political and economic one. The next change dealt with pluralism which replaced the state-centric approach. Non-state subjects exert greater and greater influence on the shape of the international order. Modern geopolitical discourse is a product of a Western/European worldview and identity politics. Critical geopolitics argues that geography as a discourse is a form of power/knowledge relation and should thus be critically investigated. Such an analysis helps to understand that how social and political life is constructed through discourses. What is said or written by political elites is a result of the unconscious adoption of rules of living, thinking, and speaking that are implicit in the texts, speeches, and documents. This group, on the other hand, is also considered to be the elite that guides the masses concerning how they should live, think, and speak. It is thus a ready-made way of thinking and has similarities with the characteristics

of ideologies. Critical geopolitics has grown from its roots in the poststructuralist, feminist and postcolonial critique of traditional geopolitics to become an integral part of mainstream human geography. A body of 'critical geopolitics' research has developed independently of the classical form of geopolitics it initially emerged in response to, meaning that it can now be considered a field in itself. The field has retained a sustained focus on the spatiality of international politics. Nevertheless, it has also become a part of a broader theoretical and methodological trend within human geography toward a closer study of everyday life. The heterogeneity of critical geopolitics is central to its vibrancy.

The end of superpower rivalry fuelled interest in the spatiality of power in geography. It was in the context of the rethinking of power that this critique gained pace and gradually acquired the label 'critical geopolitics'. As a sub-field of human geography, critical geopolitics investigates the geographical assumptions and designations that enter into the making of world politics. It does so by examining the practices by which political actors spatialize international politics and represent it as a 'world' characterized by particular types of places. As compared to the state-centred and state-sponsored 'strategic analysis', this critical work approaches geopolitics not as a neutral consideration of pre-given 'geographical' facts, but as a deeply ideological and politicized form of analysis. It shows that geographical claims are necessarily geopolitical, as they inscribe places as particular types of places to be dealt with in a particular manner. Conversely, all international politics is also geopolitics as it necessarily involves geographical and spatial assumptions about people and places. These assumptions are not abstract images floating above political interest but form an integral part of how interests and identities come into being. The aim of critical geopolitics is not to describe the geography of politics within pre-given, commonsense places, but to examine the politics of the geographical specification of politics. Critical geopolitics has no single theoretical canon or set of methods. It rather advances decidedly diverse critiques of, and alternatives to, conventional analyses of international affairs. The concerns of critical geopolitics lie not with the sources and structures of power in some general sense but with the specific sites and technologies of power relations. Its

analytical focus is not on any set of territories, borders or actors – however diverse – but rather on the processes by which these categories are produced. Conceptualizing geopolitics as an interpretative cultural practice and a discursive construction of ontological claims, critical geopolitical analyses prioritize the contextual, conflictual and messy spatiality of international politics. Thus, critical geopolitics directly challenges the conventional demarcations of foreign and domestic, political and non-political, state and non-state. In parallel with its diversity, critical geopolitics does have a core set of concerns. In broad terms, those revolve around enriching our understanding of spatiality and subjectivity in world affairs. In terms of spatiality, the field advances the shift from primarily territorialized understandings of politics toward more nuanced understandings of the complex spatialities of power. In terms of subjectivity, critical geopolitics broadens the analysis of geopolitics from state actors located in formal institutions, such as government ministries, universities or think tanks, to non-state actors and everyday life. The two moves are linked: if the state is no longer the principal site and agent of geopolitics, then statesmen are no longer the principal practitioners of geopolitics. The critical geopolitics also concentrates on unpacking the rigid territorial assumptions of mainstream analyses in an effort to offer more flexible accounts, which are better attuned to the societal realities of our time: for example, dissecting the continued reliance on binary understandings of power and spatiality in geopolitical writing – East and West, security and danger, freedom and oppression – in many government agencies, think tanks, ‘strategic analysis’ and much of the mass media. While it is often claimed that this binary thinking offers a hard-nosed analyses of ‘geographical facts’, it in fact disengages from geographical complexities in favour of simplistic territorial demarcations of inside and outside – an us and them imagination. Critical geopolitics lays out why such simplifications are inadequate and how we can conceptualize and practice politics differently. Through such rethinking, it seeks to establish new spaces for political debate and action. Simultaneously critical geopolitics also questions the centrality of the USA. Moreover, this geopolitics broadens research empirically outside the core states. This is necessary both analytically and politically. Now there are substantial literatures on other states like Britain, Germany, France and Russia. Literature has been emerged on the smaller and historically more peripheral states.

3.4 WAR AND ITS CHANGING NATURE (DETERRENCE, MAD, REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA), PRE-EMPTIVE WAR)

- Suneel Kumar

War is more than a mere chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity...; of the play of chance and probability...; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

-Carl von Clausewitz

STRUCTURE

- 3.4.0 Objectives**
- 3.4.1 Introduction**
- 3.4.2 Defining the Concept of War**
- 3.4.3 Changing Nature of War**
- 3.4.4 MAD and Deterrence**
- 3.4.5 Revolution in Military Affairs**
- 3.4.6 Pre-emptive War**

3.4.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- The meaning and definition of War
- Changing nature of war
- The concepts of Mutually Assured Destruction and Deterrence
- What is meant by revolution in military affairs

3.4.1 INTRODUCTION

Although war is a brutal and ugly activity, yet it is central to human history. War is an open armed conflict between two or more countries or groups. It is one of the significant events that have already been in existence since the creation of mankind and will continue to coexist with us indefinitely. Nobel Laureate Richard E. Smalley listed war as the sixth out of ten biggest problems that mankind will be facing for the next fifty years. War has been fought throughout the history of mankind. Even before the dawn of civilization, small scale wars had already taken place between different tribes. People had been violent even before the advent of guns and knives. Nevertheless, Second World War was the most deadly war of all in which more than 72 million people were killed. The word 'war' means more than just a military conflict between nations or parties. War is complex. It arouses feelings of aggression, depression, confusion and satisfaction. It entails many stages of action. It can last for years. William T. Sherman considered war as a hell because war is any place or state of supreme misery or discomfort. War is a plague, contagious and deadly. Wars have been fought for hundreds of years, usually to satisfy one side with more freedom, power or wealth. Countries whom are allies with the nation at war may also get drawn into providing soldiers and supplies, thus spreading the impact of the war and increasing the number of casualties. For instance, in the context of the war in Iraq, Britain is not the original country to feud with Iraq, but it is the United States. However, since Britain is the US's ally, they help by providing soldiers, as the US would do the same for them. As a result

of this, more people are affected by the war.

3.4.2 DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF WAR

War is a controversial concept and it is hard to define the concept of war as it is a sociological phenomenon concerns the every sphere of life. Throughout the history, definition and phenomenon of war has changed. As a result of development of societies and technology, character and definition of war has also changed. Therefore, the definition of war which is made in one period may not be valid for another period. Clausewitz defines the war as a “continuation of politics by other means.” Cicero’s viewed war as a “settlement of disputes by means of coercion.” Hugo Grotius defines the war as a situation among contendings by means of use of force. In his book, “On the Law of War and Peace”, Grotius opined that every disagreement will lead to war among states. From the international relations perspective, international relations scholars generally define war as large-scale organized violence between politically defined groups. According to R.D. Hooker, Jr., War is an “...armed conflict between states.” According to Wallerstein, war is a struggle for shaping institutional structures of the world economy in order to create a world market which favors to existing economic actors.

Thus, in brief, it can be argued that war is an organized violent activity, waged not by individuals but by men sometimes joined by women in groups. It is a mutual activity. Whatever takes place in it relates, or should relate, primarily to the enemy’s movements with the aim of defeating him and avoid being defeated oneself. The conduct of war is conditioned on the hope for victory, or at the very least self-preservation. Where that hope does not exist there can be no war, only suicide. War rests on contention. War is not a one-sided activity, but assumes resistance. The invader might be only too pleased to gain his objectives without fighting. It is the defender who resorts to war to oppose the invader’s intentions. Even when the invader uses force, if there is no response, the result will be not a war but a massacre. War assumes a degree of intensity and duration to the fighting. Frontier skirmishes and isolated clashes between patrols are not

necessarily war. Besides, those who fight do so not in a private capacity, but as public servants. A personal vendetta is not war. Moreover, war is not fighting for its own sake. It has an aim, often normatively defined in political terms, but perfectly capable of being more narrowly and militarily defined, for example as the pursuit of victory.

3.4.3 CHANGING NATURE OF WAR

War has changed on how it is waged since the first time it occurred. From clubs and stones that the pre-historic man used to kill his enemies to the missiles and nuclear bombs that has now become the new face of death and world destruction. For the past century, the weapons used in warfare had seen a significant development, making wars more deadly than ever. Guns became deadlier as it phased out its round musket ammunition and changed it with the pointed aerodynamic bullets that we use today. Becoming even more deadly, the once single firing rifles have become rapid firing automatic weapons, slaughtering anyone that it faces. Bombs became more powerful and a lot more accurate seeing the first use of remote controlled fins that make the bomb more accurate. However, the most significant development in the history of weapons was the manufacturing of the atom bomb, the most destructive and powerful weapon man has ever created. It can kill millions of people and destroy one whole city with one blast. The creation of the atom bomb changed how modern warfare is fought and brought a new radical era throughout the world. This is known as the Nuclear Age.

The development of weapons has made the present weapons more powerful and dangerous, making wars much more destructive with greater number of casualties. A war-ridden country would be probably impoverished after the war. Another effect of war to a country is depopulation as many of its citizens would die.

Since the end of Second World War, the rise of insurgents and non-state actors in war, and their readiness to use terror and other irregular methods of fighting, have increased leading to the phenomenon of 'new wars'. The 'old wars' were waged solely between states, and were accordingly fought between comparable

and 'symmetrical' armed forces. However, new wars have changed the whole concept of old wars. The end of the Cold War, the rise of globalization, the spread of democracy, and the advent of a new millennium raised hopes that mankind might move beyond the catastrophic wars that shaped the 20th century. Those hopes were dashed by Somalia and Rwanda and Bosnia, by the Sudan and the Congo and Kosovo, by Chechnya and Afghanistan and Iraq.

The modern way of organizing war that grew out of the transformation of feudal into modern society is to entrust it to be directed by the state. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which ended the Thirty Years' war, states alone have been authorized to wage war. Conversely, whenever violence was used by individuals, other groups and organizations, it was known as crime, uprising, rebellion, or civil war. Inside each state a distinction was drawn between the government that alone could conduct the war at the highest level; the armed forces, whose task was to fight; and the civilian population, whose assigned role was to pay and sustain the effort. By setting up an organization whose members, even at the higher levels, were selected for their professionalism rather than their loyalty which had been the case in empires and feudal societies and who were dedicated solely to war, the state and its resources led the way to unprecedented technological development in the military field. The military and war making capabilities of the modern state were so great that by 1914 some half dozen industrialized states had come virtually to dominate the world. During the nineteenth century, the advent of railways and telegraphs for the first time enabled large states to begin to harness virtually their entire resources for military purposes. This culminated in the era of "total war" (1914-45) when such governments took over control of almost every aspect of their citizens' lives from the wages that they were paid to the temperature of the water in which they could bathe. These trends affected the United States, which was relatively isolated and safe, much later than they did the main European powers, which confronted each other directly. In the long run, the United States built a military-industrial complex larger than any other in the world.

As the war making communities developed and became more sophisticated, so

did the scale on which they fought and the methods they used. Early tribal societies counted their warriors in the dozens and knew only the raid, the ambush and the skirmish. With the establishment of chiefdoms, there appeared forces numbering in the hundreds or at most thousands, as well as battle and siege operations, whereas empires could count their troops in the hundreds of thousands and were capable of conducting sophisticated operations that lasted for years on end. However, all pre-modern political entities were hampered in their conduct of war by problems of both logistics and communication. The former meant that armed forces spent more time looking after their supplies than actively campaigning, and indeed that war itself was usually a seasonal activity. The latter not only prevented the coordination of operations from the capital but made it virtually impossible for the armed forces of any one state to cooperate with each other on anything larger than a tactical scale once they had been united on the battlefield. Modern technology during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century put an end to these limitations. Instead of coming about by tacit agreement between the commanders on both sides, battles could be developed into coherent campaigns; campaigns waged in different theatres could be integrated with the conduct of war as a whole, and the latter coordinated from the national capital, which also controlled the mobilization of demographic and economic resources. The different level of war – from minor tactics through tactics and the operational art and strategy all the way to grand strategy – made their appearance. More and more, war came to be waged by vast powers or coalitions of powers, each counting their subjects in the dozens if not hundreds of millions. Once unleashed by the Industrial Revolution, military technology mushroomed. Between 1815 and 1945, it took war from flintlocks to tanks and from foot slogging soldiers to long range bomber aircraft and the first ballistic missiles. Throughout these millennia of organizational and technological growth, the character of war as a mutual activity remained unchanged.

With the advent of nuclear weapons war seemed to have undergone a decisive change. Hitherto, it had often been possible for one side to use some combination of force and guile in order to achieve victory at a cost acceptable to itself. Now, the prospect had to

be faced that victory, instead of guaranteeing one's existence, would lead to annihilation as the defeated side fell on the nuclear button. Indeed, the more resounding the victory, the more acute the danger that this would happen. Under such circumstances, it is scant wonder that those states that possessed nuclear weapons by and large, the most powerful ones generally began taking very good care not to commit suicide and to avoid escalating conflicts between each other. The more nuclear weapons proliferated, the less important and less powerful the states against which large scale, conventional warfare could still be fought. Reflecting these developments, military organization and military technology reversed direction. Throughout the years since A.D. 1000, armies and navies had been getting larger and larger, culminating in the tens of millions of uniformed personnel who served during the two World Wars. Now, all of a sudden, they began to shrink as the most important states abandoned the system of mass mobilization of the kind that initially appeared after 1789. For the first time in history, some weapons – were deliberately made less, rather than more, powerful. Neither the most powerful missiles, such as the American Titan, nor the monster hydrogen bomb of 58 million tons of TNT that the Soviets exploded in 1961 had successors. Research and development were redirected in an effort to develop more accurate delivery systems such as multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and cruise missiles carrying more limited warheads: Both reflected the feeling that their city destroying predecessors had grown too indiscriminate and too dangerous to serve any useful purpose. As nuclear weapons put a ceiling on the size and violence of wars between nations, such wars became rarer at the end of the twentieth century. However guerilla warfare and terrorism emerged as new form of war which was not based on the customary division of labor among government, armed forces, and people. It was immune to those weapons and could be waged even in their presence. Guerilla warfare and terrorism in the 1990s continued to resist successfully the armed forces of many states around the world.

For many centuries, war was incommensurably concentrated in the hands of great powers in Europe, but in the second half of twentieth century, warfare shifted from major powers to minor powers, from Europe to other regions, and from inter-state warfare to intra-state wars. Warfare has been affected by political

formations and it has experienced big changes. Major political changes have contributed the changing nature of warfare. For example, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of ethno-national conflicts have affected and shaped the understanding of war. At the end of Cold War, first conflicts in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda were the first examples of new type of wars. With this period, developments in the international environment caused that the traditional concept and definition of war has changed. In other words, the perception of war has been affected by developments in international system. After the Cold War, the actors in the international system have varied. As a consequence of these changes, the understanding of warfare has changed. Changing of warfare is parallel with the technological development. In 21st century, wars have become localized rather than international. Wars among the states have been replaced by local based civil wars. According to K.J. Holsti, new wars are within and about states. There has been an average of 0.85 internal wars per state since 1945 as compared to only 0.30 interstate wars per state. Besides, there are some differences in dimension of wars. At the present time, the term of war is replaced by conflict. Majority of the conflicts has occurred in failed states. The top ten failed states are Somalia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Guinea, and Pakistan.

3.4.4 MAD AND DETERRENCE

Mutually assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy in which a full-scale use of the weapons of destruction (WMD) that is nuclear weapons by two opposing sides would effectively result in the destruction of both the attacker and the defender. This would become a war in which there is no victory or any armistice but only total destruction. It is based on the theory of deterrence according to which the deployment of strong weapons is essential to threaten the enemy in order to prevent the use of the same weapons.

The doctrine of MAD assumes that each side has enough nuclear weaponry to

destroy the other side; and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate without fail with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate irreversible escalation of hostilities resulting in both combatants' mutual, total and assured destruction. The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a first strike because the other side will launch on warning or with secondary forces, resulting in unacceptable losses for both parties. The payoff of the MAD doctrine is expected to be a tense but stable global peace.

This doctrine was applied during the Cold War (1940s to 1991) in which MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the US and the SU while they engaged in smaller proxy wars around the world. It was also responsible for the arms race, as both the superpowers struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain second-strike capability. Although the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction continues to be applied. Proponents of MAD as part of US and SU strategic doctrine believed that nuclear war could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive a full-scale nuclear exchange as a functioning state. Since the credibility of the threat is critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial capital in their nuclear arsenals even if they were not intended for use. In addition, neither side could be expected or allowed to adequately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles. This led both to the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

This MAD situation is often referred to as nuclear deterrence. The term deterrence was first used in this context after the Second World War. Alfred Nobel is also quoted as when talking about his invention of dynamite that "My dynamite will sooner lead to peace than a thousand world conventions. As soon as men will find that in one instant, whole armies can be utterly destroyed, they surely will abide by golden peace. In March 1940, the Frisch-Peierls Memorandum anticipated deterrence as the principal means of combating an enemy with nuclear weapons. Although the US and Soviet Union had acquired nuclear capability, yet both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against each other. However, with the development of aircraft like the American Convair B-

36 and the Russian Tupolev Tu-95, both sides were gaining a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country. The official nuclear policy of the United States became one of massive retaliation as coined by President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Secretary of State John Foster Dulles which called for massive attack against the Soviet Union if they were to invade Europe, regardless of whether it was a conventional or a nuclear attack. By the time of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed the capability of launching a nuclear-tipped missile from a submerged submarine, which completed the *third leg* of the nuclear triad weapons strategy necessary to fully implement the MAD doctrine. Having a three-branched nuclear capability eliminated the possibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a first strike attack; this, in turn, ensured the credible threat of a devastating retaliatory strike against the aggressor, increasing a nation's nuclear deterrence.

The strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction and the acronym MAD are due to John von Neumann, who was, among other things, an inventor of game theory, a cold war strategist, and chairman of the ICBM Committee until his death in 1957.

The strategy of mutually assured destruction was fully declared in the early 1960s, primarily by United States Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara. According to him there was the very real danger that a nation with nuclear weapons could attempt to eliminate another nation's retaliatory forces with a surprise, devastating first strike and theoretically "win" a nuclear war relatively unharmed. True second strike capability could only be achieved when a nation had a *guaranteed* ability to fully retaliate after a first strike attack. The United States had achieved an early form of second strike capability by fielding continual patrols of strategic nuclear bombers, with a large number of planes always in the air, on their way to or from fail safe points close to the borders of the Soviet Union. This meant the United States could still retaliate, even after a devastating first strike attack. The tactic was expensive and problematic because of the high cost of keeping enough planes in the air at all times and the possibility they would be shot down by

Soviet anti-aircraft missiles before reaching their targets.

The deterrence strategy and program has continued into the 21st Century, with the Trident-II ballistic missile nuclear submarine fleet continuing operations as one of the United States remaining strategic nuclear deterrent.

The original doctrine of US MAD was modified on July 25, 1980, with US President Jimmy Carter's adoption of *countervailing strategy* with Presidential Directive 59. According to its architect, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown countervailing strategy stressed that the planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb Russian population centres and cities primarily, but first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military targets, in the hope of a Russian surrender before total destruction of the USSR and the United States. This modified version of MAD was seen as a winnable nuclear war, while still maintaining the possibility of assured destruction for at least one party. This policy was further developed by the Reagan Administration with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, nicknamed "Star Wars"), the goal of which was to develop space-based technology to destroy Soviet missiles before they reached the US. The SDI was criticized by both the Soviets and many of America's allies including Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher. Because if it would have operational and effective, it would have undermined the assured destruction required for MAD. If America had a guarantee against Soviet nuclear attacks, its critics argued, it would have first strike capability which would have been a politically and militarily destabilizing position. Critics further argued that it could trigger a new arms race, this time to develop countermeasures for SDI. Proponents of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) consider the MAD as exceptionally dangerous. Because it offers a single course of action in the event of nuclear attack, that is, full retaliatory response.

3.4.5 REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA)

The term 'RMA' highlights the evolution of weapon technology, information technology, military organization and military doctrine among advanced powers. Advanced versions of RMA incorporate other sophisticated technologies, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), nanotechnology, robotics and

biotechnology. More recently, the RMA debate has focused on network centric warfare which is a doctrine that aims to connect all troops on the battlefield.

In other words, the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a military-theoretical hypothesis. It is about the future of warfare and often connected to technological and organizational recommendations for change in the United States military and others.

The RMA claims that in certain periods of the history of mankind, there were new doctrines, strategies, tactics and technologies which led to an irrevocable change in conduct of warfare. Furthermore, those changes require an accelerated adaptation of novel doctrines and strategies. The RMA is tied to modern information, communications and space technology. The original theorizing of the RMA was done by the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. The United States initially became interested in it through Andrew Marshall, the head of the Office of Net Assessment, a Department of Defense think tank. Gradually it gained credence within official military circles and other nations began exploring similar shifts in organization and technology. The China's People's Liberation Army has strong interest in RMA and the structure of future US armed forces and thus, it has been incorporated to China's strategic military doctrine. Military of the countries such as Canada, United Kingdom, Holland, Sweden, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, India, Russia and Germany consider the RMA as organizational structure however, not all militaries due to the significant infrastructure and investment involved. The US' victory in Gulf War in 1991 renewed interest in RMA theory. American dominance through superior technology emphasized how the United States' technological advances reduced the relative power of the Iraqi military, by no means an insignificant rival, to insignificance. After the Kosovo War in which the United States did not lose a single life, others suggested that war had become too sterile, creating a virtual war. In 1997, the US army mounted an exercise codenamed "Force 21", to test the application of digital technologies in warfare in order to improve communications and logistics by applying private-

sector technologies adapted for military use. Specifically, it sought to increase awareness of one's position on the battlefield as well as the enemy's, in order to achieve increased lethality for enemies and greater control of the tempo of warfare.

Thus, in nutshell, the RMA is the inclusion and expansion of new technology within current military tactics. It has the ability to reduce casualty rates and facilitate intelligence gathering. Operation Desert Storm is considered the first major global conflict successfully implementing RMA and is considered a model of future military operations due to the low casualty rate and the US military's speed and precision. However, the RMA technological advances have also resulted in a dehumanizing of warfare. This negatively effects the decisions made by officers, as well as individuals in the field.

3.4.6 PRE-EMPTIVE WAR

A pre-emptive war is a war that is commenced in an attempt to repel or defeat a perceived offensive or invasion, or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending war before that attack materializes. It is a war which pre-emptively breaks the peace. The intention with a pre-emptive strike is to gain the advantage of initiative and to harm the enemy at a moment of minimal protection, for instance while vulnerable during transport or mobilization. However the concept of pre-emptive war can be used to start a war by claiming that the nation would soon be under attack and therefore had to defend itself. This is a controversial concept as it can be used as a justification to start a war on questionable grounds.

The term 'pre-emptive war' is sometimes confused with the term 'preventive war'. A preventive war is launched to destroy the potential threat of an enemy when an attack by that party is not imminent or known to be planned. On the other hand, a pre-emptive war is launched in anticipation of immediate enemy aggression. Some scholars equate the preventive war with aggression, and therefore consider it as illegitimate.

The waging of a pre-emptive war has less stigma attached than does the waging

of a preventive war. The initiation of armed conflict: that is being the first to break the peace when no 'armed attack' has yet occurred, is not permitted by the UN Charter unless authorized by the UN Security Council as an enforcement action. Israel has incorporated pre-emptive war in its strategic doctrine due to its lack of strategic depth. The Six Day War, which began when Israel launched a successful attack on Egypt on June 5, 1967. This has been widely described as a pre-emptive war. According to the US State Department, this is the most cited example of pre-emption. Others have alternatively referred to it as a preventive war.

After September 11, 2001 during the Bush administration period (2002–2008) the doctrine of pre-emption had been revived following the US invasion on Iraq. Bush administration mainly claimed for the necessity to intervene to prevent Saddam Hussein from deploying weapons of Mass destruction (WMD) prior to launching an armed attack. The Bush administration had claimed that Iraq gave WMD to terrorists groups and claimed that security of the nation was at a great risk. Later it was confirmed that Iraq had no WMD. Nevertheless the US invasion on Iraq in 2003 was claimed as a pre-emptive war by the Bush administration. Since the departure of the Bush administration, the Obama administration has made no such claims to retain the right to declare a pre-emptive war, but has adopted and continued many policies of the Bush Doctrine.

**4.1 UNITED NATIONS (ROLE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF
PEACE AND SECURITY, CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, UN REFORMS)**

- Suneel Kumar

STRUCTURE

- 4.1.0 Objectives**
- 4.1.1 Introduction**
- 4.1.2 Origins, Objectives, Principles and Structures**
- 4.1.3 Role of UN in Maintaining Peace and Security**
- 4.1.4 Need and Demand for Democratic Reforms**

4.1.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- The origin and Objectives of United Nations
- The principle and structures of United Nations
- Role of United Nations in maintain peace and security

- Need for reforms to the United Nations in general and specific organs in particular

4.1.1 INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) is an international inter-governmental organization. Its declared aims are facilitating cooperation in international law, international security, economic development, social progress, human rights, and achievement of world peace. The United Nations is best known for peace-keeping, peace-building, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance. Apart from this, there are many other ways the United Nations and its specialized agencies are working for the making the world a better place. In the contemporary times, the UN is working on a broad range of fundamental issues such as sustainable development, environment and refugees protection, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation, promotion of democracy, human rights, gender equality and the women empowerment, governance, economic and social development and international health, clearance of landmines and enhancement of food production, and more, in order to achieve its goals and coordinate efforts for a safer world.

4.1.2 ORIGIN, OBJECTIVES, PRINCIPLES AND STRUCTURE

The UN was founded in 1945 after the Second World War to replace the League of Nations, to stop wars between countries, and also to provide a platform for dialogue. It contains multiple subsidiary organizations to carry out its missions. Global peace and security which figured prominently in the thinking of the great powers encouraged them for creating the UN and its predecessor, the League of Nations. These institutional reforms were inspired by the liberal conviction that both war and the management of other global problems can best be controlled by removing global anarchy. This anarchy was due to the absence of a supranational authority to regulate relations between states. The League of Nations sought to prevent a recurrence of the catastrophic First World War by replacing the balance of power system with one based on the construction of a *collective security* regime

made up of rules for keeping peace. This was guided by the principle that an act of aggression by any state would be met by a collective retaliatory response from the rest. The League of Nations failed to check the expansionist and aggressive policies of Germany, Japan, and Italy during the interwar period (1919-1939) and maintain the peace in the world. Failure of the League led to the Second World War. Since the beginning of Second World War the US, British, and Russian allies began planning for a new international organization, the United Nations, to preserve the post-war peace because it was believed that peace could not be maintained unilaterally by any one great power acting alone. The name “United Nations”, coined by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt was first used in the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, during the Second World War, when 26 nations pledged their Governments to continue fighting together against the Axis Powers. In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco to draw up the United Nations Charter. Those delegates deliberated on the basis of proposals worked out by the representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States at Dumbarton Oaks, United States in August-October 1944. The Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 by the representatives of the 50 countries. Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the original 51 Member States. The United Nations officially came into existence on 24th October 1945, when its Charter was ratified by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and by a majority of other signatories. Thus, the United Nations Day is celebrated on 24th October each year. The UN Charter in its Article-1 defines the following objectives of the UN:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the

principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

As per the article-2 of the UN Charter, the United Nations and its members, in pursuit of the abovementioned objectives shall act in accordance with the following principles:

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter. They shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be

necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the UN Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter-VII of the UN Charter.

At present the UN has 193 member-states. Headquarter of the UN is situated at New York and enjoys extraterritoriality. The United Nations is committed to maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations and promoting social progress, better living standards and human rights. The UN has six principal organs:

- General Assembly, the main deliberative assembly
- Security Council for deciding certain resolutions for peace and security;
- Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for promoting international economic and social co-operation and development;
- Secretariat for providing studies, information, and facilities needed by the UN
- International Court of Justice, the primary judicial organ;
- Trusteeship Council inactive since 1994

The UN has also its specialized agencies including the World Health Organization (WHO), International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the UNESCO, and UNICEF. Non-governmental organizations can be granted consultative status with ECOSOC and other agencies to participate in the UN's work. The UN has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001. Due to its unique international character, and the powers vested in its founding Charter, the Organization can take action on a wide range of issues, and provide a forum for its Member States to express their views, through the General Assembly, the

Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and other bodies and committees.

4.1.3 ROLE OF UN IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY

Since its creation, the UN has often been called upon to prevent disputes from escalating into war, to help restore peace when armed conflict does break out, and to promote lasting peace. The Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary General all play major role in fostering peace and security. Since the establishment of the UN numerous international disputes originated which could have disturbed the international peace. However, the timely effective intervention made by the UN solved those problems.

Over the decades, the UN has helped to end numerous conflicts, often through actions of the UN Security Council. Under the UN Charter, Security Council is primary responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. When a complaint related to a threat to peace is brought before the Security Council, usually it recommends the parties to try to reach agreement by peaceful means. Sometimes it undertakes investigation and mediation. On numerous occasions, the Council has issued ceasefire directives which have been instrumental in preventing wider hostilities.

4.1.3.1 International Crises and The UN intervention

Since the preserving world peace is a central purpose of the United Nations, over the years, it has played a major role in helping defuse international crises and in resolving protracted conflicts. In 1946, the Soviet Union had withdrawal its troops from the territory of Iran. Suez Canal Crisis was also resolved in 1956 due to the intervention of the United Nations. The UN helped in defusing the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Cyprus problem of 1963, Czechoslovakia crisis of 1968 and the Middle East crisis of 1973. When Iran-Iraq war was occurred in 1980 then again due to its continuous efforts, the UN had succeeded to enforce the cease-fire in August 1988. In 1989, the UN-sponsored negotiations led to the withdrawal

of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. In the 1990s, the UN was instrumental in restoring sovereignty to Kuwait. It also played a major role in ending civil wars in Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mozambique, restoring the democratically elected government in Haiti. In brief, it can be said that due to relentless efforts of the United Nations numerous conflicts have been resolved.

4.1.3.2 Disarmament and the United Nations

Armament race among the different global, regional and local powers is a big threat to world peace. For the maintenance of peace at international level, disarmament is essential. Therefore, the stop the spread of arms and reduction and eventually elimination of all weapons of mass destruction are major goals of the United Nations. The UN has been an ongoing forum for disarmament negotiations. It makes recommendations and initiate studies for disarmament. It has supported various multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and in other international bodies. These negotiations have resulted into numerous treaties such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) (1963), Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty(NPT) (1968), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) (1996) and the treaties establishing nuclear–free zones. The UN efforts for disarmament have also produced other treaties prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons (1992) and biological weapons (1972), ban nuclear weapons from the seabed and ocean floor (1971) and outer space (1967); and ban or restrict other types of weapons. Due the UN efforts, in 1997, more than 100 nations signed the Ottawa Convention to outlaw the landmines. The UN has also encouraged all nations to adhere to this and other treaties banning destructive weapons of war. The UN is also supporting efforts to control small arms and light weapons.

4.1.3.3 The United Nations and Its Peace-Making and Peace-Building Efforts

The UN peacemaking brings hostile parties to agreement through diplomatic means. The UN in efforts to maintain international peace and security, through Security Council can recommend ways to avoid conflict and/or restore or secure

peace. The UN Secretary-General plays an important role in peace-making. The Secretary-General can bring any matter into the notice of the Security Council that appears to threaten international peace and security. The Secretary-General uses “good offices” to carry out mediation. It also exercises “quiet diplomacy” behind the scenes, either personally or through special envoys. The Secretary-General also undertakes “preventive diplomacy” aimed at resolving disputes. On various occasions, the UN Secretary-General had sent the fact-finding missions in conflict-prone zones and supported regional peace-making efforts in Asia and Africa.

Development assistance is a key element of peace-building. In cooperation with UN agencies, and with the participation of donor countries, host governments and NGOs, the United Nations is working to support good governance, to maintain the law and order, to conduct the free and fair elections and also to promote the human rights in various countries. It is helping the countries rebuild administrative, health, educational and other services disrupted by conflict. In 1989, the UN supervised elections in Namibia. It also supervised the mine-clearance programmes in Mozambique and police training in Haiti. In Liberia, the UN has opened a peace-building support office. The UN is maintaining a human rights office in Cambodia. Moreover, it is helping in the implementation of peace agreements in Guatemala.

4.1.3.4 The UN Peace-Keeping Operations

The first UN peace-keeping mission was established in 1948. In 1948, the Security Council authorized the deployment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between the Arabs and Israel. Since then, there have been a total of 64 UN peace-keeping operations around the world. Since the UN deployed its first peace-keepers in 1948, some 118 countries have voluntarily provided more than 750,000 military and civilian police personnel. The UN has more than 20 peace-keeping operations in Africa. The UN has helped repatriate refugees to Mozambique, provided humanitarian assistance in Somalia and Sudan and undertaken

diplomatic efforts to restore peace in the Great Lakes region. It has helped prevent new unrest in the Central African Republic. Similarly in Asia, the UN has strengthened Cambodian civil society, human rights and democracy following the massive 1992–1993 UN peacekeeping mission in that country. Since 1993 the UN Special Mission has worked to facilitate national reconciliation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. In East Timor, UN brokered talks between Indonesia and Portugal culminated in the May 1999 agreement. Under the agreement, a UN mission supervised voter registration and the August ballot, at which 78 per cent of East Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia over autonomy within that country. When the results were announced, militias opposing independence unleashed a campaign of violence, forcing some 200,000 East Timorese to flee their homes. Then in 1999, the UN Security Council dispatched an international security force to restore order. The UN Transitional Administration replaced the international force which is overseeing East Timor's transition towards independence.

The UN has also worked strenuously towards resolving the conflict in Europe. From 1992 to 1995, the UN peace-keeping forces sought to bring peace and security to Croatia. It helped protect civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It helped ensure that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was not drawn into the war. Under the umbrella of the UN, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations are working with the people of Kosovo to create a functioning, democratic society with substantial autonomy.

The UN is instrumental in resolving protracted conflicts in Central America. In 1989, in Nicaragua, the peace effort led to the voluntary demobilization of the resistance movement, whose members turned in their weapons to the UN. In 1990, a UN mission observed Nicaragua's elections. In El Salvador, a UN peace-keeping mission verified implementation of all agreements. In Guatemala, UN assisted negotiations ended a 35 years' long civil war. The UN restored the democratically elected government in Haiti.

In brief, it can be argued that the UN peace-keeping operations were evolved to

meet the demands of different conflicts. Most of the peace-keeping operations involve military duties, such as observing a ceasefire or establishing a buffer zone between the hostile parties. Operations in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, have been deployed as a means to help prevent the outbreak of hostilities. The concept of peace-keeping operations was originated at the time when the Cold War rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council. The primary goal of the UN peace-keeping was to maintain the ceasefires and stabilize situations on the ground that may lead to resolution of conflict by peaceful means. The UN peace-making expanded in post-Cold War. Reason being the end of Cold war has created new opportunities to end civil wars through negotiated peace settlements. A large number of conflicts were brought to an end, either through direct UN mediation or by the efforts of others acting with UN support. Countries assisted included El Salvador, Guatemala, Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, and Burundi, Sierra Leone and Kosovo.

4.1.3.5 The UN Role in Democratic Transition and Elections in Different Countries

The United Nations has played a significant role in the democratic transition and conducting or supervising the election in different countries. Since September 2012, the UN has supported the preparation and conduct of elections in 55 Member States. In Afghanistan, the UN assisted the Independent Election Commission in reform of the electoral legal framework. In Iraq, the United Nations is providing technical advice and assisting to build the capacity of the Independent High Electoral Commission. In Somalia, the Organization supported the finalization of the Provisional Constitution and the establishment of a new Federal Parliament, bringing an eight-year political transition to an end. In June 2013, a new mission in Somalia was established to provide political and strategic support to the Somalia to consolidate peace and security and establish new federal structures, in advance of national elections scheduled for 2016. In Burundi, the United Nations facilitated the adoption of an inclusive road map for the preparation of the 2015 presidential elections.

In nutshell one can say that since its formation, the United Nations is playing a critical role in the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. It made effective intervention in numerous bilateral and multilateral conflicts and established the peace in the Cold War period as well as in the post-Cold War period. Moreover, through peace-keeping forces, it has tried to establish peace in the various conflict-ridden countries of Asia, Africa, Americas and Europe. Moreover, it is responsible for various disarmament agreements and treaties. This has also facilitated the democratic transitions and supervised the elections in the countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Burundi.

4.1.4 NEED AND DEMAND FOR REFORMS IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Since the formation of the United Nations in 1945, international scenario has changed drastically. In 1945, the UN had only 51 member states whereas now it has 193 member-states. After the establishment of UN, numerous countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America had come out of the shackles of colonialism and become the member of the UN. A large portion of the world population live in these countries but these countries had no representation in the UN Security Council. With the change of international scenario, the UN has expanded its area of activities. Due to these reasons, there is a demand for reforms in the United Nations.

During the first years, the first decisive change was the development of peace-keeping measures to oversee the implementation of ceasefire agreements in 1949 in the Middle East. The Soviet Union had launched reform during the Cold War Superpowers' rivalry in the 1950s to curtail the independence of the Secretariat by replacing the post of Secretary-General with a troika, including a representative from the socialist states. In the late 1990s there have been many calls for reform of the United Nations. However, there is little consensus about what reform might mean in practice. There are demands for a greater role of the UN in world affairs. Just opposite to this, there is an opinion that the UN must be confined to humanitarian work. The range of opinion extends from those who want to eliminate the UN entirely, to those who want to make it into a full-fledged world

government. In 1992, the UN Security Council had asked Secretary General Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali to submit the proposals of reforms in the UN Charter. Dr. Ghali prepared a document of 52 pages titled 'Agenda for Peace'. He suggested that preventive diplomacy should be used to prevent wars. He was of the view that preventive forces should be deployed in the areas where there is a possibility of the breakout of war. In 1995, during the 50th Birth Anniversary of the United Nations, General Assembly in its special session emphasized on the modernization of United nations. After this in 1997, Secretary General Kofi Annan made the following suggests:

- Office of the Deputy Secretary General of the UN should be established.
- The number of the officials of the United Nations should be reduced.
- A Drug Control and Crime Prevention Office should be established in Vienna.
- The United Nations Group should be established at the UN headquarter.
- Public Information Department should be reorganized.

After this in June 2011, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had appointed Atul Khare of India to spearhead efforts to implement a reform agenda aimed at streamlining and improving the efficiency of the world body.

4.1.4.1 Reforms in the UN Security Council

A very frequently discussed change to the UN structure is to change the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, which reflects the power structure of the world as it was in 1945. There are several proposed plans, notably by the G-4 nations, by the Uniting for Consensus group, and by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The reformers demands that adequate representation should be given to the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. For this purpose its membership should be increased. The number of the permanent members of the Security Council should also be increased. Today India, Brazil, Germany and Japan have formed G-4 and are making joint efforts to get permanent membership of the United Nations' Security Council. Hence the expansion of the Security Council has become an international issue. Beside this, the International

Thinkers Forum of 22 members is asking the for the abolition of veto power and also asking the establishment of an Economic Security Council. This is also suggesting to establish a UN Rapid Action Force for any emergency situation.

4.1.4.2 Reforms in the UN Secretariat

There is a demand for making the UN administration especially the UN Secretariat more transparent, more accountable, and more efficient. For this purpose, it has been suggested that there should be direct election of the Secretary-General by the people. The UN Secretariat reforms seldom get much attention in the media. Former Secretary General of the United Nations Development Programme, Mark Malloch Brown has attributed the inefficiency of the UN administration to the “disconnect between the merit and reward”. Brown has advocated for reconnecting merit to make the UN again an international meritocracy. He has suggested the UN to stop promoting on the basis of political correctness that encourages promoting staffs proportionately from certain regions of the world. Instead the UN make more use of Asia, Africa and other so-called less developed regions that now offer a large pool of talented, skilled, and highly motivated professionals. The individuals of these regions who are highly qualified will readily move up through the UN system without need of the cultural relativism which is used to promote incompetents. The Third World countries often complain that some of the most desirable senior posts within the Secretariat are filled under a tradition of regional representation that favors the United States and other affluent nations. The major powers hold very high positions in the Secretariat. They support their national interests and refuse to allow the Secretary General to cut departments.

4.1.4.3 Human Rights Reform

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights came under fire during its existence for the high-profile positions it gave to member states that did not guarantee the human rights of their own citizens. Several countries which are

the guilty of gross violations of human rights became members of the organization, such as Libya, Cuba, Sudan, Algeria and China. Thus, in March 2006, the United Nations General Assembly had voted overwhelmingly in favour of establishing a new United Nations Human Rights Council, the successor to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

4.1.4.4 Other Related Reforms and Proposals

Proposal For Creation of United Nations Parliamentary Assembly

There is a proposal for the creation of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, or United Nations People's Assembly (UNPA). This would eventually allow for direct election of UN Parliament members by citizens of all over the world. The proposal for a UNPA is as old as the UN itself. However, this was stagnated until the 1990s. Recently, this has gained traction amidst increasing globalization, as national parliamentarians and citizens groups seek to counter the growing influence of unelected international bureaucracies.

Creation of United Nations Environment Organization(UNEO)

After the publication of Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC in February 2007, a "Paris Call for Action" read out by French President Chirac and supported by 46 countries, called for the United Nations Environment Programme to be replaced by a new and more powerful United Nations Environment Organization (UNEO), to be modelled on the World Health Organization. These 46 countries included the European Union nations. Nevertheless, it did not include the United States, China, Russia, and India, the top four emitters of greenhouse gases.

Removal of Irrelevant Provisions in the UN Charter

Several provisions of the United Nations Charter are no longer relevant. Hence there is demand for the removal of following irrelevant provisions:

- Since there are no longer any trust territories, the UN Trusteeship Council does not serve any purpose. It is defunct since 1994. Thus, Chapter XIII of the Charter is no longer relevant, and can be deleted.

- As a result of Cold War disagreements, the Military Staff Committee never succeeded in its intended purpose. Although it formally still meets every two weeks, it has been effectively inactive since 1948. Thus, there is demand for the removal of article-47, and the references to it in articles-26, 45 and 46 of the UN Charter.
- The term “enemy” in articles-53 and 107 contain special provisions relating to the Axis powers of Second World War (Germany, Japan and Italy). Some countries consider these articles irrelevant. Japan wants to see these provisions removed from the UN Charter.

In brief, it can be argued that in the changing international scenario, there are various proposals for making different reforms in the United Nations including the demand for the expansion of the Security Council, to make UN Secretariat more accountable and transparent, to hold the direct election for the UN Secretary, to create a UN Parliamentary Assembly, to create the United Nations Environment Organization and also to delete the irrelevant provisions from the UN Charter.

4.2 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

- Suneel Kumar

STRUCTURE

- 4.2.0 Objectives**
- 4.2.1 Introduction**
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- 4.2.7 Terrorism and Human Rights**

4.2.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- The nature of terrorism
- The aims and objectives of terrorism
- Types of terrorism
- Causes and impact of terrorism

- Inter relationship between terrorism and human rights

4.2.1 INTRODUCTION

In International relations terrorism has become a bigger problem. It is neither a new phenomenon for domestic politics nor for international politics. However in 21st century it has emerged as a problem of global concern. The process of globalization has helped in globalizing and organizing terrorism at global level. The spectre of cross-border terrorism per se international terrorism has shaken the world peace with panic and scare. Today international terrorism's membership is world wide, its array is trans-national, its set-up is global and marks can be anywhere. All the major cities of the world have faced the havoc of international terror at one time or other. New York, London, Mumbai, Nairobi, Chechnya, Islamabad and many other cities of both the developing and developed world have suffered due to the activities of international terrorist organisations. Terrorism has created a variety of challenges and dilemmas for human rights advocates. In many countries these were further complicated by the events of September 2001, which triggered a profound and often disturbing debate about how societies and governments should respond to terrorist acts while respecting human rights and the rule of law.

4.2.2 DEFINING THE CONCEPT AND NATURE OF TERRORISM

Though it dates back to bloody assassinations of Greeks, Romans and Hindus etc, the world terrorism was coined in the days of French revolution. The revolutionaries who seized power adopted the policy of violence against their enemies and era was known as the "reign of terror". The term has various meanings for different people. It is full of political and intellectual ambiguity. Commonly it is mentioned as the use of force, creating terror, using intimidating methods, especially to secure political ends, liquidating opposition, stifling rebellion, guerrilla warfare etc.

The term 'terror' is derived from the Latin word '*terrere*' meaning 'to tremble' or 'to frighten from'. It may be defined as a systematic use of violence and

intimidation to achieve some goals especially political. Thus it is different from all other crimes in its purpose. Its objective is to put the people in a state of terror and keep it there while forcing a government or organization to either act or not act in a given direction. In modern times, it was first used during the French Revolution and the Jacobin Reign of Terror. At first, it was identified with the state action, but later, it was applied to individual or group violence. It covers varied form of violence, raging from indiscriminate bombing to hijacking, kidnapping, taking of hostage assassination and severe destruction of property. Terrorism is uniquely offensive form of political violence, generally in response to the political importance of the ruler or some political malaise. Literally, terrorism like other 'ism' is a system or the method or theory behind it, the method strongly believing in use of terror towards the achievement of certain objectives. Terror in the ordinary parlance means intense, overpowering fear and use of terrorizing methods for governing or resisting a government. One of the most formidable problems faced by the legal control of terrorism is the precise definition of the term terrorism. Up till now, a specific juridical definition, both from national and international perspective is not possible in view of what has been said of its dual dimensions and also because terrorism is a generic term comprising of a variety of acts including terror, barbarity or uncommon violence not only by individuals or group of individuals with in a state but also by armed forces of one state against another state. There has been a divergence of opinion between Afro- Asian states; on the other hand, and western states, as to whether states or governmental acts should be included in the category of terrorist acts.

Terrorism as an expression of violent dissent provides a dramatic method of highlighting a 'cause' it seeks to demoralize, terrorize and renders helpless the target group/ state; it seeks to achieve its 'cause' through coercion with total disregard of the consequences of innocent human beings as the motto is that the end justifies the means! Terrorism is also a convenient label, which a colonial power may choose to give a liberation movement for acts of violence directed against the power. When terrorism is institutionalized in the coercive exercise of the power of a state aimed at gagging even democratic dissent, it becomes state terrorism. Latest communications and transports have enabled terrorism to

go beyond national boundaries. The international networks of terror have logistic links and operative structures. The international terrorist organizations have operational cells in various countries and have access to all kinds of weapons and technology.

In spite of the fact that there is no consensus on the meaning and definition of terrorism, international terrorism can be defined as “criminal act directed against a State and intended to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, groups or the general public.” In 1994, the General Assembly’s Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, set out in its resolution 49/60, stated that terrorism includes “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes” and that such acts “are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them.” Ten years later, the Security Council, in its resolution 1566 (2004), referred to “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”.

The ad-hoc committee on terrorism of the UN has defined international terrorism as “any act of violence endangering or taking the innocent lives of human or jeopardizing their fundamental freedoms and affecting more than one state, such act being committed as a form of coercion to secure some specific end.”

In short, international terrorism can be defined as the acts of any individual, group, organisation or a rouge state directed at a particular state or an organisation of international stature or the civilian of any state, or to attack one or more states at a time or at different intervals to induce fear into the minds of the people of the world of any act of violence containing international dimensions or consequences of it reflect on the relations of the national states. It is essentially a method that

seeks to achieve political goals by spreading fear. Governments have also used terror as a tactic, but it is particularly associated with “asymmetrical conflicts” where one party is militarily much weaker than the other.

4.2.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF TERRORISM

The basic aim or objective of most of terrorist activities is to induce fear in the mind of the opposite party. It seeks to scare the human decency out of the people in order to get them perform the purpose of terrorist leaders and networks by direct action or at the least through support for or somnolent consent to the elimination of reasonable order locally and globally.

The objectives of terrorists vary with their types, but all forms of terrorists try to jolt their oppositions with violent activities. Their tactics include hijacking, blackmailing, and ruthless killing by shooting and use of bombs etc. violence is not their immediate goal, therefore they insist upon psychological rather than practical results. It is to create an emotional state of extreme fear among specific groups and thereby alter their behaviour and bring about general or particular changes in the groups, society and state.

The tactics and technologies of terrorist groups have become more sophisticated. Due to the large area of operations and use of latest technologies, it has become difficult to predict and protect the targets of international terrorist organizations’ targets. The presence of surprise is always there in the terror activities. The political and economic objectives are primary in the terrorist activities. Psychological impact of violent activities is most significant.

4.2.4 TYPES OF TERRORISM

Types of the terrorism have been described as follow:

- 1. State Terrorism:** For long time the repressive measures of the State have been described as the terrorism, giving birth to the term ‘state terrorism’. It is related to the repression of the dissent or protest in their varied expressions. The earlier meaning of terrorism was related to the state

terrorism.

2. **Revolutionary Terrorism:** When terror and violence is employed to make a revolution successful or to overthrow a corrupt or repressive government it is called revolutionary terrorism. Usually it is against the status quo having the support of masses.
3. **Xeno-Terrorism and Homo-Terrorism:** When terrorism is applied against a foreign country is called xeno-terrorism e.g. Afghans fighting in Kashmir. When the terrorism is applied against own countrymen it is called homo-terrorism. In homo-terrorism the support of population is very important, that cannot be lost to win the fight.
4. **Local, National and International Terrorism:** On the basis of its network and extent of activities the terrorism can be divided into local, national and international. If the targets and activities of any terrorist group are limited to a region or area it is categorized as local terrorism, e.g. terrorism in Punjab, Manipur and Chechnya etc. In contrast to this if terrorist activities are ranged to the whole country it is called national terrorism. Herein the targets of terror are nationwide but within the national boundaries. While the targets, networking and activities of terrorist groups are beyond one nation's boundaries, it is termed as the international terrorism. Today the most prominent and cause of suffering for many people of the world in various countries is international terrorism. The strike on world trade center, and bombs in London etc were activities of international terrorism.
5. **State-sponsored Terrorism:** Some times, due to hostile relation some countries are blamed to support terrorist groups of other countries. It falls in the preview of state sponsored terrorism. During Cold War period USA and former USSR blamed each other of financing terrorism. Pakistan is blamed to sponsor terrorist groups like Harkat-ul-Mujahidin and Lashkar-e-Toiba in Kashmir against India.
6. **Religious Terrorism:** When religion provides the basis for terrorist activities it is called religious terrorism. In present days the close

analysis of international terrorism has showed the emergence of religion based terrorist groups. This brand of terrorism regards violence as an act to divine duty and service to God. The radical Sikh fundamentalism and Hindu conservatism in India and Islamic texture of Al-Qaida' activities are example of this kind of terrorism. Most of the nations of world like Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Morocco, India, Libya, Yemen, China, Russia and many others are suffering due to this type of violence. Clubbed with international terrorism, this type of terrorism has become the global concern.

- 7. Ideological Terrorism:** Terrorism can be divided into extreme left and extreme right wing on the basis of ideology. The Naxalite terrorism, which is prevent in many districts of India is ideological terrorism. Maoist violence in Nepal is also ideological terrorism based on the ideas of Mao Ze Dong.
- 8. Nuclear Terrorism:** The reach of nuclear technology in the hands of terrorists has caused a new kind of threat for the world. The ever increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons and material makes the threat of their being stolen by or bestowed to the terrorists. These weapons and material is potential to create havoc in world. It can be used to humble even the strongest.
- 9. Cyber Terrorism:** with the advances in technology, a new kind of terrorism has emerged on the world scene, which is termed by Barry Collin as 'cyber terrorism'. The motivated attack by terrorist groups against information, computer systems, computer programs and data that result in the suffering of any human being or state is called cyber terrorism. Here technology and violence has come together for human suffering. Whenever there is abuse of computer technology to use information as a threat, it is treated as the cyber terrorism.
- 10. Bio-Terrorism:** Bio terrorism is when terrorists use biological or chemical agents to create terror and havoc. The biological and chemical weapons

have the capability to travel unseen in the air and cause mass deaths in a matter of days. In March 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan attacked a Tokyo Subway with Sarin nerve gas killing 12 persons and injuring thousands. Biological weapons are defined as the infectious agents such as a bacteria or virus used intentionally to inflict harm upon others. Anthrax, Ricin, Botulism, Smallpox and Camelpox etc are some examples of biologically used warfare agents.

In addition to these above said types there may be numerous categories based on the ideology, material used, tactics and strategy etc. No single type of terrorism can be segregated from other. Terrorism in Kashmir is having symptoms of religious terrorism, state sponsored terrorism, national terrorism and xeno as well as homo terrorism. In the same way all of the world terrorist activities can be seen with various traits of above said type as a mixture.

4.2.5 CAUSES OF TERRORISM

The causes of terrorism are as numerous as their types are. Many thinkers have tried to analyse the reasons of aggression and anger among human beings but no single theory can boast of fully look into the problem. Robert Ted Gurr has called it as the result of difference between value expectations and value capabilities. Karl Marx viewed it as the outcome of economic exploitation of have-nots by the haves. Fanon see it as the result of wrongs done by the expansionists and colonialists.

But still no theory has been able to clearly provide the concrete causes of terrorism especially international terrorism. International terrorism having very wide area of operations and variety of individuals along with their mindsets is a tedious task to be analyzed. But one can broadly categories the causes of terrorism as under:

1. **Colonialism:** - Some of the major terrorist outfits owe their struggle to the colonialism and expansionist activities. The brutal suppression, physical torture and dehumanizing that was unleashed during the years

of colonialism has caused many outfits to rise up in arms against colonial powers. The violent freedom movements became the ultimate tactics in the absence of legitimate political participation.

2. **Fundamentalism:** - Religious fundamentalism is one of the major causes of terrorism since long. Most of the terrorist activities in the present world today are some way connected to fundamentalism. Jews fundamentalism in Palestine, Sikhs fundamentalism in Punjab, Islamic fundamentalism in Chechnya, Iraq, Jammu and Kashmir, Xinxiang all are examples of religious fundamentalism. Samuel Huntington while writing about 'Clash of Civilization' has tried to explain the envious relations between Islamic and Christian world order. The recent disturbance in Iraq is also due to the fundamentalist outfit ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) which proved to be one of the major terrorist and coup activities of the world in present times.
3. **Organised Crime and Drug Trafficking:** - the nexus between terrorist and internationally organised crime and drug-trafficking is also one of the causes of growing terrorism in the world. The distinction between international terrorism and internationally managed crime has become blurred nowadays. Many times to finance the terrorist activities terrorist outfit by themselves generate the money with the help of drugs and human trafficking. Some times drug lords finance the terrorist activities against any particular government. Supply of children as child soldiers is also one of the major businesses of the organised crime outfits. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya, Columbia, Sri Lanka and some other countries are blamed to have organised crime headquarters which also finance the terrorist activities all over the world.
4. **Advances and Availability of Weapons:** - easy access and availability of arms and ammunitions has also caused the rise in terrorist activities in the world over. With the advancement in the technology has made the light weapons with heavy impact available to the users. The new research in chemicals, new engineering in weaponry and remote as well as the computer detonating is largely responsible for the easy use and affordability of arms

and ammunitions. Weapons like AK-47, AK-56, land mines, plastic explosives, RDX etc have helped the terrorist in terrorizing the world with much ease.

5. **Secessionism:** - the problem of nation building has been witnessed by many of the third world countries, but advanced countries are also not immune to this. Some times the dissatisfied group of citizens try to secede from the parent nation and in this process adopt the violent way of terrorism. There are hundreds of examples of this scenario. The Irish republican movement, the movement in Croatians in Yugoslavia, Québec in Canada, Tamil in Sri Lanka, Khalistan in India and Basques in Spain are its prime evidences. The identity crisis and demand for separate homeland are prime movers in this type of terrorist activity.
6. **Modern technology:** - the easy transportation, communication and other types of modern technological marvels have also resulted in the easy terrorist activities. These technological advancements have provided the easy availability of all types of material to any part of the world. The communication technology has been used by the terrorists to remain a step ahead of the security forces. Today no ordinary man can become terrorist. Persons with high education and know how of modern technology are master minds of major terrorist outfits. Take example of Osama Bin Laden who was an engineer. Computers, satellite phones, walkie talkies, cell phones are used by terrorist to plan and coordinate their activities.
7. **Abetment by states:** - under the shadow of collective security open war has become a rare scene. UN and other international agencies are working as the watchdogs in relations among countries. Due to this scrutiny some state have found a way in financing and helping terrorist outfits in enemy state rather than openly coming to war. This secret war against the enemy state is fought with the help of xeno terrorist and by supplying money and weapons to the disgruntled groups in the enemy states. Pakistan for long has been blamed to finance terrorist first in Punjab and then in Kashmir against India. The Taliban government financed the terrorist outfits against the western world.

8. **Economic reasons:** - the rising gap between rich and poor in the developing countries is also major cause of people turning violent. Many ideological terrorist activities and outfits are alive due to the deteriorating conditions of the poor in the developing countries. Dependency theory, Marxian theory etc have proved that whenever there is gap between the rich and poor, the have-nots with resort to violence and terrorist activities. The violent activities of Naxalites in India are infused in the poor people due to their bad economic conditions.
9. **Political Reasons:** - there are many political reasons also behind the rising tide of international terrorism in the world. The fight between developing and developed world is one of the major cause of violence at global level. Developed countries have financed terrorist groups in developing countries to keep them under their control. On the other side developing countries have acted in retaliation and the attacks in developed countries are its examples. USA has waged war against terrorism world over but it is also blamed of supporting many terrorist groups world over to keep check on many nations and their progress.

4.2.6 IMPACT OF TERRORISM

Terrorism has affected the domestic as well as the international relations in ways. First of all, international terrorism has caused a new era of international relations. The global incidents of terror have forced international community for their quest for peace, harmony, brotherhood and coordination. After attack on World Trade Centre international community is aware of the damage that international terrorism can inflict.

Second, due to international terrorism new types of security threats have been created which are covert and sudden. Undeclared threats are aimed at cities, buses, trains, political leaders, social workers and even common people. No one is aloof of dangerous of international terrorism. With the help of modern technology and means of communication and transportation terrorists have attacked on economic and political system of global powers.

Third, the foreign policies of major powers of the world have seen a change after the realization of threat from international terrorism. In early times terrorism was used as a tool of foreign policy by many countries. Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and even some times USA were blamed to use terrorism while supporting the proxy wars in the enemy countries. Wherever direct war was considered dangerous to self interests, these states have supported dissatisfied groups in enemy countries. They have provided them safe sanctuaries, passports, arms, ammunitions, training camps, expert guidance and moral supports. After international war on terrorism these states have become bull's-eye. This has forced many countries to change their foreign policies as per the environment. The American war against terrorism is also the product of international terrorism. After the 9/11 attacks the war was waged by the USA with the helps of NATO forces to eliminate the future possible threat of terrorism. They have stroked in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Libya and in Pakistan to end the rule of terrorist and their supporters. Many other countries have provided support to this war against terrorism of USA. Moreover, the threat of international terrorism has brought some old rival state close to each other. The coalition between Russia and USA to fight international terrorism is one example of these new coalitions. After ignoring for long the activities of terrorist in Pakistan even on the repeated demands of India after 9/11 international community is concerned about the safe heavens of terrorism. Now USA and allies have stroked in Pakistan not on India's demand but due to the possibility of future 9/11. This has caused a coalition between India and USA.

Fourth, thesis of 'clash of civilizations' has also emerged as a result of international terrorism. S P Huntington has propounded this thesis in which he has talked about the struggle between the western world and eastern world. It was more Islamic world against Christian (western) world. Later event proved his thesis true. The joint strikes of USA, England, Australia, Canada and other western countries have proved that the war has been waged against the Islamic nations which were blamed to support the Islamic fundamentalism. The strikes on Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Jordon, Egypt etc were viewed as the part of larger

strategy of eliminating the supporter of Islamic nationalism. The counter strike of ISIS and other outfits in response to these strikes have deteriorated the conditions.

Fifth, due to this, the world has been divided into the western world and eastern world. The Islamic states and Christian states are face to face. The older division of first world, second world and third world has lost its glow in the shadow of this new division. Many third world countries are joining hand with USA in its war on terrorism and some first world countries are remaining aloof of it. The economic division of the world has given way to the religious division.

Sixth, since the emergence of former USSR, the whole western world under the leadership of USA was fighting a proxy and cold war with it. Even after the disintegration of former USSR and birth of Russia this hostility was not done away with. But now international terrorism has attracted the attention of Western world more than the communism of Russia and its allies. Now North Korea, Cuba, Russia, China are not on the hit list of USA but those countries are which are considered the heavens for international terrorism. The coalitions are also being formed between Russia and USA to fight international terrorism. Thus the place once occupied by the communism has been taken by the terrorism.

Seventh, the international terrorism and resulted war against terrorism has caused the change in the regime in Afghanistan and Iraq. After the 9/11 strike, USA forces have struck out the Taliban regime in Afghanistan under the blame of supporting terrorist (Osama Bin Laden). Iraq was attacked under the suspense of hiding the weapons of mass destruction and Osama. Both regimes were changed with the use of heavy force and newly established regimes are still vulnerable to the terrorist outfit for coup.

4.2.7 TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Human rights are relevant to terrorism as concerns both its victims and its perpetrators. The concept of human rights was first expressed in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which established “recognition of the inherent dignity and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.”

The innocent victims of terrorism suffer an attack on their most basic right to live in peace and security. The suspected perpetrators of attacks also have rights, as members of the human family, in the course of their apprehension and prosecution. They have the right not to be subject to torture or other degrading treatment, the right to be presumed innocent until they are deemed guilty of the crime and the right to public trial. The “war on terror” focused human rights issues. The Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, the subsequent declaration of a “global war on terror,” and the rapid development of more stringent counter-terrorism efforts have pitched the issue of human rights and terrorism into high relief. This is true not only in the United States, but in a number of countries who have signed on as partners in a global coalition to crack down on terrorist activity. Indeed, following 9/11 a number of countries that routinely violate the human rights of political prisoners or dissidents found tacit American sanction to expand their repressive practices. The list of such countries is long and includes China, Egypt, Pakistan and Uzbekistan. Western democracies with long records of an essential respect for human rights and institutional checks on excessive state power also took advantage of 9/11 to erode checks on state power and undermine human rights. The Bush Administration, as the author of the “global war on terror” has taken significant steps in this direction. Australia, the UK and European countries have also found advantage in restricting civil liberties for some citizens, and the European Union has been accused by human rights organizations of facilitating the rendition the illegal detention and transport of terrorist suspects to prisons in third countries, and where their torture is all but guaranteed. According to Human Rights Watch, the list of countries who found it to their benefit to use terrorism prevention to “intensify their own crackdown on political opponents, separatists and religious groups,” or to “advance unnecessarily restrictive or punitive policies against refugees, asylum-seekers, and other foreigners” immediately following the 9/11 attacks includes: Australia, Belarus, China, Egypt, Eritrea, India, Israel, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Macedonia, Malaysia, Russia, Syria, the United States, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.

The human cost of terrorism has also been felt in virtually every corner of the

globe. The United Nations has itself suffered tragic human loss as a result of violent terrorist acts. The attack on its offices in Baghdad on 19th August 2003 claimed the lives of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and 21 other men and women, and injured over 150 others, some very seriously. Terrorism clearly has a very real and direct impact on human rights, with devastating consequences for the enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and physical integrity of victims. In addition to these individual costs, terrorism can destabilize Governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, and threaten social and economic development. All of these also have a real impact on the enjoyment of human rights. Security of the individual is a basic human right and the protection of individuals is, accordingly, a fundamental obligation of Government. States therefore have an obligation to ensure the human rights of their nationals and others by taking positive measures to protect them against the threat of terrorist acts and bringing the perpetrators of such acts to justice. In recent years, however, the measures adopted by States to counter-terrorism have themselves often posed serious challenges to human rights and the rule of law. Some States have engaged in torture and other ill-treatment to counter terrorism, while the legal and practical safeguards available to prevent torture, such as regular and independent monitoring of detention centres, have often been disregarded. Other States have returned persons suspected of engaging in terrorist activities to countries where they face a real risk of torture or other serious human rights abuse, thereby violating the international legal obligation. The independence of the judiciary has been undermined, in some places, while the use of exceptional courts to try civilians has had an impact on the effectiveness of regular court systems. Repressive measures have been used to stifle the voices of human rights defenders, journalists, minorities, indigenous groups and civil society. Resources normally allocated to social programmes and development assistance have been diverted to the security sector, affecting the economic, social and cultural rights of many. These practices, particularly when taken together, have a corrosive effect on the rule of law, good governance and human rights. They are also counterproductive to national and international efforts to combat terrorism. Respect for human rights and the rule of law must be the bedrock of

the global fight against terrorism. This requires the development of national counter-terrorism strategies that seek to prevent acts of terrorism, prosecute those responsible for such criminal acts, and promote and protect human rights and the rule of law. It implies measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including the lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, and socio-economic marginalization; to foster the active participation and leadership of civil society; to condemn human rights violations, prohibit them in national law, promptly investigate and prosecute them, and prevent them; and to give due attention to the rights of victims of human rights violations, for instance through restitution and compensation.

4.2.7.1 Impact of Terrorism on Human Rights

Terrorism aims at the very destruction of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It attacks the values that lie at the heart of the UN Charter and other international instruments: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules governing armed conflict and the protection of civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Terrorism has a direct impact on the enjoyment of a number of human rights, in particular the rights to life, liberty and physical integrity. Terrorist acts can destabilize Governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize peace and security, threaten social and economic development, and may especially negatively affect certain groups. All of these have a direct impact on the enjoyment of fundamental human rights. The destructive impact of terrorism on human rights and security has been recognized at the highest level of the United Nations, notably by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the former Commission on Human Rights and the new Human Rights Council. The international community has observed the following impact of terrorism on human rights:

- Threatens the dignity and security of human beings everywhere, endangers or takes innocent lives, creates an environment that destroys the freedom from fear of the people, jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and aims at

the destruction of human rights;

- Has an adverse effect on the establishment of the rule of law, undermines pluralistic civil society, aims at the destruction of the democratic bases of society, and destabilizes legitimately constituted Governments;
- Has links with transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, money-laundering and trafficking in arms, as well as illegal transfers of nuclear, chemical and biological materials, and is linked to the consequent commission of serious crimes such as murder, extortion, kidnapping, assault, hostage-taking and robbery;
- Has adverse consequences for the economic and social development of States, jeopardizes friendly relations among States, and has a pernicious impact on relations of cooperation among States, including cooperation for development; and
- Threatens the territorial integrity and security of States, constitutes a grave violation of the purpose and principles of the United Nations, is a threat to international peace and security, and must be suppressed as an essential element for the maintenance of international peace and security.

International and regional human rights law makes clear that States have both a right and a duty to protect individuals under their jurisdiction from terrorist attacks. This stems from the general duty of States to protect individuals under their jurisdiction against interference in the enjoyment of human rights. More specifically, this duty is recognized as part of States' obligations to ensure respect for the right to life and the right to security. The right to life, which is protected under international and regional human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has been described as "the supreme right". Reason being, without its effective guarantee, all other human rights are meaningless. Therefore, it is an obligation on the part of the State to protect the right to life of every person within its territory and no derogation from this right is permitted, even in times of public emergency. The protection of the right to

life includes an obligation on States to take all appropriate and necessary steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction. As part of this obligation, States must put in place effective criminal justice and law enforcement systems, such as measures to deter the commission of offences and investigate violations where they occur; ensure that those suspected of criminal acts are prosecuted; provide victims with effective remedies; and take other necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations. In addition, international and regional human rights law has recognized that, in specific circumstances, States have a positive obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual or individuals whose life is known or suspected to be at risk from the criminal acts of another individual, which certainly includes terrorists. Also important to highlight is the obligation on States to ensure the personal security of individuals under their jurisdiction where a threat is known or suspected to exist. This, of course, includes terrorist threats. In order to fulfil their obligations under human rights law to protect the life and security of individuals under their jurisdiction, States have a right and a duty to take effective counter-terrorism measures, to prevent and deter future terrorist attacks and to prosecute those that are responsible for carrying out such acts. At the same time, the countering of terrorism poses grave challenges to the protection and promotion of human rights. Therefore as part of States' duty to protect individuals within their jurisdiction, all measures taken to combat terrorism must themselves also comply with States' obligations under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.

4.2.7.2 Counter-Terrorism Strategies and Protection of Human Rights

Since terrorism has a serious impact on a range of fundamental human rights, States have not only a right but a duty to take effective counter-terrorism measures. Effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are complementary and mutually reinforcing objectives which must be pursued together as part of States' duty to protect individuals within their jurisdiction. Terrorism was first addressed at the international level in 1937,

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when the League of Nations prepared the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Since then, the international community has engaged in resolute and swift action in taking measures to condemn terrorism, especially after the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. The UN has adopted thirteen resolutions since the 1960s relating to terrorism, eleven of which emerged prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. With the passage of General Assembly resolution 60/288 in 2006, member States agreed to cooperate in the global effort to eradicate terrorism, while ensuring that measures taken comply with the rule of law and human rights. The Security Council has also committed to this sentiment as demonstrated in resolutions 1373 (2001), 1456 (2003), 1566 (2004), and 1624 (2005). After the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, the UN Security Council acted swiftly to strengthen the legal framework for international cooperation and common approaches to the threat of terrorism in such areas as preventing its financing, reducing the risk that terrorists might acquire weapons of mass destruction and improving cross-border information-sharing by law enforcement authorities. The UN Security Council also established a monitoring body – the Counter-Terrorism Committee – to supervise the implementation of these measures.

Since the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), proliferation of security and counter-terrorism legislation and policy has occurred throughout the world. Most countries, when meeting their obligations to counter terrorism by rushing through legislative and practical measures, have created negative consequences for civil liberties and fundamental human rights.

Besides this, regional approaches have also been developed in the context of the African Union, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Organization of American States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and other organizations.

Through the adoption of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/288, the international community has committed to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as

the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. International Community has also resolved to take measures aimed at addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, and ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. The World Summit Outcome, adopted by the General Assembly in 2005, also considered the question of respect for human rights while countering terrorism and concluded that international cooperation to fight terrorism must be conducted in conformity with international law, including the UN Charter and relevant international conventions and protocols. The General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights have emphasized that States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. Under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, including measures to address terrorism as a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council has undertaken a number of counter-terrorism actions, notably in the form of sanctions against States considered to have links to certain acts of terrorism primarily in the 1990s and later against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, as well as the establishment of committees to monitor the implementation of these sanctions. In 2001, it adopted resolution 1373 (2001), which obliges Member States to take a number of measures to prevent terrorist activities and to criminalize various forms of terrorist actions, and calls on them to take measures that assist and promote cooperation among countries including signing up to international counter-terrorism instruments. Member States are required to report regularly to the Counter-Terrorism Committee on their progress.

In nutshell it can be argued that international terrorism promotes human rights' abuses at global level. The promotion and protection of human rights is an obligation of states and an integral part of the fight against terrorism. Counter-terrorism strategies of the states are required to prevent acts of terrorism,

prosecute those responsible for such criminal acts, and promote and protect human rights and the rule of law. At the outset, it is important to highlight that the vast majority of counter-terrorism measures are adopted on the basis of ordinary legislation. In a limited set of exceptional national circumstances, some restrictions on the enjoyment of certain human rights may be permissible. States can effectively meet their obligations under international law by using the flexibilities built into the international human rights law framework.

4.3 NORTH-SOUTH DYNAMICS IN CHANGING CONTEXT: FROM DEPENDENCE TO INTERDEPENDENCE

- Suneel Kumar

STRUCTURE

4.3.0 Objectives

4.3.1 Introduction

4.3.2 The North-South Gap

4.3.3 Historical Origins of North-South Gap

4.3.4 Demand for New International Economic Order

4.3.5 Strategies to Eradicate North-South Gap

4.3.6 Summing UP

4.3.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- What is meant by North-South gap
- The reasons for North-South gap

- The demand for New International Economic Order to reduce north-south gap
- Other strategies advocated to reduce North-South gap

4.3.1 INTRODUCTION

At the equator, the Earth is divided into two hemispheres – North and South which is an artificial line of demarcation and is meaningless except for use by cartographers to chart distance and location on maps. However, this divide also represents a popular way of describing the inequalities that separate rich and poor states at global level. These two groups are, by and large, located on either side of the equator. This North-South divide generally refers to an economic and political divide of the globe. Life pattern of the people of the North Hemisphere is quite different from the people of the South Hemisphere. The disparity is deep and in many places appears to be growing. The division in power and wealth characterize the North.

4.3.2 THE NORTH-SOUTH GAP

The dominance in power and wealth characterize the North. The North includes rich and industrialized countries of the world located primarily in the Northern Hemisphere including the North America, Europe and developed parts of East Asia. In other words, the North is home to four of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and mostly covers the West and the First World, along with much of the Second World. Economically and politically, the North dominates the international relations. The South designates the less developed countries located primarily in the Southern Hemisphere, made up of Africa, Latin America, and developing Asia including the Middle East.

The South poses both moral and security problems. While poverty and inequality have existed throughout recorded history, today the levels have reached extremes. The poor countries find themselves marginalized, in a subordinate position in the global hierarchy. In the North, 95 percent population has enough food and shelter. As compared to in the South, only 5 percent population has enough food

and shelter. The South also lacks adequate and appropriate technology. It suffers from political instability. The economies of the South are disarticulated. Its foreign exchange earnings depend on primary product exports. From the economic perspective, a big gap exists between the North and the South. Only 30 percent population of the world lives in the developed countries and has the control over the 70 percent of the economic wealth of the world. Opposite to this, the South has control over 30 percent of the economic wealth of the world whereas 70 percent of the world's population lives in these countries. The South serves as a source for raw material for the North.

Countries those become economically developed, also become part of the North, regardless of geographical location. However any other nations which do not qualify for developed status are considered as a part of the South. According to Collier and Ferguson, the South also described as a “zone of turmoil” and an “axis of upheaval” in contrast to the peaceful and democratic North, most of the people in the Global South face chronic poverty amidst war, tyranny, and anarchy. In the poorest countries of the Global South where pre-existing conditions of dictatorships and dismal financial prospects persist, the odds increase that these countries will experience civil wars and armed conflicts with each other. Indeed, more than 90 percent of the inter-state and intra-state conflicts and 90 percent of the casualties in the past 60 years occurred within the South. Democracy has spread rapidly and widely since the 1980s, becoming the preferred mode of governance throughout much of the South as a means of promoting both economic development and peace. Paul Collier points out many South countries lack well-developed domestic market economies based on entrepreneurship and private enterprise.

At least 84 percent of the world's population is poor is both a reflection and cause of these unequally distributed resources. The World Bank differentiates the low-income and low and middle-income, economies in developing countries, whose gross national income (GNI) is an average of 13,141 billion US dollars for each state, from the “high-income” developed countries, which average 39,686 billion US dollar for each state. Among the developed countries, wide variations

in economic performance including the growth and inflation rates, debt burdens, and export prices, and international circumstances such as the availability of oil and other fuels are evident. More than 1,296 million people which comprised at least 20 percent of humanity live in the 49 Least Developed of the Less Developed Countries (LLDCs), where barter of one agricultural good for another rather than money typically is used for economic exchanges. These countries are the very poorest, with little economic growth and rapid population growth. These countries are not emerging or re-emerging to break the chains of their destitution. They are falling behind the other South countries.

A daunting scale of misery and marginalization is thus evident across the South, from which only a fraction of its countries have begun to escape. For most South countries, the future is bleak, and the opportunities and choices most basic to freedom from fear and poverty are unavailable. The aggregate pattern of international relations shows that more than 60 countries today are worse off than they were and are falling ever further behind the levels achieved by the countries in the North. Nearly all the population growth is occurring in the South. The poorest countries are cut off from circulation in the globalized marketplace. The developing countries of the South countries have been unable to evolve an indigenous technology appropriate to their own resources. In fact, they have been dependent on powerful multinational corporations (MNCs) of the North to transfer technical know-how. Research and development expenditures are directed toward solutions of the North's problems, with technological advances seldom meeting the needs of the South. Hence in the information age, technology has not been distributed equally geographically. The lowest density of computer connections to the Internet is in the South.

4.3.3 HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE NORTH-SOUTH GAP

The roots of inequalities between North and South are the result of historical pattern and colonialism. It has been observed that prevailing worldwide conditions are part of a much longer historical pattern. The rules that govern the international politics today were constructed in the treaty of Peace of Westphalia

in 1648 after the Europe's Thirty Years' War. These rules were formulated by the great powers at the time to serve their parochial self-interests in preserving their predominant positions at the top of the global pyramid of power by preventing less-powerful states from joining them. According to Kegley, Jr. and Blanton the origins and persistence of the inequalities of states stem in part from the fact that today's modern global system was initially, and remains, a socially constructed reality by, of, and for the most powerful states. The powerful did not design a global system for equals. The great powers followed the prescription of realist thought to always seek self-advantage. They did not build the global system with an eye to preventing the victimization of the weak and the disadvantaged. Moreover, the industrial revolution in Europe encouraged the colonization. The European countries conquered Asia, Africa and Latin America and the seized their territory for exclusively European gain. All of the independent sovereign states in the Southern Hemisphere were at one time colonies. Hence, inequality between the North and South is a product of this past colonization. Although colonialism has disappeared, yet its effects persist. Economic disparity between the rich North and the poor South is attributed in part to unequal and exploitative relations during the colonial period. Even today the South worries that in the future; even newer forms of great power imperialism might continue to destroy any South hopes for progress. The leadership of the South countries have found that freedom from the colonialism had not translated into autonomy, economic independence and domestic prosperity. This had ultimately led to the conflict between the rich North and the poor South.

4.3.4 NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE AND DEMAND FOR NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

The South also argues that western industrialized and developed countries organized the monetary and multilateral trading systems in a way that could serve their interests only. According to the developing countries, the existing international economic structure is against their interests and this is one of the factors responsible for their backwardness. Thus the end of colonialism had

brought more covert, clever and dangerous technique of exploitation of the developing countries of the South at the hand of developed countries of the North. For the economic independence and development, developing countries have demanded for a fair, just and equitable international economic structure in the form of New International Economic Order(NIEO). The developing countries of the South find following four defects in their relationship with the North:

1. The division of the world into exporters of the primary products and exporters of the manufactures;
2. Adverse terms of trade for the products of the developing countries;
3. Dependence of the developing countries on the developed for finance and;
4. Dependence of the developing countries on the developed for their engine of growth.

Thus due to the defective relationship of developed and developing countries the North-South debate emerged. The North-South debate refers to the process through which the developing and newly independent nations of the third world, predominantly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, engaged the industrialized countries of North America and Western Europe in negotiations over changes to the international economic system during the 1970s.

The developing countries have benefitted from global economic integration. Despite all this, the developing countries of the South have been born into a political economic order with rules they had no voice in creating. In order to gain control over their economic futures, they began coordinating their efforts within the United Nations, where their growing numbers and voting power gave them greater influence than they could otherwise command. After the Second World War, numerous Latin American countries became increasingly frustrated with US trade and tariff policies. At the same time, nationalist movements in Asia and Africa helped lead to widespread decolonization. The UN membership had increased from 51 countries in 1945 to 100 in 1960 and 150 by 1979. The sudden influx of new countries changed the balance of power in the General Assembly in favor of the South. In the 1960s, developing countries also formed a coalition of

the world's poor, the Group of 77(G-77) and used their voting power to convene the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The UNCTAD created a forum through which the third world countries could propose economic policies, engaging the rich and industrially developed countries of the North. The UNCTAD later became a permanent UN organization through which the Global South would express its interests concerning development issues. A decade later, the G-77 having more than 120 member-countries again used its UN numerical majority to push for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) to replace the international economic regime championed by the United States and the other capitalist powers since Second World War. Motivated by the oil-exporting countries' rising bargaining power, the Global South sought to compel the North to abandon practices perceived as perpetuating their dependence.

The term "North-South Dialogue" was used to distinguish this dynamic from the East-West conflict of the Cold War, and to stress the point that development issues were just as pressing as the ideological conflict between communists and capitalists. Several factors increased the willingness of the industrialized nations to negotiate with the South. One was the rising power of oil-producing countries in the Arab world, and another was the US loss in the war in Vietnam, that demonstrated to both the world and the industrialized North that not even wealth and power were enough to guarantee military victory. Both of these issues drew Western attention toward the global balance of economic power.

The dialogue began in a period of relaxed East-West tensions, which meant that the industrialized world could give more attention to issues like development. The Newly Industrializing Economies, meanwhile, believed the entrenched international economic system benefited developed countries at the expense of the developing world. They hoped to facilitate a reorganization of the international economic system to rectify this imbalance. The North-South Dialogue addressed issues pertaining to trade and tariffs, international finance, foreign aid, and the governance of multinational companies and institutions. During the era of détente in the 1970s, when East-West tensions were more relaxed, there was a willingness among industrialized nations to cooperate. Even as détente began to falter in the

mid-1970s, the parties to the North-South Dialogue continued their discussions. In May 1974, the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly was held in which Third World countries secured the passage of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. The resolution essentially calls for:

1. Expanding and diversifying trade, improving productivity and increasing export earnings of the developing countries;
2. Securing stable, remunerative and equitable prices for exported raw materials, and protecting their purchasing power;
3. Reducing or removing tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting the less-developed countries' exports;
4. Increasing the volume and improving the terms of development assistance;
5. Achieving the official development assistance target of 0.7 percent of donor countries' GNP by the end of this decade;
6. Increasing the LDCs' access on favourable terms to world capital markets;
7. Relieving debt burdens of the most seriously affected countries;
8. Giving the Third World a greater voice in the management of international financial institutions and larger access to their resources;
9. Increasing international control and surveillance over the creation and equitable distribution of world liquidity; and
10. Facilitating the process of industrialization in the developing world.

Developed countries of the North rebuffed many of the South's proposals. Nevertheless, in later 1974 General Assembly again reflecting the rolling majority commanded by the developing nations adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the States. Prior to this, in its 25th session, UN General Assembly had declared period between 1st January 1971 and 31st December 1981 as the Second United Nations Development Decade and adopted an International

Development Strategy for this decade. Despite the rejection of the majority of the proposals of the Global South by the Global North, some of the issues that were raised such as debt relief remain on the global agenda. For example in 2003 during the meeting of the World Trade Organization in Cancun, Mexico, the poor countries united to demand major concessions from the wealthy countries, especially with regard to foreign subsidies. In 2008 another step was taken when “Banco del Sur” (Bank of the South) was launched by founding members Brazil and Argentina to compete directly with the World Bank and thereby fund big infrastructure projects through the region’s new oil wealth to go around the North interference.

4.3.5 STRATEGIES TO ERADICATE THE NORTH-SOUTH GAP

With the failure of reform envisioned by the NIEO, the integration of Global South countries into the globalization process may occur according to the rules dictated by the Global North. Hence, South states are looking to take advantage of growing economic interdependence to achieve their development goals through the regional arrangements. They are looking the regional economic arrangements as an approach to close the gap between the North-South. To promote growth through regional economic agreements, in the 1990s the global economy began to subdivide. It created three trade blocs – one in Europe, with the European Union (EU) as its hub; a second in the Americas, with the United States at the centre; and a third in the East, with Japan and China dominant. In recent developments, in the Americas, the Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) aims to emulate NAFTA and create a free-trade zone that includes the United States, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Intent on liberalizing US and Central American markets, the agreement is the first major sub-regional agreement between very unequal trading partners – the combined GDP of Central America is equal to 1 percent of the US GDP. The Mercosur, commonly referred to as the Common Market of the South, is the largest trading bloc in South America which includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile holding associate membership

status. In Asia, the association of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an informal forum created in 1989. This has committed itself to creating a free-trade zone during the next twenty-five years. In addition, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), first established in 1967 by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand and now including Vietnam, agreed to set up a free-trade area. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the largest of twelve regional free-trade areas in the region.

Foreign assistance is also considered as one of the strategies for closing the gap between the South and the North is through the distribution of foreign assistance. It is therefore the Chinese President Hu Jintao in February 2009 had urging the wealthy countries to help the poorest. He had declared that developed countries should assume their responsibilities and obligations, continue to deliver their aid, keep their debt relief commitments, maintain and increase assistance to developing countries and effectively help them maintain financial stability and economic growth. Some foreign aid includes outright grants of money, some include loans at concessional rates, and some also include shared technical expertise. Although most foreign aid is bilateral and hence money flows directly from one country to another, yet an increasing portion is now channelled through global intergovernmental institutions such as the World Bank which termed as multilateral aid. Commonly stated foreign aid goals include not only the reduction of poverty through economic development but also human development, environmental protection, reduced military spending, enhanced economic management, the development of private enterprise, increased power for women, the promotion of democratic governance and human rights, and humanitarian disaster relief and assistance to refugees. However, security objectives have figured prominently as motives of donors' allocations of both economic aid and military assistance. For example, the United States continues to target Israel and Egypt as major recipients to symbolize friendship, maintain a balance of power, and tilt the scales toward peace in the Middle East. Security was also the primary motive behind the doubling of the US foreign assistance budget after the September 11 to provide funds for allies' use in the global war on terrorism. In

the last fifteen years, foreign aid from the rich countries of the North to the poor South has increased. In 2008, North donors gave 119.8 billion US dollars to poor countries of the South.

Many aid donors have become frustrated with the slow growth rates of many of the Global South recipients and have grown impatient and doubtful of the effectiveness of their aid programs, despite strong evidence that foreign aid has made a positive difference. Donors are especially resentful that the countries seeking aid do not value the core Western values of hard work, economic competition, and entrepreneurial creativity believed to be crucial for progress and prosperity. Hence, the donors have grown increasingly insistent on conditionality, or demands that aid recipients must meet to receive assistance. Donors also persist in their habit of making development assistance tied to the donors for their benefit, such as requiring purchases from the donors, even though the World Bank estimates this practice reduces the value of aid by 15 to 30 percent, decreases its efficiency, and violates the same free-market principles that the Global North promotes.

On the other hand, South countries complain that the Global North donors have been promising for the past forty years to allocate 0.7 percent of their gross national product (GNP) to foreign aid, but only a few have kept the promise or even come close. This is true despite the evidence that more assistance does indeed contribute to development when it is designed properly and is delivered in a sustained way to countries with records of improving democratic governance. Recently, however, many Global South leaders have joined Global North critics of foreign aid, interpreting it as an instrument of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism and resenting the conditionality criteria for receiving aid imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral institutions.

The developing countries have long pleaded for trade, not aid to improve their global position. This request for greater trade through reduced barriers has met with success. Number of free-trade agreements between Global South and Global North countries increased to 186, from only 23 in 1990. Indeed, many countries of the Global South have benefited from a virtuous cycle, wherein trade leads to

improved domestic conditions that in turn facilitate trade. In an effort to shore up the global economy and assist the Global South during the economic downturn, at the G-20 summit meeting in London in 2009, global leaders promised 1.1 trillion US dollars in additional loans and guarantees to bail out troubled countries and finance trade. Nonetheless, a North-South divide persists as the North-South gap has not narrowed in the globalization era.

Majority of the South countries have not been able to improve their basic infrastructure. Market access remains difficult because domestic pressure groups in these low-growth Global South countries have lobbied their governments to reduce the imports of other countries' products that compete with their own industries. Moreover, political barriers are also a hindrance for the free trade. The primary danger with this strategy is the potential for foreign investments to lead to foreign control and the erosion of sovereign governments' capacities to regulate the economy within their borders. An additional danger is the probability that the multinational foreign investors will not invest their profits locally but channel them abroad for new investments or disburse them as dividends for their wealthy Global North shareholders.

However, despite the risks, many developing countries have relaxed restrictions in order to attract foreign investors. They have given less emphasis on liberalizing investment restrictions and encouraging open domestic economic competition than on offering tax and cash enticements and opportunities for joint ventures. This has enhanced the flow of capital investments to the Global South. The impact of this new infusion of foreign investments in the developing countries has been substantial due to the relatively small economies of the Global South. It has paved the way for emerging markets to expand their rates of economic development. The developing countries are intensifying their competition for foreign investment capital in order to liberate themselves from dependence and destitution. Foreign direct investment is the leading cause of the shift from farm work to service jobs in Global South. The urban areas of the Global South are lifting millions of people out of poverty while at the same time outsourcing skilled jobs from the Global North.

The prospects for foreign aid, trade and foreign direct investments to the future development of, and relief of poverty in, the Global South depends on its debt management. The World Bank estimates that Global South debt in 2007 exceeded 3,465 billion US dollars. Moreover, the debt-service payments of these countries were equivalent to over 25 percent of their gross national income. This is unsustainable and threatens their economic health and future growth. In an effort to provide debt relief within a framework of poverty reduction, the joint IMF-World Bank Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) coordinated efforts through multilateral organizations and governments to reduce the severe external debt of HIPCs to a level that they could sustain. To provide even further debt relief, a group of developed countries of Global North proposed the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2005. Under this program, four multilateral lending institutions – the International Development Association (IDA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), African Development Fund, and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) – provide 100 percent debt relief on eligible debts owed to them by HIPCs once those countries have completed key structural reforms as required by the HIPC Initiative process and have already received the initial HIPC Initiative assistance. This was partly done out of compassion. However, partially, this was a result of the economic self-interest of the Global North, which sees in debt relief a pragmatic method for preventing an economic collapse that could threaten the entire world economy in the age of interdependent globalization. Yet these reforms may not be as successful as their advocates claim. On the one hand, China and Singapore have enjoyed rapid economic growth without undertaking significant political liberalization. On the other hand, many Global South countries that have implemented economic liberalizing reforms have not experienced growth. Some have even experienced increased hardship, civil conflict, and human rights repression.

4.3.6 SUMMING UP

In nutshell, it can be argued that passing through certain peculiar historical conditions Global South has emerged as a global actor in the international affairs.

After the colonial exploitation a considerable change occurred in the Global South. After the Second World War decolonization took place and the relationships between the Global North and Global South also continued to change. As the Global South emerged as a significant political force it formed various platforms such as G-77 and demanded for a New International Economic Order leading to the North-South debate. In the era of globalization, development of the Global South is certain to depend on the activities of the Global North. The North-South cooperation can contribute to find the solutions to common problems ranging from commercial to environmental and security concerns. Relationship of the Global South and the Global North is remaining dominated by the great powers through the powerful international organizations, such as the United Nations, IMF and the World Bank. However, the increasing global interdependence provides an opportunity for the Global South to exert influence on world politics.

4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE GLOBAL COMMONS

- Suneel Kumar

STRUCTURE

- 4.4.0 Objectives**
- 4.4.1 Introduction**
- 4.4.2 Global Warming**
- 4.4.3 Environment and International Politics**
- 4.4.4 Environmental Degradation and Global Commons**
- 4.4.5 Summing Up**

4.4.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you will be able to understand:

- What is meant by Global Warming
- How environmental issues are played out in contemporary international relations
- How environmental degradation is affecting global commons

4.4.1 INTRODUCTION

Environment is changing constantly at global. Our planet is poised at the brink of a severe environmental crisis. Current environmental problems make the mankind vulnerable to disasters and tragedies at present and in future. Mankind is in a state of planetary emergency, with environmental problems piling up high around us. Environmental issues are harmful aspects of human activity on the biophysical environment. Major current environmental issues include global warming, climate change, pollution, environmental degradation, Ozone depletion, loss of biodiversity, resource depletion, deforestation and desertification. The conservation movement is emphasizing on the protection of endangered species and other ecologically valuable natural areas. Environmental issues are addressed at a regional, national or international level by government organizations.

4.4.2 GLOBAL WARMING

Since the late eighteenth century when the invention of power-driven machinery produced the Industrial Revolution, is caused by an increase in human-made gases leading to gradual rise in Earth's temperature resulting into global warming. The gas molecules, primarily carbon dioxide (CO₂) and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), form the equivalent of a greenhouse roof by trapping heat remitted from Earth that would otherwise escape into outer space. Since 1950, the emissions of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels have climbed steadily and risen fourfold. Additionally, deforestation has contributed to global warming, as it accounts for 17 to 25 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions second only after energy use. As these gases are released into the atmosphere, they have created a greenhouse effect which has caused global temperatures to rise. The average global temperature on the Earth's surface since the late 1800s has increased between 0.4 and 0.8 degree Celsius. According to environment scientists there is a possibility of the enhancement of the average additional global temperature between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees Celsius by 2100. This reflects that the trend of global warming is accelerating. The globe's temperature has been projected to further increase dramatically by 2100 if rapid preventive measures are not taken by the global

community. Although CO₂ is the principal greenhouse gas, concentrations of methane in the atmosphere are growing more rapidly. Methane gas emissions arise from livestock populations, rice cultivation, and the production and transportation of natural gas. Interestingly, the largest concentrations of methane are not in the atmosphere. These are locked in ice, permafrost and coastal marine sediments. This enhances the possibility that warming will cause more methane to be released into the atmosphere, which would then increase global temperatures because of methane's strong warming potential. The human-induced greenhouse gases are at work. The temperature changes relate with level of carbon dioxide. The UN team of hundreds of atmospheric scientists from around the world known as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) first conclusively stated in 1995 its belief that global climate trends are unlikely to be entirely due to natural causes, that humans are to blame for at least part of the problem, and that the consequences are likely to be very harmful and costly in the form of natural disasters, the melting of glaciers and the expansion of water resulting into massive floods, hurricanes and deadly storms and submerges of the areas of low-lying coastal lands especially in Asia and the US Atlantic coast.

4.4.2.1 Depletion of Ozone Layer

Depletion of Ozone layer is a serious environmental concern. Ozone is a pollutant in the lower atmosphere, but in the upper atmosphere. This provides the Earth with a critical layer of protection against the sun's harmful ultraviolet radiation. A marked depletion of the ozone layer has been discovered by the scientists in the form of an "ozone hole" over Antarctica that has grown larger than the continental United States. Scientists have conclusively linked the thinning of the layer to CFCs – a related family of compounds known as halons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), methyl bromide, and other chemicals. Depletion of the ozone layer exposes humans to health hazards of various sorts, particularly skin cancer, and threatens other forms of marine and terrestrial life. Scientists link halons and CFCs to ozone depletion since the early 1970s.

4.4.2.2 Loss of Biodiversity

Global biodiversity is also facing threat due to the environmental degradation. Global biodiversity refers to the Earth's variety of life. This encompasses three basic levels of organization in living systems: genetic diversity, species diversity and ecosystem diversity. Until recently, global attention was focused almost exclusively on preserving species diversity, including old forests, tall grass prairies, wetlands, coastal habitats, and coral reefs. Forests especially tropical forests are important to preserving biodiversity. Reason being, they are home to countless species of animals and plants. According to scientists the global habitat contains between eight and ten million species. Of these, only about 1.5 million have been named and most of them are in the temperate regions of North America, Europe, Russia, and Australia. Destruction of tropical forests, where two-thirds to three-fourths of all species are believed to live, threatens the destruction of much of the world's undiscovered biological diversity and genetic heritage. The globe is relentlessly heading toward major species extinction. Out of the 242,000 plant species which were surveyed by the World Conservation Union, 33,000 are threatened with extinction as a result of clearing land for housing, roads, and industries. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that global warming increases the risk of extinction for almost 70 percent of species with Arctic animals such as the polar bear most likely to die out first.

Since much of the Earth's biological heritage is concentrated in the tropics, the Global South also has a growing concern about protecting its interests in the face of MNCs' efforts to reap profits from the sale of biologically based products. MNCs in the Global North are merchandizing the products derived from plant and animal genes that are the genetic bases for sustained life. Pharmaceutical companies in particular have laid claim to Global South resources. They actively explore plants, microbes, and other living organisms in tropical forests for possible use in prescription drugs. Global South argues that the genetic character of the many species of plants and animals is a part of the global commons and therefore available for commercial use by all for their medical benefit. Biogenetic

engineering threatens to escalate the loss of global diversity. Biological resources including animal and plant species are distributed unevenly in the world. According to the UN, about fifty thousand plant and animal species become extinct each year as the global community wrestles with the ethics of biodiversity preservation and management policies.

4.4.2.3 Deforestation, Desertification and Shortage of Water

Since the 1980s, a dominating trend of deforestation has been noticed at global level. According to the World Resources Institute, over the last eight thousand years half of the forests once covering the Earth have been converted for ranching, farmland, pastures, and other uses. Three-fourths of the world's forests are located in the Global South. Deforestation is occurring most rapidly in the remaining tropical moist forests of the Amazon, West Africa, and parts of Southeast Asia. Destruction of tropical rain forests in such places as Brazil, Indonesia, and Malaysia is a matter of special concern because much of the world's genetic heritage is found in these areas. High population growth rates, industrialization and urbanization have increased pressure to farm forests and marginal land poorly suited to cultivation. This has led to deforestation and desertification. The world is also running out of fresh water. There's water everywhere, of course, but less than three percent of it is fresh, and most of that is locked up in polar ice caps and glaciers, unrecoverable for practical purposes. Lakes, rivers, marshes, aquifers, and atmospheric vapour make up less than one percent of the Earth's total water, and people are already using more than half of the accessible runoff. Water demand and water use in many areas already exceed nature's ability to recharge supplies and demand seems destined to exceed supplies since ground water overdraft and aquifer depletion are expected to increase 18 percent between 1995 and 2025. According to James Canton, by 2025 two out of every three people on the planet will live in a water-stressed area. According to the UN World Water Assessment Programme as the global warming is speeding up the hydrological cycle, mankind is leading towards a global water crisis.

The soil degradation has stripped billions of acres of the Earth's surface from

productive farming. Soil erosion and pollution are problems both in densely populated developing countries and in the more highly developed regions of mechanized industrial agriculture. Global demand for food is projected to double in the next fifty years as urbanization proceeds and income rises. But arable land per capita is shrinking. The threat will surely increase because land degradation is increasing and deforestation continues at about eight thousand square kilometres a year. Indeed, land degradation has reduced agricultural productivity since 1980 by as much as 8.9 percent. In the Global North, reforestation has alleviated some of the danger. This is not the case, however, in many cash-starved Global South countries where the reasons for rapid destruction vary. South American forests, most notably the Amazon, are generally burned for industrial-scale soybean farming or cattle grazing. In Southeast Asia, forests are burned or cut for large-scale planting of palm to obtain the oil that is used in a wide array of products, including cosmetics and food processing. In Africa, individuals hack out small plots for farming. Deforestation is being spurred by the global demand for bio-fuels. Worldwide investment in bio fuels rose from \$5 billion in 1995 to \$38 billion in 2005 and is expected to top \$100 billion by 2010. In Brazil, deforestation roughly doubled in 2008 alone due in part to the dramatic expansion in agriculture aimed at producing farm-grown fuels. While bio fuels such as ethanol are often touted as being eco-friendly, critics point out that ethanol destroys forests, contributes to global warming and inflates food prices. Brazil now ranks fourth in the world in carbon emissions, and most of its emissions come from deforestation.

4.4.3 ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The global attention to the environmental problems commenced during the Cold War era particularly after 1972. In 1972, first international environmental conference, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment which also known as the Stockholm Conference was held and attracted 114 participant countries including China. For policymakers and diplomatic representatives to the United Nations, stressed on the establishment of global administrative entities capable of nurturing environmental solutions into full-fledged environmental regimes. Thus as a result of the Stockholm Conference, the United Nations

Environment Program (UNEP) was created. This is the largest international agency to address the environmental issues. There is an International Union for Conservation of Nature. Before 1972 in the area of international environmental treaties, there were less than thirty-six multilateral environmental treaties. Between the 1972 Stockholm Conference and 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, several hundred bilateral and multilateral environmental treaties were signed.

States gradually began reflecting the concern, long voiced by environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), that environmental issues deserve as much attention as do traditional military related security concerns. The International Union for Conservation of Nature brings together 83 states, 108 government agencies, 766 Non-governmental organizations and 81 international organizations and about 10,000 experts and scientists from countries around the world. At present numerous international non-governmental organizations such as the Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and World Wide Fund for Nature are spreading awareness regarding the environmental issues. Governments formulate environmental policy and enforce environmental law. This is done to differing degrees around the world. Sustainability is the key to prevent or reduce the effect of environmental issues. There is now clear scientific evidence that humanity is living unsustainably, and that an unprecedented collective effort is needed to return human use of natural resources to within sustainable limits. For humans to live sustainably, the Earth's resources must be used at a rate at which they can be replenished. Concerns for the environment have prompted the formation of Green parties, political parties that seek to address environmental issues. Initially these were formed in Australia, New Zealand and Germany but are now present in many other countries.

4.4.4 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, GLOBAL COMMONS AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The 'Global Commons' are those parts of the planet that fall outside the national jurisdictions and to which all the nations have access. The UNs Report of the

Commission on Global Governance lists the following as commons: The atmosphere, Outer space, the oceans beyond national jurisdiction and the related environment and life-support systems that contribute to the support of human life. International law identifies the High Seas, the Atmosphere, the Antarctica and the Outer Space as the four global commons. The global commons are considered as the common heritage of mankind. Resources of interest and value to the welfare of the global community such as tropical rain forests and biodiversity have lately been included among the traditional set of global commons as well. Despite efforts by governments or individuals to establish property rights and other forms of control over most natural resources, the Global Commons have remained an exception. The World Conference on Global Commons was held in 1999 in Japan. In its Tokyo Declaration on Global Commons, the global community sought new directions for proper management of the Global Commons from the perspective of sustainable development.

4.4.4.1 The Oceans (The High Seas)

The oceans that comprise the bulk of the hydrosphere is a classic global commons. The oceanic waters are interspersed by many smaller seas, gulfs, and bays. Most of the freshwater bodies ultimately empty into the ocean and are derived through the Earth's water cycle from ocean waters. The Law of Sea is a body of public international law governing relationships between nations in related to navigational rights, mineral rights and jurisdiction over coastal waters. Apart from being a significant means of transportation, a large proportion of all life on the Earth exists in its ocean, which contains about 300 times the habitable volume of terrestrial habitats. Specific marine habitats include coral reefs, kelp forests, sea grass meadows, tide pools, muddy, sandy and rocky bottoms. At a fundamental level, marine life helps determine the very nature of our planet. Marine life resources provide food especially food fish, medicines, and raw materials.

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has identified several areas of need in managing the global ocean: strengthen national capacities for action, especially in developing countries; improve fisheries management; reinforce

cooperation in semi-enclosed and regional seas; strengthen controls over ocean disposal of hazardous and nuclear wastes; and advance the Law of the Sea. Specific problems identified as in need of attention include rising sea levels; contamination by hazardous chemicals including oil spills; microbiological contamination; ocean acidification; harmful algal blooms; and over-fishing and other over exploitation. Although, there is an international legal framework to govern high seas which include the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 and instruments governed by the International Maritime Organization and UNEP's Regional Seas Conventions to govern the high seas. However, no single international treaty or body addresses pollution and overfishing. In the high seas, bio-prospecting is not regulated by the UNCLOS, and other activities such as deep-sea fishing, mining and research, hydrocarbon exploration and extraction, carbon sequestration and storage, and ocean fertilization are expected to increase as well. A confusing patchwork of sea basin cooperation groupings, regional fisheries management organizations and pollution monitoring agreements is in place. The integrated marine policy of the EU recognizes the need to improve governance of the seas while avoiding treaty congestion. While no unifying treaty or body to manage maritime issues is likely to appear that may lead to greater coherence and cooperation in managing environmental threats.

4.4.4.2 The Atmosphere

The atmosphere is a complex dynamic natural gaseous system that is essential to support life on planet Earth. Main concern for management of the global atmosphere is air pollution, the introduction into the atmosphere of chemicals, and biological materials that cause discomfort, disease, or death to humans, damage other living organisms such as food crops, damage the natural environment. As a result of air pollution, stratospheric depletion of Ozone has long been recognized as a threat to human health as well as to the Earth's ecosystems. Pollution of breathable air is a central problem in the management of the global commons. Pollutants exist in the form of solid particles, liquid droplets and gases. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air

Pollution (CLRTAP) of 1979 is an early international effort to protect and gradually reduce and prevent air pollution. This has been implemented by the European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme (EMEP), directed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).

The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer Montreal Protocol is an international treaty designed to protect the ozone layer by phasing out the production of numerous substances which are responsible for ozone depletion. The treaty was opened for signature on 16th September 1987 and entered into force on 1st January 1989. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international environmental treaty that sets binding obligations on industrialized countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. This prevents potentially harmful anthropogenic interference in the climate system. Acceptance of the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer Montreal Protocol has led to a huge 90 percent reduction since the late 1980s in global atmospheric concentrations of chlorofluorocarbons. The expansion of the ozone regime was made possible by growing scientific evidence and by having an active NGO epistemic community to actively promote the treaty. However, in spite of reductions in CFCs over the past twenty years, the ozone hole over Antarctica continues to expand, and depletion of the protective ozone shield is expected to continue before it begins to regenerate itself. Production of CFCs in the Global North declined sharply in the 1990s as the largest producers and consumers of these ozone-damaging products prepared for their complete phase-out.

However, production in the Global South surged, and increased demand for refrigerators, air conditioners, and other products using CFCs offset the gains realized by stopping production in the Global North. Developed countries agreed to provide aid to help the developing countries adopt CFC alternatives, but they have failed to provide all of the resources promised. Without this support, many in the Global South may not be able to keep their end of the global bargain. Meanwhile, a significant illegal trade in both virgin and recycled CFCs has emerged, threatening to further undermine the positive effects of the ozone

regime. Success at containing ozone depletion has raised hopes that other environmental threats also can be given higher priority than vested financial interests. Forests are critical in preserving the Earth's biodiversity and protecting the atmosphere and land resources. For these reasons, they have been a rising ecological issue on the global agenda. Some rules have emerged to guide international behaviour in the preservation of biodiversity, but issues concerning forests have proven much more difficult to address.

4.4.4.3 The Antarctica

Antarctica is facing rapid environmental degradation due to human pressures such as pollution, and the effects of global warming. At present, the Antarctica Treaty and related agreements, collectively called the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) regulate international relations with respect to Antarctica. Earth's only continent without a native human population. The treaty, entering into force in 1961 and currently having 50 signatory nations, sets aside Antarctica as a scientific preserve, establishes freedom of scientific investigation and bans military activity on this continent.

4.4.4.4 The Outer Space

Management of outer space as a global common has been contentious since the successful launch of the Sputnik satellite by the former Soviet Union on 4th October 1957. There is no clear boundary between Earth's atmosphere and space. Nevertheless there are several standard boundary designations: one that deals with orbital velocity, one that depends on the velocity of charged particles in space, and some that are determined by human factors such as the height at which human blood begins to boil without a pressurized environment. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 provides a basic framework for international space law. It covers the legal use of outer space by nation states. The treaty states that outer space is free for all nation states to explore and is not subject to claims of national sovereignty. It also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space. As of mid-year, 2013 the treaty has been ratified by 102 states and signed by an additional 27 states. Beginning in 1958, outer space has been the subject of

multiple resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly. Of these, more than 50 have concerned the international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space and preventing an arms race in space. Four additional space law treaties have been negotiated and drafted by the UN's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Still, there remain no legal prohibitions against deploying conventional weapons in space and anti-satellite weapons have been successfully tested by the US, USSR and China. The Moon Treaty of 1979 turned the jurisdiction of all heavenly bodies including the orbits around such bodies over to the international community. However, this treaty has not been ratified by any nation that currently practices manned spaceflight.

4.4.5 SUMMING UP

In brief, our planet is facing critical environmental challenges, most importantly climate change and global warming, the depletion of the Ozone layer, and rapid environmental degradation in the Antarctica. The international community acknowledges the need to conserve the global commons for development and human well-being. Thus the international community has adopted a number of conventions and treaties to govern global commons. Antarctica is facing rapid environmental degradation due to human pressures such as pollution, and the effects of global warming. The Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) ensuring the protection of the Antarctica fauna and flora; a multitude of international environmental treaties that administer and protect the atmosphere and deal with the air pollution and atmospheric depletion, like the UNFCCC and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; and the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. The frameworks covering the global commons are complex and fractured. Developing countries face a particular challenge in undertaking expensive environmental impact assessments and monitoring of the global commons. Global South often lacks sophisticated technology to carry out exploitation as well as environmental conservation activities. Moreover, the landlocked developing countries and other geographically disadvantaged countries are also required be

supported to promote their effective participation in the activities related to ocean fisheries, mining and exploration of global commons, as stipulated in the UNCLOS. A global governance regime, under the auspices of the UN can ensure the preservation of the global commons for future generations.

